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INTRODUCTION

Someone I know, more a student of contemporary fashion than I, sometimes describes people dressed in uniformly dark clothing as "slightly retro."
I am not sure of the allusion,I but what I can discern leads me to think that
the Supreme Court's nonretroactivity decisions beginning with Teague v.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., 1974, Yale College, J.D.,
1977, Stanford University. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Columbia

Law School Alumni.
1. See also Edge of Night Life, THE NE v YORKER, Dec. 31, 1990, at 12 ("Just because
you're starting to feel all cozy about New York, don't credit Christmas. In the air theres a
feeling of retro").
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Lane2 are - puns aside - more than just "slightly retro."
The Court's innovation may be stated as follows: For 160 years, Congress empowered federal judges to order state officials to release or retry individuals held in custody in violation of federal law as thosefederal judges, and
not the state officials, interpretedthat law.' In 1989 and 1990, in the absence of
statutory revision,4 the Court announced a series of decisions' holding that
federal judges henceforth may order incarcerated individuals released or retried only if those judges find a violation of federal law not only by their own
lights but also by the lights of all "reasonable" state judges, including the
2. 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).

3. Support for the 160-year figure may be found in, e.g., 1 J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
§ 2.2b, at 6-13 (1988) [hereinafter J. LIEBMAN (Volume 2

CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

will be cited as 2 J. LIEBMAN)]; Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutionsAffecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: FederalRemoval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdictionto Abort State Court Trial,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 806-19 (1965); Peller, In Defense of Habeas Corpus Religitation, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 604-05, 610-34, 643-53, 661-63 (1982). The 160-year figure is
controversial. An alternative figure of 38 years is not. Recent restatements of the view that,
until 1953, but not since, the range of constitutional errors cognizable in habeas corpus (assertedly only errors that deprived criminal courts ofjurisdiction to try the defendant) was narrower
than the range of constitutional errors cognizable generally are, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.
Ct. 1454, 1461-62 (1991); Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform of§ 2254 HabeasPetitions, 18
HoFsTRA L. REv. 1005, 1008-09 (1990); Hoffinann, The Supreme Court'sNew Vision of Federal
Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 165, 176-77, 179 (identifying Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), as watershed case making constitutional errors cognizable on
habeas corpus coextensive with those cognizable on direct appeal); Weisberg, A Great Writ
While it Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 10-11 (1990) (similar). The classic citation is
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus Review for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REv. 441, 463-99 (1963). Among the pre-Brown decisions recognizing the federal
courts' power to remedy unlawful custody on grounds coextensive with the limits of due process
are: Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); McNally
v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Ex parte McCardle, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867); other decisions cited in J. LIEBMAN, supra, § 2.2b, at 7-9 &
nn.8-19.
4. Although Congress has had habeas corpus "reform" legislation before it for years, it has
not seriously modified the Great Writ since the mid-1960s. See generally J. LIEBMAN, supra
note 3, § 2.2b, at 9 & n.23, § 20.2; id. § 2.3 (Supp. 1991); Yackle, The Reagan Administration's
Habeas Corpus Proposals,68 IowA L. REV. 609 (1983). Recently, however, the Bush Administration proposed, and the United States Senate passed, legislation limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction to claims that were not "fully and fairly adjudicated in State proceedings." See Lewis,
Crime Against Justice. How the Bush Crime Bill Will Roll Back Rights, N.Y. Times, July 29,
1991, at A15, col. 1. At the time this Article went to press, similar legislation was pending in
the House of Representatives but had not yet been acted upon. See H.R. 1400, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991). In regard to habeas corpus reform proposals currently before Congress, see infra
notes 145, 320.
5. See Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989); Teague v.
Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). The Court added no important decisions to the Teague line of
cases during the 1990 Term. It did, however, decide an important civil retroactivity case, James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735 (U.S., June 20, 1991), and it granted
certiorari to decide an important post-Teague issue concerning the application in habeas corpus
of two recent eighth amendment decisions, see Stringer v. Black, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991) (granting certiorari on question of retroactivity of Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990), and
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)).
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judges who pronounced and affirmed the applicant's conviction in the first
place.6 In the guise of a series of prudential nonretroactivity holdings, " the
Court has replaced a statute giving every federal judge jurisdiction to remedy
all "custody" that she independently determines to be "in violation of the
Constitution"' with a statute forbidding those judges to remedy custody un6. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217; see Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1265 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the
Court has limited drastically the scope of habeas corpus relief"); Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219,
1225 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority "has finally succeeded in its thinly veiled crusade to
eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus regime;" the Teague doctrine "essentially foreclos[es] habeas
review as an alternative 'avenue of vindication,' overrides Congress' will and leaves federal judicial protection of fundamental constitutional rights during the state criminal process to this
Court upon direct review"); Arkin, The Prisoner'sDilemma: Life in the Lower FederalCourts
After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371, 372 & n.3 (1990) (noting view that "Teague...
sounded the death knell of habeas corpus as a vehicle for the protection of defendants' rights");
Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L
REv. 1731, 1748-49 (1991) ("Teague... sharply diminish[es] the role of federal habeas corpus
courts in defining and protecting constitutional rights"); Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 181 (definition of "new rule" applied by post-Teague decisions "would shield most kinds of constitutional
error in state criminal trials from federal habeas review"); Patchel, The New Habeas,42 HAsTINGS L. 941, 941, 942 (1991) (im
Butler and Parks, the "Court did a little Spring cleaning,
and one thing it finally decided to throw out was federal habeas corpus review of state court
constitutional determinations regarding criminal procedure;" the Court thus "delivered the final blow to... habeas [corpus]" as long understood); Weisberg, supra note 3, at 9 ("in a pair of
decisions handed down this Term, the Supreme Court substantially eviscerated federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction as an instrument for constitutional law"); West, The Supreme Court 1989
Term - Foreword. Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L.REv.43, 58 (1990) (recent decisions "drastically limit the substantive habeas corpus protection provided convicts who are unconstitutionally detained" and constitute "a tragic instance of what began as an exception [to
habeas corpus reliefn quickly swallowing almost in toto the general rule" of relief from unconstitutional incarceration); Recent Developments, The Supreme Court Declines in Fairness Teague v. Lane 109 S. C 1060, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 162, 182 (1990) [hereinafter
Recent Developments] ("The Teague bar may effectively slam the door on most federal review of
state criminal cases and permanently stunt the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence"); The
Supreme Court 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 HARV.L. REV. 129, 316 (1990) (via new
decisions, "the deterrent force of the habeas writ is substantially and unacceptably diminished"); Berger, Supreme Court Review: Little Sympathy for Defendantsin CapitalCases, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at S12 ("if expanded beyond the context of retroactivity, the majority's
approach would overrule the leading case of Brown v. Allen, which calls for habeas courts to
conduct de novo review of [habeas corpus] claims on the law"). For collections of important
constitutional criminal procedure holdings that were announced in habeas corpus cases but that
the Teague doctrine probably would have blocked, see Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1088-89 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Recent Developments,supra at 164 n.4. But cf. Arkin, supra at 392 (reviewing 18
months of lower court litigation under Teague and concluding that "retroactivity analysis plays
a less central role in the disposition of existing habeas corpus petitions than might have been
expected"). Other recent commentary on Teague includes J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 22A.1,
at 85 (Supps. 1989 & 1991); Goldstein, ChippingAway at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced
Habeas CorpusPetitionersBe Able to Seek and Utilize Changesin the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L
& Soc. CHANGE 357 (1990-91); Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress
Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L REv. 183; Powers, State Prisoners'Accessto
FederalHabeas Corpus: RestrictionsIncrease, 25 CuM. L. BuLL. 444 (1989); Richardson &
Mandell, FairnessOver Fortuity: Retroactivity Revisited and Revised, 1989 UTAH L R V. 11
(1989); Note, The Evolution of the Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Searchfor
Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRINI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1128 (1990).
7. See, eg., Teague, 109 S. CL at 1069-78 (plurality opinion).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988); see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985) (recent dis-
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less they can say that all "reasonable" judges in the country would find a
violation.9
For anyone who considers habeas corpus to be an important aspect of the

nation's structure of judicially enforced civil rights and civil liberties, 10 the
Court's jurisdictional innovation is "retro" indeed. It casts a uniformly somber pall over the longstanding right of state prisoners to enlist politically detached judges in assessing the legality of the prisoners' convictions and
sentences, and it comes as close as any other event to encapsulating the Rehn-

quist Court's current fashion of looking darkly upon the rights of individuals
-

especially condemned individuals 1 -

whose liberty has been withdrawn

and whose lives have been placed at risk by state criminal justice systems.12 If
cussion of federal courts' "independent" review obligation in habeas corpus cases). See generally J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 8.4. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court
refused to apply a nonconstitutional prophylactic rule (the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule) in habeas corpus proceedings. Stone accordingly is not an exception to the statement in
the text. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.2b, at 9 n.18, § 25.2.
9. See West, supra note 6, at 58 n.95 (Court's 1990 nonretroactivity decisions "impose[] a
severe and entirely judicial limit on a congressionally mandated writ"). Among the numerous
questions raised by Teague that cannot be addressed fully here, see, e.g., infra notes 14-36 and
accompanying text, is the question of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under article III to
amend a statute that supposedly defines its jurisdiction. Compare Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218,
1224 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning propriety or at least wisdom of what is viewed as
majority's "thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus regime") with Hoffman,
supra note 3, at 177 (because the Court, acting without congressional authorization, dramatically expanded its habeas corpus jurisdiction in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), and Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), Teague Court had all the authority it needed to curtail that jurisdiction and ignore stare decisis). As is true of other cases dating back to the 1960s and increasing
in frequency in the 1970s and 1980s, the Teague line of cases adopts an exceptionally freewheeling approach to the Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction - an approach that proceeds almost
independently of the statute that in theory confers that jurisdiction. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note
3, § 8.2a, at 86 n.6. Recently, for example, in McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), the
Court (i) all but ignored the statute (28 U.S.C. § 2244) and rule (R. Gov. § 2254 CASES IN U.S.
DIST. Crs. 9(b)) that Congress adopted to control the filing of second and successive habeas
corpus petitions and that clearly permitted such petitions as to claims the petitioner did not
previously waive, see J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 26.3, 26.4; (ii) treated the question of the
scope of successive petitions as controlled by the Court's prior cases irrespective of the statute
and rule; and (iii) forbade nearly all successive petitions, including ones raising claims that the
petitioner did not previously waive. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1462-71.
10. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1971) (along
with right to jury trial, habeas corpus deemed sufficient by itself, without need of additional
protections of sort critics of original Constitution sought to have included in a bill of rights, to
guard against all manner of "[a]rbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting...
offenses, and arbitrary punishment upon arbitrary conviction"); Chafee, The Most Important
Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REv. 143 (1952).
11. On the link between the Teague doctrine and capital litigation, see Hoffman, supra
note 3, at 187 ("significant effect[] of the Teague doctrine... in capital cases"); Weisberg, supra
note 3, at 9 ("though we know no motives for Supreme Court cases other than those announced
in the decisions, one can speculate that the Court [in its Teague line of cases] was simply frustrated with the inadequacy of the execution rate of America's death row inmates").
12. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 18-19 (recent habeas corpus innovations part of "desperate[]" search for "explanations and scapegoats for the perennial perception that violent crime is
out of control").
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Warren Burger led "The Counter-Revolution that Wasn't,"1 3 then Teague
reveals William Rehnquist in the vanguard of the Thermidor that is.
There are a number of perspectives from which one could assay the impact of the Court's new criminal nonretroactivity holdings. I can only briefly

assume most of those perspectives here, leaving more comprehensive analysis
for another day.
First, from the standpoint of practical consequences, particularly for the
2500 men and women on death row across the country who form the focus of
this Symposium, 4 the Court's innovation threatens to make close to a legal

irrelevancy of the fact that many or most state capital sentences in this country are meted out in violation of the Constitution. More specifically, the non-

retroactivity doctrine may considerably deflate the existing 40-60% reversal
rate in capital cases" and considerably inflate existing execution rates.

6

13. V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983);
see Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was it Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is it
Really So Prosecution-Oriented?),and Police Investigatory Practices,in id. at 62.
14. Actually, there were 2421 men and 36 women (2457 individuals total) on death row as
of April 24, 1991. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC, DEATH RoW,
U.S.A. 171 (Apr. 24, 1991) [hereinafter DEATH Row, U.S.A.].
15. Counting only published decisions, the federal courts found constitutional error in
40% of the 361 capital judgments of conviction and sentence that those courts finally reviewed
in habeas corpus proceedings between mid-1976 and mid-1991. The constitutional error rate is
46% (of 408 cases) when discoverable unpublished decisions also are counted. See Memorandum to Senator Joseph F. Biden, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee from James S. Liebman (July 15, 1991), reprintedin Statement of John ".
Curtin, Jr., President of the American
Bar Association, and of James S. Liebman, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of
Law and Member, ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, on behalf of the American Bar Association, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
Comm. on the Judiciaryof the US. House orRep. ConcerningFairnessand Efflciency in Habeas
Corpus Adjudication, 102d Cong., 1st Sess (July 17, 1991) appendix [hereinafter ABA Testimony]. During that same 1976-1991 period, the reversal rate in capital cases as a whole was
probably 60% or more. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (between 1976 and
1983, approximately 70% of condemned individuals denied federal habeas corpus relief in district courts prevailed in courts of appeals); U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATics BULLETIN, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 1988, at 8 (July 1989) (hereinafter DE?'T OF
Jus-ncE) (courts overturned 111 death sentences in 1988 compared to 296 individuals sentenced
to death that year); Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and CapitalPunishment, 14 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDuAL RTS. & RESP. 14 (1987) ("Between 1978 and 1983, the
federal courts of appeals decided a total of 41 capital habeas appeals, and... ruled in favor of
the condemned prisoner in 30, or 73.2% of them."); Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death
Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MrCH. L. Rav. 1741, 1792 (1987) (Florida Supreme Court
reversal rate of 47% in capital cases between 1972 and 1984); Dix, Appellate Review of the
Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. LJ.97, 111, 144-45 (1979) (between 1974 and 1979, Georgia Supreme Court reversed conviction or death sentence in 30% of all death cases; comparable
figure for reversals by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals between 1975 and 1979 was 33%);
Greenberg, CapitalPunishmentas a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 918 (1982) (between 1972 and
1982, 60% of convictions or sentences imposed under capital punishment statutes after Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), were reversed after trial; comparable reversal rate for federal
criminal judgments in noncapital cases was 6.5%). Cf Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, Federal
Habeas Corpus and Its Reform" An EmpiricalAnalysis,13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 683 (1982) (just
over 3% of noncapital habeas corpus petitioners in six federal districts obtained total or partial
relief between 1975 and 1977); Faust, Rubenstein & Yackle, The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the FederalHabeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 637, 681
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From the standpoint of Supreme Court practice, the innovation is noteworthy because the Court accomplished it in six decisions,17 in two-thirds of
which 8 - including Teague itself - the determinative issue was not briefed
by the parties or asserted as a basis for decision by the state.19
In addition, the new decisions accomplish a remarkable transformation
from the standpoint of constitutional decisionmaking. Before Teague, habeas
corpus fairly could be described as an adjudicative, quasi- or super-appellate
process in which national courts (mainly the lower federal courts acting as
surrogates for the Supreme Court"M) used adversary procedures to establish
national constitutional policy in the process of reviewing state court convic(1990-91) (rate of reversals of convictions and sentences in noncapital habeas corpus cases in
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York only 3% and 4% for periods 1973-1975 and 1979-1981, respectively). Although state appellate and postconviction decisions, which account for a portion of the exceedingly high posttrial reversal rate for capital
convictions and sentences, are not immediately affected by Teague, they are likely to be affected
in the long run as Teague diminishes the chances that state court conclusions will be reviewed
and rejected in habeas corpus proceedings. See infra notes 328-47 and accompanying text.
16. The annual number of post-Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), nonconsensual
executions in this country is as follows:
0
1973-1978
1
1979
0
1980
0
1981
1982
1
5
1983
1984
21
14
1985
17
1986
23
1987
10
1988
1989
14
1990
16
2
1991 (4 mos.)
DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 14, at 5-7. Recently, the States have been sentencing between
250 and 300 men and women to die each year. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 1.
17. See supra note 5.
18. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989);
Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
19. Compare Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069 (plurality opinion) (concededly "sua sponte consideration of retroactivity" issue) with S. CT.R. 15.1 (respondent's failure "in the briefin opposition" to raise nonjurisdictional defects "bearing on the question of what issues [are] properly...
before the Court if certiorari [is] granted" waives consideration of those defects (emphasis in
original)) and Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I question
the propriety of making such an important change in the law without briefing or argument")
and id. at 1084, 1086 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's haste to decide an issue not
presented or briefed). In Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990), the Court acknowledged that the nonretroactivity of the legal rule on which a party relies is not a jurisdictional defect.
20. See, e.g., Schiro v. Indiana, 110 S. Ct. 268, 269 (1989) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting
the denial of certiorari); Geagan v. Gavin, 181 F. Supp. 466, 468-69 (D. Mass. 1960) (Wyzanski,
J.), aff'd, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1962); Hazard, Criminal

Justice System: Overview, in 2

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JusTicE

465 (1983).
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tions and sentences. 1 The Teague line of cases has replaced that judicialappellate process with what amounts to an administrative process: State
courts (acting in default by the Supreme Court, given the limits of the Court's
certiorari jurisdiction 2) are delegated the critical day-to-day role in national
constitutional policymaking, subject only to the loosest instructions from the
Supreme Court and the Constitution;2 lower federal courts (acting pursuant

to what amount to nonadversary bureaucratic procedures 24 ) retain only the
minimal supervisory task of reviewing state judicial actions for "reasonableness" 25 and substantial evidence.2 6

The Court's innovation is also worth analyzing from the perspective of
constitutional history. Modem habeas corpus took shape in one of the great
21. See J. LmBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 2.1, 5.2, 7.1b, 26.2, 26.3, 27.1, 28.1 (1988 & Supp.
1991); 2 J. LMBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 30.1, 35.1 (1988 & Supp. 1991); Friedman, A Tate of Two
Habeas, 73 MiNN. L. REv. 247 (1988).
22. See Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 167, 186-87. But cf Spencer v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct.
2276 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (suggesting that at least one
member of the Court interprets Teague as expanding the Court's certiorari obligations on direct

appeal in criminal cases).
23. See generally Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 167, 190-92.
24. See, e.g., R. Goy. § 2254 CASES IN U.S. DIST. CmS. 4 (discussed in J. LMBMAN, supra
note 3, § 15.2).
25. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827 (1990); Saflte v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257,
1260 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988), interpreted in Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982).
Teague's limitation of the federal courts to a "reasonableness" review of state court legal determinations tracks the looser of the two rules that the federal courts use when reviewing the legal
determinations of administrative agencies. See Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 2071, 2091-92 (1990) (distinguishing rule requiring reversal "[hf the
court has a firm conviction that the agency interpretation violates the statute" and rule requiring affirmance, despite a firm conviction of error, as long as "a reasonable person might accept
the agency's view"). The Justice Department has explicitly defended Teague on the ground that
the decision requires the federal courts to pay the same deference to state court interpretations
of constitutional law that the Supreme Court currently requires the federal courts to pay to
administrative agencies' interpretations of their organic statutes. See Statement of Andrew G.
McBride, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the Judiciaryof the US. House of Rep. concerning the
Supreme Court's Decision in Teague v. Lane and the Standard of Review in Federal Habeas
CorpusProceedings,102d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 27, 1991), at 19-20 & n.15 (citing Chevron Inc.,
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Committee, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Descriptively, the Justice Department is accurate: administrative law indeed supplies the only available analogy for
the minimal level of scrutiny of legal determinations that Teague imposes on courts. But that
interpretation is normatively unsatisfying - even bizarre. The justification for requiring a reviewing court to defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of its organic statute is the
agency's comparative advantage as a shaper and interpreter of the statute due to its expertise
and experience in the substantive area and the quasi-legislative duties that the organic act assigns the agency. See Sunstein, supra, at 2085-91, 2096-97. That justification has no application
to the Teague situation, in which the federal courts are required to defer to state judicial bodies
that (i) are less expert and experienced in the interpretation of the relevant federal law, (H) are
no more legislatively empowered than the federal courts, and (iii) were given less, not more,
claim to interpretive supremacy by the controlling organic act (im this case, the Constitution)
than were the federal courts. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377, 385-86,
415-19 (1821); THE FEDERALIsr No. 81, at 486 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1971).
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nationalizing statutes, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,27 enacted during one of
the country's great nationalizing periods, Reconstruction.28 Teague's transfer
of constitutional policymaking authority from the national to the state courts
accordingly is an important step in, and emblematic of, the Court's recent
assault on the nationalizing force, not only of the Habeas Corpus Act, but also
of the fourteenth amendment and federal judicial review pursuant to that
amendment.
The Court's decisions may be most interesting, however, from the standpoint of contemporary legal theory. On one view, the Court's decisions are
simply an instance of its current obsession with democratic decisionmaking: 29
As long as the majestic generalities of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth
amendments remain in the Constitution and apply to the states, judicial decisionmaking in criminal cases necessarily will include constitutional policymaking; as between state and federal judicial policymakers, state judges (so
the Court's credo has it) are democratically preferred to federal judges because
the former are elected or at least are more susceptible to local political controls than are the latter. This justification is troublesome enough given that
the attributes of state and federal judges on which it relies have heretofore
been understood to create strong reasons for preferring federal judicial
policymakers.30
More interesting and more troubling, however, is the linkage that appears
to be developing between the modem Court's democratic theory - exalting
31
"will" (the people's, supposedly) over "reason" (the federal courts', usually)
and an almost Critical Legal Studies attitude towards judicial reasoning
and the judicial function. At the level of practice, for example, the Court's
announcement of these major doctrinal shifts took place (1) without briefing
and argument, 32 (2) in opinions that read as if to say that the presence of five
votes is a sufficient explanation for the outcome, 33 and (3) with no deference at
all to the traditional requirement that judges confine themselves to the issue as
27. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-54
(1988)).

28. See E.

FONER, RECONSTRUCTION

1863-1877, at 276-77, 454-58 (1988).

29. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 61-74 (1989); Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: PoliticalReconstruction, LiberalRecollection, and LitigativelyEnforced Legislative Reform,
76 VA. L. REv. 349, 378-81 (1990).
30. See, eg., Chemerinsky, ParityReconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,
36 UCLA L. REv. 233 (1988); Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. Rnv.
1141, 1179-88 (1988); Neuborne, The Myth ofParity,90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1115-30 (1977).
31. See generally Kahn, Reason and Will in the OriginsofAmerican Constitutionalism,98
YALE L.J. 449, 450-51 (1989).
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. See, e-g., Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990) (announcing "reasonableness" definition of "new rule" without attempting to locate definition in words, history, or logic
of statute or prior decisions); see also Weisberg, supra note 3, at 22-23, 28 ("Court seems unembarrassed at ... [defining "new rules" in terms of] a distinction that law students soon learn to
deconstruct - the conceptually impossible distinction between a ruling that follows ineluctably
from precedent and one which concededly expands precedent - all this in a judicial world
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narrowly framed by the facts of the particular case, rather than as posed by all
imaginably similar cases.' The Court thus dispensed with virtually every procedural and even rhetorical distinction that traditionally has differentiated
judging from legislating.
At the level of substance, moreover, the Court even more clearly has obliterated any legitimate or legitimizing distinction between judges and legislators. Thus, by defining the concept of "new rules of law" so broadly, the
Court insists that virtually every imaginable act on its part of what used to be
called constitutional law-finding or adjudication is exposed instead as an act of
lawmaking or legislation that, as such, deserves merely prospective effect.
Lest the implication be left that it is only federal judges and Justices whose
adjudicative endeavors are legislative acts, the Court has gone on to adopt a
"rational basis" level of habeas corpus review of state judges' decisions that
mimics the level of review traditionally reserved for legislative, as opposed to
judicial, exercises in legalism. If the Court next extends its nonretroactivity
presumption to cases requiring the resolution of so-called "mixed questions of
fact and law,""5 the Court's analysis also will threaten the distinction between
fact-finding and law-interpreting that judges, but not legislators, traditionally
have maintained, and will further legitimate critical attacks on the common
law process of incremental decisionmaking as being nothing more than myriad
decentralized exercises of political power. 6
where courts rarely acknowledge that they do any more than draw ineluctable conclusions from
precedent").
34. In Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990), for example, the Court probably could have
held the principle urged upon it by the petitioner to be "new" under longstanding precedent
defining new "rules" as ones establishing a "clear break" with prior precedent. See Teague v.
Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1070 (1989) (plurality opinion) (paraphrasing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)) (a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States"). For, as interpreted by the Parks majority, the principle urged by the petitioner "contravene[d] well considered precedents," ran against the grain of
"the large majority of federal and state court [decisions] that have rejected challenges to...
instructions similar to that given at [petitioner's] trial," was "difficult to reconcile... with our
long-standing recognition that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and
nonarbitrary," and invited the jury "to make the sentencing decision according to its own
whims or caprice." Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1259, 1261, 1262-63. Butsee infra note 174 (suggesting
thatParksmajority may have mischaracterized petitioner's claim). Instead, the Court went out
of its way itself to break new ground in redefining "new rules" by leaving aside the concededly
revolutionary nature of the principle it took the habeas corpus petitioner to be advocating and
stating that its decision would be the same as to principles with even the most modestly evolutionary potential. Parks, 110 S. CL at 1260 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. at 1217)
(rule is "new" if it departs from any theretofore "'reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions' "); see infra note 227 (contrasting broad language and narrow holding of other postTeague decisions); see also Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for its "undue eagerness to apply the new standard for retroactivity... at the expense
of thoughtful legal analysis" leading to "carelessness" that is especially inappropriate "when a
life is at stake").
35. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. CL 1246, 1252 (1991); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104, 113-15 (1985); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 20.3d.
36. See, eg., infra notes 259-305 and accompanying text.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

(Vol. XVIII:537

Although I hope to say something about these and other implications of
Teague elsewhere, I want here simply to describe and draw out the doctrinal
implications of Teague'sjurisdiction-limiting innovation in all its darkly hued
splendor. In keeping with the subject matter of this Symposium, it also will be
my intention to alert constitutional lawyers - especially those advocating on
behalf of incarcerated and condemned prisoners, those adjudicating their petitions, and those in Congress - to the places at which doctrinal bulwarks remain, or ought to be erected, against the Rehnquist Court's continuing rout of
habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Part I provides an overview of the Court's treatment of nonretroactivity
in the criminal context, then compares that treatment to the Court's divergent
approach to retroactivity in the civil context. Confronting the issues the
Teague doctrine poses in the order courts and advocates are likely to address
them, Part II then discusses whether retroactivity is more properly understood as a threshold issue or a defense; Part III considers what recent or proposed decisions present retroactivity issues because they are "new;" Part IV
considers when cases become "final," hence susceptible to Teague's presumptive rule of nonretroactivity of "new" decisions; Part V examines the two exceptional situations in which new decisions do apply retroactively in cases that
have become final; and Part VI discusses the burden of proving and pleading
the Teague nonretroactivity bar. Following Part VII's discussion of the retroactivity of new rulings that are unfavorable to habeas corpus petitioners, the
Article concludes with an argument for congressional repeal of Teague.
I.
WHAT'S HAPPENING?: AN OVERVIEW OF RETROACTIVITY AND
HABEAS CORPUS BEFORE AND AFTER TEAGUE

This Part provides an overview of the various issues that arise in the process of deciding whether constitutional violations occurring in the course of
state criminal trials are immunized from habeas corpus review by Teague's
nonretroactivity defense. Each of the remaining Parts then addresses those
issues in more detail.
In contrast to new legislative enactments, which generally apply only prospectively, new judicial rulings generally apply retroactively as well as prospectively.37 From time to time, however, the Supreme Court has recognized
37. See, eg., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4736 (U.S., June
20, 1991) (plurality opinion) (practice of according fully retroactive effect to new decision is
"overwhelmingly the norm"); American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984);
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 & n.7 (1982) (quoting Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), and citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442 (1886); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 103 (1801); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (15th ed. 1809)) (" 'general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions' "); Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Processof Time and Law, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 56, 56-57 (1965). See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Hospital Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 468

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1990-91]

ROUT OF HABFAS CORPUS

a "nonretroactivity" defense to claims premised on newly announced judicial
rulings.3 8 According to the Court's judge-made and prudential nonretroactivity doctrine,3 9 certain new rulings disrupt preexisting law so much that they
may not fairly or wisely be applied to cases that commenced - or that
reached some specified stage of the proceedings (for example, trial, direct appeal, or collateral review of a priorludgment) - before the new rule was
adopted.44
(1988). In the minority view of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia, the presumption of
retroactivity of judicial rulings is both conclusive and constitutionally mandated. See JamesB.
Beam Distilling Co., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4740 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); American TruckingAss'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2343 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial
role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be. The very framing of the
issue... whether [a recent] decision... shall 'apply' retroactively - presupposes a view of our
decisions as creatingthe law, as opposed to declaringwhat the law already is" and "is contrary
to th[e] understanding of 'the judicial Power'... [in] U.S. Const., Art. m, § 2, cl. 1" (emphasis
in original)); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co., 59 U.S.LW. at 4739 (plurality opinion)
(treating as open the question whether Court has the power to withhold full retroactivity from a
new decision). But see iaL at 4739 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("in proper cases a
new rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively"); id. at 4740 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (discussing and following "well-settled precedent in which this Court has refused
repeatedly to apply new rules retroactively in civil cases"); American Truckang Co., 110 S. Ct. at
2341-42 (plurality opinion) (although it is only in "relatively rare circumstances where established precedent is overruled... [that] the doctrine of nonretroactivity allows a court to adhere
to past precedent... in order to avoid 'jolting... expectations,'" the Court has "[n]ever held
that nonretroactivity violates the Article I requirement that this Court adjudicate only cases
or controversies"). See generally infra note 96 (raising question whether the majority view in
JamesB. Beam DistillingCo. that either rejects or resists the Court's power to make new rules
nonretroactive can coexist with the Teague doctrine).
38. See J. LEBMAN, supra note 3, § 8.4, at 106 n.23.
39. See, ag., James . Beam DistillingCo., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4736 (plurality opinion) (treating retroactivity as prudential "choice of law" question); American TruckingAss'n, 110 S. Ct. at
2330, 2342 (plurality opinion) (discussing "our retroactivity doctrine" and otherwise suggesting
that retroactivity is matter of judge-made law (emphasis added)); Johnson, 457 U.S. at 542 &
n.1; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249-53 (1969); id. at 268 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"The determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive... is a matter
of [nonstatutory] federal law." American TruckingAss'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2330 (plurality opinion);
accord Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3204 (1990) (per curiam).
40. See, e-g., James B. Beam Distilling C., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4737 (quoting Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)) (justification for nonretroactivity lies "in its appreciation that '[t]he past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaraand that to apply the new rule to parties who relied on the old would offend basic
tion,'
notions ofjustice and fairness"); American TruckingAss'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2342 (plurality opinion)
("The utility of our [non]retroactivity doctrine in cushioning the sometimes inequitable and
disruptive effects of law-changing decisions is clear."); Halstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S.
Ct. 304, 312 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069 (1989); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 297 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965); Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 103
(1801). See generally Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069, 1070-71 (plurality opinion) (collecting prior
retroactivity decisions and listing the various junctures in the trial, appellate, and postconviction proceedings at which the Supreme Court from time to time has drawn the retroactivity/
prospectivity line); Johnson, 457 U.S. at 542-48 (similar); Weisberg, supra note 3, at 22-23 &
nn.68-70 (similar).
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Until recently, the nonretroactivity doctrine was not principally a defense

to habeas corpus relief based upon new rules of constitutional criminal procedure, but rather a defense to relief of any sort based upon any and all types of

new rulings that the Court deemed to be too disruptively novel to be applied
retroactively. Whether the retroactivity issue arose in connection with a new

criminal or civil ruling, a new constitutional or statutory ruling, or a new
substantive or procedural ruling, the Court applied essentially the same test to
determine which persons, if any, whose cases had reached the courts prior to
the adoption of the new rule would have access to that rule.4 If, but only if,
the Court concluded that a recent ruling was "new," i.e., that it "'overul[ed]

clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or... decid[ed] an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed,' -42
the Court was prepared to hold the rule nonretroactive on the basis of a threefactor formula. That "formula... applied whether a case was on direct re-

view or arose in collateral proceedings, [and] involved consideration of [1] the
purpose of the new rule, [2] the extent of reliance on the old rule, and [3] the

effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new
rule."'4 3 Under the Court's longstanding methodology, it typically announced

a new ruling first and thereafter confronted the question whether the ruling
applied retroactively."
45
Starting in the mid-1960s, Justice Harlan, a number of other Justices,

and various commentators 46 began expressing disagreement with the threefactor test for determining the retroactivity of "new rules" -

at least in the

41. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, 110 S. Ct. at 3204 (traditional test applied to determine retroactivity of recent ruling of constitutional civil substantive law); Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 308-10
(traditional test applied to determine retroactivity of recent ruling of statutory civil procedural
law); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1973) (traditional test applied to determine
retroactivity of recent ruling of constitutional civil substantive law; drawing upon retroactivity
decisions rendered in context of prior constitutional criminal procedure rulings); Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (statutory civil substantive law); Linkletter, 381 U.S.
at 622-23 (constitutional criminal procedural law).
42. American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chevron
Oil, 404 U.S. at 106); see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United States Shoe Machinery Corp., 392
U.S. 481, 498 (1968).
43. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1078 (1989) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967)); see, e.g., Id. at
1069 (plurality opinion) (citing cases); Johnson, 457 U.S. at 542-45 (citing cases); Chevron Oil,
404 U.S. at 106-07; Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622-23.
44. See American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2337, 2342 (plurality opinion) (citing cases)
("we have generally considered the question of retroactivity to be a separate problem [from the
merits], one that need not be resolved in the law-changing decision itself"); cases cited infra
notes 147-5 1.
45. See Johnson, 457 U.S. at 545- 47 & nn.9, 10 (citing opinions); Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critiqueand a Proposal, 61 VA.
L. REv. 1557, 1558 & n.3 (1975) (citing authority); Mishkin, supra note 37. But see Schwartz,
Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to ProfessorMishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
719 (1966). See generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1738-49, (reprising some of the
recent history of the nonretroactivity doctrine in the criminal context).
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context of constitutional criminal procedure rulings - and began proposing
alternatives. In a series of constitutional criminal procedure decisions beginning with United States v. Johnson4 7 in 1982 and Shea v. Louisiana4 8 in 1985
and culminating with Griffith v. Kentucky4 9 in 1987, different majorities of the

Supreme Court, following Justice Harlan's earlier dissents, gradually abandoned the retroactivity defense in cases that were pending at trial, on "direct
appeal,""0 or on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court" or that other-

wise were "not yet final at the time the [new] decision was rendered."" 2 In
these decisions, particularly Griffith, a majority of the Court embraced Justice
Harlan's view that the "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to

criminal cases pending on direct review [at the time the new rule was declared]
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." 5 3 The Court accordingly
held that "'a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not
yet final, with no exception for cases in which the rule constitutes a "clear
break" with the past.' "" Notably, however, the Court - still, apparently,

tracking Justice Harlan55 - continued to define a "new rule" as one56 that
either overruled, or at least was not foreshadowed by, prior precedent.
The Court promoted the approach adopted in Griffith and the earlier
cases on the basis of the principle's consistency both with the general pre47. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
48. 470 U.S. 51 (1985).
49. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
50. See, eg., Shea, 470 U.S. at 59; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944 (1989).
52. Shea, 470 U.S. at 56; see, e.g., Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 ("distinguishing between cases
that have become final and those that have not, and... applying new rules retroactively to cases
in the latter category"); Shea, 470 U.S. at 58 (new decision applied retroactively to cases that
had not "become final" when the new decision was announced); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,
650 (1984) (new decision applied retroactively to cases not involving "final convictions").
53. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.

54. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1072 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Griffth, 479
U.S. at 328); accord,eg., Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1109 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989); Nieto V.
Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1989) (recent decision in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984), automatically applies to petitioner's case because case was not "final on appeal" until
after announcement of Waller).
55. Justice Harlan's views on the definition of a "new rule" are not crystal clear, but they
did not diverge nearly as drastically from prevailing retroactivity lore as did his views on the
means of determining whether "new rules," however defined, should be applied retroactively.
See infra note 386 and accompanying text (advocating definition of "new rule" extracted from
Justice Harlan's analysis).
56. See, eg., Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986) (per curiam) (new rule is one that
makes "explicit and substantial break with prior precedent"); United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 549, 551 (1982) (new rule is one that "explicitly overrules a past precedent of this
Court ....

or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases..., or

overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but
which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved").
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sumption of retroactivity5 7 and with the included "common-law rule, recognized in civil and criminal litigation, 'that a change in law will be given effect

while a case is on direct review.'

"58

Among the issues that Griffith implicitly

left for later determination and that the Court in Yates v. Aiken 9 explicitly
identified as open was whether habeas corpus - as to which there assertedly is
no "common-law" retroactivity doctrine to fall back on - would be treated,
for this purpose, as part of the "direct" appellate or quasi-appellate chain of
proceedings that follows a criminal defendant's conviction of a criminal offense.' Also left open was the question whether the Court would apply its
innovations in regard to the retroactivity of new rulings of simultaneously
constitutional, criminal, and procedural law to other kinds of new rulings.
In eleven decisions handed down in 1989, 1990, and 1991,61 the Supreme
Court answered many of these questions. In the first of those decisions

(Teague itself), the Court took up the question whether to extend Griffith's
conclusive presumption of retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal
,procedure to cases then pending in habeas corpus. Still following Justice

Harlan,6 2 a four-person plurality led by Justice O'Connor,6 3 with varying degrees of support from three additional members of the Court," concluded that
a sharp divide should be carved between state "direct" appellate and federal
postconviction proceedings: 6 Whereas Griffith had held that new constitu-

tional rules of criminal procedure always apply retroactively to cases that were
not yet final at the time the new rules were announced, the Teague plurality

concluded that, "[u]nless they fall within [one of two] exception[s] to the gen57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

58. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 543 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965)).
59. 484 U.S. 211, 215-17 (1988).
60. See generally J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 2.1, 5.2, 7.1b, 7.2b, 16.2, 26.1, 27.1, 28.1; 2
J. LIEBMAN supra note 3, § 35.1; supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
61. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735 (U.S., June 20, 1991);
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202 (1990) (per curiam); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2822 (1990); Collins v. Youngblood, J10 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990); American Trucking Ass'n,
Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 109 S.
Ct. 1060 (1989).
62. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1071-76 (plurality opinion) (discussing Justice Harlan's
opinions).
63. Id. at 1069-78 (plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
64. See id. at 1078-79 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1079-82 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Blackmun, J.).
65. Ironically, the same day the Court in Teague refused to treat habeas corpus as an
essentially appellate procedure for retroactivity purposes, a majority of the Court strongly endorsed the quasi-appellate treatment of the writ in the procedural-default context. See Harris v.
Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042-43 (1989) (discussed in J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 9.4, at 66 n.1.1,
§ 24.2d, at 188 n.24, § 24.2e, at 193 n.48 (Supp. 1991)) (giving full effect in habeas corpus to
"adequate and independent state grounds" jurisprudence that the Supreme Court developed to
govern its direct appellate jurisdiction); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789,
4791-92 (U.S., June 24, 1991) (reiterating the applicability to habeas corpus of the "adequate
and independent state grounds" doctrine while cutting back on Harris).
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eral rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable
to cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." 6
In addition, the plurality,6 7 subsequently joined by Justice White in regard to confirmatory dicta, 68 with the remaining four Justices in dissent on the

point,6 9 concluded that the federal courts should treat retroactivity as a
threshold question. Under this approach, a petitioner arguing that a claim in
66. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1079
(White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("regret[ting] the course the Court has taken" and
noting that, "[i]f we are wrong in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes, Congress
can of course correct us," but concluding that Part IV of plurality opinion, which includes the
passage quoted in text, "is an acceptable application in collateral proceedings of the theories
embraced by the Court in cases [such as Giffith] dealing with direct review, and I concur in
that result"); id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Blackmun, J.) ("I
am persuaded that the Court should adopt Justice Harlan's analysis of retroactivity for habeas
corpus cases as well [as] for cases still on direct review."); infra Part V (discussing "exceptions"
to the Teague doctrine).
67. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069-70, 1077-78 (plurality opinion).
68. See, eg., Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (quoting Teague, 109 S.
CL. at 1069 (plurality opinion)) ("[glenerally speaking, '[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a
threshold question!" on which Court must rule before reaching merits; Court does not decide
retroactivity question, however, because state waived nonretroactivity objection); Satmle v.
Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1259-60, 1262-63 (1990) ("[a]s [petitioner] is before us on collateral
review, we must first determine whether the relief sought would create a new rule" because "[ilf
so, we will neither announce nor apply the new rule sought by [the petitioner] unless it would
fall into one of two narrow exceptions;" in process of characterizing rule for which petitioner
contends as "new," however, Court disparages merits of rule as "difficult to reconcile... with
... long-standing" constitutional policies and as designed to "grant the jury the choice to make
the sentencing decision according to its own whims or caprice."); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 110
S. Ct. 2822, 2827 (1990) ("We need not address the significant questions concerning the merits
of petitioner's Caldwell claim on these facts" and "address only whether Caldwell is available to
petitioner as a ground upon which he may seek relief."). The current status of the Teague
plurality view on this question remains in doubt. Although the majority in fact treated retroactivity as a threshold question in Teague and several post-Teague cases, in nearly all those cases
the majority also violated the Court's own rules (S. Cr. M 15.1) and practice (eg., City of
Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (1989)) by denying relief on the basis of a nonjurisdictional defense (see Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. at 2718) that was not raised in a timely
(or any) fashion by the responding party. The Court thus rather obviously chose to treat this
nonjurisdictional matter as if it were a jurisdictional, hence necessarily preliminary and
nonwaiveable, question in order that it could more quickly complete the process of formulating
its new doctrine and entrenching it in the law. Now that the Court has reverted to its usual
practice of treating the concededly nonjurisdictional defense of retroactivity as, like most defenses, waiveable, see id. (state waived nonretroactivity defense by not raising it), it is possible
that the Court also will revert to treating the defense as, like most defenses, a question that
arises only after resolution of the merits of the moving party's claims. The doubt surrounding
the issue is compounded by the absence of any clear statement on the matter by Justice W/hite;
his having recently written one and joined another opinion disavowing the need to treat retroactivity as a threshold question in the civil setting, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59
U.S.L.W. 4735, 4739 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (White, J., concurring in the judgment); American
Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2330, 2336-37, 2342 (1990) (plurality opinion);
and the post-Teague majority's repeated discussion of merits issues even while claiming that the
resolution of the retroactivity issue made resort to the merits inappropriate. See infra notes
174-76 and accompanying text. See generally Arkin, supra note 6, at 398 (detecting postTeague majority's "recognition" in Sawyer "that the extreme [threshold-question] position of
Teague was unworkable from the start").
69. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1090-91 & n.7 (Brenan, J., dissenting in part, joined by Mar-
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her petition is controlled by a recent constitutional criminal procedure deci-

sion would have to establish first, before the court could reach the merits, that
the new decision applied retroactively to the petitioner's case. More conse-

quentially, a petitioner advancing a "new" rule of her own invention almost
never would be able to secure federal habeas corpus consideration on the merits of the proposed rule, on the theory that the hypothetical rule's novelty
precludes its retroactive application to the habeas corpus petitioner and to all
' 70
other prisoners whose cases had progressed beyond the point of "finality
and into federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Later in the 1988 Term in Penry v. Lynaugh, 71 a five-person majority of

the Court extended the reach of the nonretroactivity doctrine announced in
Teague, a noncapital case, to capital proceedings. 72 The following Term, the

same five-person majority made clear not only that it had substantially limited
the range of situations in which "new rules" of constitutional criminal procedure would apply retroactively to cases that had reached the habeas corpus
stage before the new rule was announced to two "narrow exceptions ' 73 but
also that it had drastically broadened the definition of a "new rule." Hence-

forth, "new rules" would consist not only of decisions that overruled, or were
not foreshadowed by, prior holdings74 but also decisions that, while "clearly"
and concededly foreshadowed -

and even "controlled" -

by prior deci-

sions, 75 did not reach the only outcome that "reasonable" jurists ineluctably

shall, J.); id. at 1079 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Blackmun, J.).
70. See infra Part IV (defining "finality").
71. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
72. Id. at 2944 ("In our view, the finality concerns underlying Justice Harlan's approach
to retroactivity are applicable in the capital sentencing context, as are the two exceptions to his
general rule of nonretroactivity."); id. at 2963-64 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.). Although the Teague plurality purported to leave for another
day the question whether its new nonretroactivity presumption for cases that had become final
applied in capital proceedings, Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 n.3, the plurality was at pains to reject
Justice Stevens' view, expressed in a separate opinion, that the Teague doctrine did not apply in
capital cases. Id. (disagreeing with id. at 1081 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
As had the four-person plurality in Teague, the five-person majority in Penry ruled on the capital retroactivity question "without the benefit of briefing or oral argument." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at
2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Four justices concluded that the
nonretroactivity presumption for final cases should not apply in capital cases. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Blackmun, J.); Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1081 n.3
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Blackmun, J.).
73. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990); Saffie v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260
(1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1214 (1990).
74. See, e.g., Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069 (denying retroactivity of a rule that would overrule
clear language in a previous case).
75. See, e.g., Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828, 2330 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 8) (neither the
fact "that our earlier Eighth Amendment cases lent general support to the conclusion reached
in [a recent decision] ... nor [the fact].., that state courts 'would have found [that decision] to
be a predictable development in Eighth Amendment law'. . suffices to show that [the new
decision] was not a new rule," nor does the fact that numerous state court decisions had
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had to reach on the basis of prior decisions.76 As a result, a prisoner can
secure relief at the habeas corpus stage only on the basis of legal theories that
are so "airtight" as of the time the case became final that the only conclusion
one could reach about the state judges who theretofore rejected the theories

and affirmed the petitioner's conviction is that those judges acted "unreasonably" or in "bad faith."
At the end of the 1989 Term, therefore, prior to Justice Brennan's resignation, the state of the law with regard to the retroactivity of recent constitutional criminal procedure rulings was as follows: All members of the Court
accepted Justice Harlan's general view that "new rules" should apply retroactively to all individuals whose cases had not become "final" prior to the time
the new rule was adopted.7 7 Seven Justices - Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy - also
accepted Justice Harlan's general view that, save in two exceptional circumstances, "new rules" should not apply retroactively in noncapital cases to individuals whose cases had become "final" prior to the time when the new rule
was adopted.7 Five of these seven Justices - Chief Justice Relnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy - (1) applied this general
approach without exception in capital cases;79 (2) substantially expanded Justice Harlan's"° and other previous definitions of "new rule,""1 drawing within
the definition all rulings with which reasonable minds theretofore might have
differed; 2 (3) significantly contracted Justice Harlan's understanding of the
two exceptional circumstances; 83 and (4) (with the possible exception of Justice White 4) treated retroactivity as necessarily a threshold question. 5 The
remaining two of the seven Justices who generally follow Justice Harlan Justices Blackmun and Stevens, joined in this regard by Justices Brennan and
Marshall - (1) exempted condemned individuals from the post-finality presumption of nonretroactivity;8 6 (2) applied the preexisting definition of "new
rule," namely, overrulings and not-clearly-foreshadowed innovations;17 (3)
"pointed toward" or were "congruent with" the new decision as a matter of state law); Parks,
110 S. Ct. at 1261; Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18.

76. See Sawyer, 110 S. CL at 2827 ("The principle announced in Teague serves to ensure
that gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later
used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered."); Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260
(quoting Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217) ("'The "new rule" principle therefore validates reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are
shown to be contrary to later decisions.' ").
77. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
80. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Part V.
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.

86. See supra note 72.

87. See, eg., Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1222-23 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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read the two exceptions more broadly;" s and (4) preferred to decide the merits
of the constitutional claim first, only thereafter determining whether nonretroactivity poses a defense to relief on any claim that is shown to have merit. 9
Finally, Justices Brennan and Marshall rejected -Justice Harlan's nonretroactivity presumption in regard to cases becoming "final" after a new rule's adoption and adhered in this context to the preexisting three-part analysis of the
purpose and disruptiveness of the new rule and the extent of the States' reliance on the prior rule.9"
In a series of decisions in 1989, 1990, and 1991, the Court considered the
retroactivity of rulings involving something other than constitutional criminal
procedure. 91 For most civil rulings, the Court retains the preexisting (overruling/not-foreshadowed) definition of "new rules" and the preexisting procedure that resolves the merits before addressing retroactivity. 92 Beyond that,
the Court is fragmented: A four-person plurality - ironically, the same four
Justices (Rehnquist, White, .O'Connor, and Kennedy) who are Justice
Harlan's most devoted adherents in the criminal context - reject Justice
Harlan's view that new civil rulings should be treated the same way that he,
88. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2838-39 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
90. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1093-94 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text. As of this writing, Justice Brennan's replacement, Justice
Souter, has not passed on any of these criminal-retroactivity questions. Justice Souter's views
on civil retroactivity coincide with Justice Stevens' views. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 49 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4736 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (plurality opinion); infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
91. The Court variously described the subject of its new nonretroactivity doctrine in the
Griffith-Teague line of cases as "new rules governing criminal procedure," Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 326 (1987), "new rule[s] of constitutional law," Safile v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257,
1258-59 (1990), and "new constitutional rule[s] of criminal procedure," Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1069 (plurality opinion).
92. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3205 (1990) (per curiam) (quoting
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)) (ex post determination of new decision's
retroactivity; recent decision did not announce "new" rule, although it "unquestionably contributed to the development of... [existing] jurisprudence" and extended prior law "beyond the
context in which it had originated," because it "was not revolutionary" and "neither overturned
established precedent nor decided 'an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed' "); American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2330-33 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106) (applying definition of" 'new princi.
ple of law' "as one that" 'overul[es] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or
...decid[es] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed,'"
Court holds that recent ruling is "new" because it "left very little of [a prior] ... line of precedent standing;" balance of equities favors making decision prospective only); see also Hallstrom
v. Tillamook County, 110 S.Ct. 304, 309-12 (1989) (similar application of retroactivity test). In
the Court's most recent civil retroactivity decision, the four Justices who addressed the "new
law" question adhered to the "overruling or not clearly foreshadowed" formulation. James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4739 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 4741-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.
and Kennedy, J.). The six Justices who addressed the order-of-decision question assumed that
the merits determination precedes the retroactivity determination. Id. at 4736 (plurality opinion of Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens, J.); id. at 4739 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at
4741 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and now they, treat new criminal rulings, Le., as automatically retroactive to
nonfinal cases. In the civil context, these Justices instead follow the preexist-

ing three-part approach to retroactivity that they roundly rejected in the criminal context in Teague.9 3
Another group of Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and,
apparently, Souter) apply Harlan's automatic retroactivity rule to nonfinal
cases, thus unifying those Justices' approaches to retroactivity in criminal and
civil prefinality situations.9 4 Justice Scalia understands all new civil - but, for
unexplained reasons, not all new criminal - decisions to be fully retroactive

as a95constitutional imperative under the "judicial Power" language of article

II, except when his vote favoring retroactivity would create a majority for
retroactive application of a decision with which he disagrees, in which case
article HI allows him to vote for nonretroactivity."

93. See JamesB. Beam Distilling Co., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4739 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 4741 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); American TruckingAss'n, 110 S. Ct. at 233132 (plurality opinion); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct at 312; see also American
Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2330-42 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 10607, and Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 n.8, 328) (citations omitted) (new civil rules may be held
nonretroactive upon a balancing of several factors, Le., the new rule's "'prior history,"' its
"'purpose and effect,"' "'whether retrospective operation will further... [the rule's] operation,"' and whether "substantial inequitable results" can be avoided if the rule is "'applied
retroactively;"' accordingly, "conclusion that [a new decision] established a new principle of
law... does not necessarily end the inquiry;" "[a]lthough the Court has recently determined
that new rules of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct
review or not yet final, retroactivity of decisions in the civil context 'continues to be governed by
the standard"' of Chevron Oil; plurality rejects Justice Harlan's view and refuses to "extend the
retroactivity doctrine recently adopted in the criminal sphere to our civil cases").
94. See JamesB. Beam DistillingCo., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4740 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment); American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2349-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf.
JamesB. Beam DistillingCo., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4736, 4739 (plurality opinion of Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, J.) (reserving question whether there are rare circumstances in which a new civil
decision may be denied retroactive application).
95. U.S. CONST. art. m, §§ 1, 2.
96. See James B. Beam Distilling Co., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4740 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2343-44 (Scalia, 3., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia believes that, as far as judges are concerned, the meaning of the Constitution, hence its interpretation by courts, never changes (save when the document is formally
amended) and, accordingly, that the Court's current interpretation of the Constitution must, by
assumption, be the right and only interpretation. See id. Justice Scalia also believes that, when
the language of a statute is clear, the statute should be interpreted to mean precisely what it
says. See, eg., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987). Taken together, these
two views ought to forbid the result in Teague. For the habeas corpus statute says, quite unequivocally, that the courts "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person... in custody in violation of the Constitution," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which, in
Justice Scalia's view, can only mean the Constitution as the Court currently interprets it. Yet,
applying the Constitution as the Court then interpreted it was exactly what the Court refused to
do (with Justice Scalia's concurrence) in Teague, Parks, and especially Butler. See infra note
108. In theory, at least, the Court's post-Teague (and post-Parksand Butler) forays into the
civil retroactivity field create the possibility that the Court, as composed prior to Justice Marshall's retirement, would overrule Teague. That result would consist not only with the dissenting views of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in Parksand Butler, but also with Justice
Scalia's, Justice Marshall's, and Justice Blackmun's automatic retroactivity position in JamesB.
Beam Distilling Co. and with Justice Souter's hint of an objection to Teague in the same case.
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On one civil-retroactivity issue that arose during 1989 and 1990, the two
groups of multiple Justices arrayed above (minus Justice Souter, who was not

then on the Court) literally switched places. Thus, in regard to the retroactivity of the habeas corpus-focused, hence "civil" and statutory,97 rule of Teague

itself, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy
(joined by Justice Scalia), sub silentio, applied a conclusive presumption of retroactivity, 98 notwithstanding Teague's forthright acknowledgement that its

ruling was (1) not argued - hence, apparently, was not foreseen or, probably,
foreseeable - by the parties, (2) was explicitly designed to shatter the Court's

twenty-five-year-old paradigm for addressing retroactivity in identical contexts, and (3) overruled scores of prior decisions. 99 In dissent, Justices Bren-

nan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens resisted Teague's retroactivity on the
ground that the losers could not fairly be punished for having reasonably relied on the law's being different thetetofore.' °
Except in the case of new habeas corpus rulings, therefore, the retroactivity rules applied by the Court's various members as of the end of the 1990
Term were as follows: Justices Blackmun and Stevens apply the same set of

rules in all (criminal and civil, constitutional and statutory, procedural and
substantive) contexts, except where that rule would work to deprive a capitally
sentenced prisoner of the retroactive benefit of a new rule. Both Justices apply

the traditional definition of "new rules;" endorse Justice Harlan's view that
new rules always, or almost always, apply in cases not yet "final" when the
new rule was adopted but, with two exceptions, never apply in cases that were
"final" when the new rule Was announced; and take up the retroactivity ques-

tion only after resolving the merits. Justice Souter follows a similar line in the
See James B. Beam Distilling Co., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4740 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment,
joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 4738 (plurality opinion of Souter, J.) (strongly
adhering to the principle that all litigants in court should be treated the same in regard to the
applicable law and noting that Teague breaks the equal-treatment rule by according "disparate
treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in collateral
proceedings").
97. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.1 (habeas corpus long recognized as a "civil" proceeding governed by federal statute). CompareTeague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 n.2 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (claiming that special nonretroactivity presumption for cases then pending in
habeas corpus is not a rule of habeas corpus but instead a (civil?, criminal?) rule of retroactivity)
with id. at 1079 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that Teague doctrine is
an exercise "in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes").
98. The Court applied Teague retroactively in the following cases, each of which was
pending before the Supreme Court at the time the Court decided Teague: Sawyer v. Smith, 110
S. Ct. 2822 (1990); Saffle v.,Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212
(1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989) (per

curiam).
99. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069-75. For discussion of the almost classically legislative,
hence presumptively nonretroactive(see supra note 37 and accompanying text) character of the
Teague line of cases, see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
100. See Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Butler, 110 S. Ct. at
1221 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) ("The Court's application of the new doctrine of retroactivity
adopted in Teague to bar relief on a claim that was litigated prior to that decision is contrary to
basic fairness." (emphasis in original)); infra note 480 and accompanying text.
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civil context but has not yet ruled on a case in the criminal context."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White O'Connor, and Kennedy apply a different set of rules in the criminal and civil context. In criminal cases,
these four Justices (joined in this regard by Justice Scalia) adopt Justice
Harlan's principles of automatic retroactivity in prefinal cases and presumptive nonretroactivity in final cases. In the process, however, they greatly expand the definition of "new rules" to include rulings with which a reasonable
jurist previously might have disagreed, contract Justice Harlan's description of
at least one of the two exceptions to the principle of nonretroactivity in "final"
cases, and (with the possible exception of Justice White" 2 ) address retroactivity before resolving the merits.10 3 By contrast, in the civil context, these Justices adhere to the traditional definition of "new rules" (only overrulings and
not-clearly-foreshadowed decisions), reject Justice Harlan's principle that new
rules automatically apply in not-yet-final cases, adhere instead to the traditional three-part test of retroactivity that they overruled in the criminal context in Teague, and address retroactivity after resolving the merits. 1°0
Justices Brennan and Marshall favor almost the mirror image of the rules
advocated by the preceding set of Justices. Thus, they adopt Justice Harlan's
principle that "new" civil (as well as criminal) rules apply retroactively in all
nonfinal cases (defining "new rules" in the traditional way), while rejecting
Harlan's principle that new criminal rules are presumptively nonretroactive in
"final" cases in favor of the application of the traditional three-part test of
retroactivity in that context.10 s In all settings, Justices Brennan and Marshall
would address retroactivity only after resolving the merits.10
Finally, Justice Scalia considers it an inherent constraint on the article III
"judicial Power" that judges limit their decisions to stating what the law is
and (apparently) always has been, such that there are no "new" judge-made
rules and the nonretroactivity issue never arises. 0 7 For reasons not yet explained, however, Justice Scalia does consider the "new law" concept to have
meaning in the habeas corpus context. In that context, he assumes That virtually all recent rulings are "new" and, on the Harlan model, presumptively
101. See supra notes 69, 87, 90, 94 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun reaches
these conclusions based in part on Justice Scalia's view that article III of the Constitution denies
federal judges the authority to make their decisions nonretroactive. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4740 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Stevens and Souter reach
these conclusions based on an understanding of the retroactivity doctrine as prudential, rather
than constitutional. See id. at 4736 (plurality opinion). Justices Stevens and Souter thus contemplate the possibility of rare instances in which nonretroactive treatment might be appropriate. See id. at 4736, 4739.
102. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
107. See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoted supra note 37).
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nonretroactive. 10 8 Despite his principled position that a nonretroactivity doc-

trine cannot coexist with article III, Justice Scalia frequently has formed the
fifth and decisive vote (along with the Chief Justice and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Kennedy) to permit the execution of capitally sentenced
habeas corpus petitioners to proceed on the ground that the nonretroactivity

defense neutralizes any constitutional violations in their cases."
Still unresolved are the questions of how the Court will treat the retroactivity of (1) new statutory criminal law and procedure rulings ° (an issue on
108. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2964 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Of course, habeas corpus is a creature of statute, and Congress, if it chose,
could forbid the courts to apply recent decisions in that context even if, as Justice Scalia contends is always the case, those decisions were not "new." But, as yet, Congress has not limited
the decisions that apply in habeas corpus cases save by requiring that those decisions construe
the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). In the
absence of any viable statutory explanation, therefore, Justice Scalia cannot coherently claim
both that article III forbids the courts to announce "new" rules of a sort that do not apply
retroactively and that virtually all recent rulings announced by the courts are "new" such that
they do not apply retroactively to cases then pending in habeas corpus proceedings. See supra
note 96 (discussing incompatibility of Justice Scalia's recent views on civil retroactivity and his
slightly earlier views on criminal, postfinality retroactivity).
109. Justice Scalia supplied the decisive vote to deny relief on nonretroactivity grounds in
three criminal retroactivity decisions during the 1989 Term. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2822 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
110. The lower courts currently are grappling with the question of the retroactivity of
three recent decisions that arose in the criminal context but do not involve simultaneously constitutional and procedural issues.
First is the retroactivity of the Court's statutory criminal procedure decision in Gomez v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), which held that magistrates have no authority under the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1988), to select juries in criminal trials. Compare,
eg., United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 226-27 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (dicta) (Gomez ought
to apply retroactively to collateral attacks on convictions by juries selected with magistrates
presiding), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991) with Gilberti v. United
States, 917 F.2d 92, 94-96 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying Teague doctrine and concluding that Gomez
created a "new rule" and thus does not apply retroactively to section 2255 petitioners whose
cases became final before Gomez was announced) and United States v. Rubio, 722 F. Supp. 77,
84-85 (D. Del. 1989) (Gomez should not apply retroactively), aff'd 908 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 523 (1990) and other decisions discussed in Arldn, supra note 6, at 404-07
(same). Without explaining why or acknowledging the civil statutory-procedural analogue in,
for example, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 309-10 (1989) (applying the
Court's pre-Teague analysis), all these decisions and the available commentary on them assume
that Teague provides the only retroactivity analysis that might apply. See Arkin, supra note 6,
at 404-07.
Second is the retroactivity of the Court's statutory substantive criminal law decision in
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), which limited the scope of the federal mail
fraud statute. Although the lower courts agree that McNally applies retroactively, see Lomelo
v. United States, 891 F.2d 1512, 1515 n.8 (11th Cir. 1990) (collecting decisions), they arrive at
that conclusion by different routes. Some courts essentially apply Teague's first exception. See,
e.g., id. (quoting Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989)) (McNally applies
retroactively to collateral attack on conviction because" 'a decision which determines that Congress never intended certain conduct to fall within the proscription of a criminal statute must
necessarily be retroactive' "); see cases cited infra note 440. Other courts assume automatic
retroactivity because Teague "addresses only the retroactivity of 'new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure' and thus does not control" cases involving new rules of substantive crimi-
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which the Court may have spit 4-4 last Term' 1); (2) new constitutional substantive criminal law rulings (a question on which the substance-focused first
exception to the Teague rule seems to bear heavily'1 2); (3) new criminal rul-

ings of all sorts that federal prisoners seek to enforce in postconviction proceedings brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255;

13

and (4) new rulings of all

sorts that litigants seek to enforce in collateral attacks on civil judgments (a
subject on which an important 1989 civil rights decision reveals a five-person
majority prepared to abandon the nonretroactivity scruples to which the same
five Justices religiously adhere in the criminal collateral-attack context

14).

As fraught with dissensus as the Court appears to be, there is a high
nal law. Callahan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 232 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1816 (1990).
Third is the question of the retroactivity of the Supreme Court's habeas corpus - hence
civil and either statutory or prudential - ruling in Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989)
(discussed supra note 65). Here again, agreement on retroactivity, see Shafer v. Stratton, 906
F.2d 506, 509 n.3 (10th Cir.) (assuming retroactive application of Harris), cerL denied, 111 S.
Ct. 393 (1990); Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1272 n.8 (lth Cir.), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct.
96 (1990), masks disagreement on the retroactivity analysis that applies. Compare Young v.
Herring, 917 F.2d 858, 862 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990) (Harrisrule is retroactive because it is quasijurisdictional and is not a rule of criminalprocedure), aff'd en banc on othergrounds, No. 894095 (5th Cir. July 26, 1991) (U.S. App. LEXIS 16661) and Peterson v. Scully, 896 F.2d 661,
664 (2d Cir.) (presuming retroactivity because rule of Harris, although probably "new" inasmuch as it "changes the law in this Circuit," is not a "new rule of constitutionally required
procedure" and hence is not subject to Teague doctrine (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3301 (1990) with Hill v. McMackin, 893 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Teague rule
but holding that Harrisis not "new" because it was "dictated by the [direct-appeal] precedent"
that Harrisfor the first time applied in a habeas corpus context). In Coleman v. Thompson, 59
U.S.L.W. 4789, 4793 (U.S., June 24, 1991), the Supreme Court all but overruled Harris- in
the process assuming that both Harrisand the rule with which the Court replaced Harrisapply
retroactively. See id. at 4793, 4794-95; see also Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir.
1991) (supplemental opinion) (per curiam) (circuit's new treatment of exhaustion question applies retroactively; Teague inapplicable because its federalism policy has no bearing on new
rules that federal courts impose on themselves); Hostler v. Groves, 912 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 &
n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases) (Supreme Court's new rule governing timing of filing of notices
of appeal by incarcerated prisoners, Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). applies retroactively), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1074 (1991); infra note 480.
111. See United States v. France, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991) (aff'g by an equally divided Court
United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1989)).
112. See infra notes 435-47 and accompanying text.
113. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. C. 1060, 1084 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (plurality leaves unsettled question of Teague doctrine's application to collateral review of federalprisoner convictions and sentences under section 2255); see also infra note 422 and accompanying text.
114. Observers inclined to believe that the Court's agenda in regard to the expansion and
contraction of underlying constitutional and statutory rights drives its treatment of such matters as finality and the breadth of collateral review will find considerable support in the juxtaposition of Teague and the Court's decision a few months later in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180
(1989). Compare, that is, Teague's substantial narrowing of the capacity of parties subject to
the loss of liberty or even life
to attack judgments collaterally on the basis of constitutional
rights of a sort that are not much in favor with the Court these days to Martin's dramatic
expansion of the capacity of nonpartiessubject to the loss of merely monetary interests to attack
judgments collaterally on the basis of reverse discrimination rights of a sort that are very much
in vogue with the Court these days. See, eg., City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson, Co., 109 S. Ct.
706 (1989).
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degree of consensus that favors retroactivity in all but one area. Thus, in cases
not "final" as of the date of the new decision, all of the Justices accord automatic retroactivity to all new constitutionalcriminalprocedure1 " and (probably) all constitutional criminal law.1 16 A majority (Marshall, Blackmun,

Stevens, Scalia, and Souter) treats all new rules of civil law the same. 117 Finally, the remaining members of the Court (Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and
Kennedy) agree that most new civil rulings (and all new civil habeas corpus

rulings) are automatically retroactive, thus replacing the majority's principle
of automatic retroactivity of all decisions with a rule of automatic retroactivity
of most decisions and presumptive retroactivity of the small number of decisions that can be said to be truly novel."' Therefore, only in regard to the

application of new constitutional criminal procedure rulings to cases theretofore pending in federal habeas corpus proceedings (and perhaps in other postappellate proceedings) has the consensus in favor of requiring or presuming
retroactivity lapsed. 119
There are four dimensions along which the Court's general - and gener-

ous - approach to retroactivity differs from its parsimonious analysis of the
retroactivity of new constitutional-criminal-procedure rulings in cases already
"final" at the time of the new ruling:

(1) Is retroactivity a threshold question? Generally, never. In the criminal/
postfinality context, always.120
(2) What constitutes a "new rule?" Generally, only rulings that overrule or
were not "foreshadowed" by prior decisions. In the criminal/postfinality
context, all rulings with which at least one "reasonable" jurist might
21
1

disagree.

115. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 435-47 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
120. Compare American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2337 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("In the civil arena, we have generally considered the question of retroactivity to
be a separate problem [from the merits], one that need not be resolved in the law-changing
decision itself.") and Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 309-10 (1989) (same, by
implication) with Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane,
109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069 (1989)) (dicta) ("[g]enerally speaking, '[r]etroactivity is properly treated
as a threshold question'" on which court must rule before reaching merits) and Teague, 109 S.
Ct. at 1069-70, 1077-78 (because of unfairness of giving relief to party first asking Court to
enforce meritorious new rule while thereafter denying relief to similarly situated parties on
nonretroactivity grounds, horizontal equity requires courts to decide retroactivity first and deny
relief to all parties proceeding on the basis of a nonretroactive new rule).
121. Compare James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4739 (U.S.,
June 20, 1991) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (decision is not "new" if it was "reasonably foreseeable") and Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3205 (1990) (per curiam)
(quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)) (although recent decision "unquestionably contributed to the development of... [existing] jurisprudence" and extended prior
law "beyond the context in which it had originated," that decision is not new rule because it
"was not revolutionary" and "neither overturned established precedent nor decided 'an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed' ") and American Trucking
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(3) Do new rules apply in later cases? Generally, always, or almost always.

In the criminal/postfinality context, almost never.122
(4) How important are reliance interests? Generally, they are decisive. In the
criminal/postfinality context, they are not important at all.123
Overall, the trend on the Court is clear if not yet fully realized: The
prudential and judge-made nonretroactivity doctrine is receding in importance

as the Court comes to treat most of its rulings as either presumptively or conclusively law-finding, not law-making, endeavors. Rather than an increase in
judge-made prudence, the nonretroactivity doctrine's recrudescence in the
Teague line of cases accordingly reflects an anomalous, judge-made revision of

the Court's statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction. 24 In the ironic guise of a set
of rulings cautioning against judicial law-making, the Teague Court has
remade Congress' habeas corpus law, transforming nonretroactivity from a
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07) (in civil
context, ruling is "new" only if it" 'overul[es] clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied, or... decid[es] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed;"' ruling in question is new because it "left very little of [a prior] ... line of precedent
standing;" only relevance of fact that prior precedent provided state courts with "good reason"
to rule differently from the way the Supreme Court ultimately ruled is on balancing of equities
that applies to decide whether new rules nonetheless should be given retroactive effect) with
Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827-28 (1990) (quoting Brief for Petitioner 8 and Butler v.
McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)) (neither fact "that our earlier Eighth Amendment
cases lent general support to the conclusion reached in [recent decision] ... nor [fact] ...that
state courts 'would have found [that decision] to be a predictable development in Eighth
Amendment law,' suffices to show that [the new decision] was not a new rule;" rather, rule is
new if it is contrary to any "'reasonable, good-faith interpretations of [prior] precedents made
by state courts even though th[ose interpretations] are shown to be contrary to later
decisions' ").

122. Compare JamesB. Beam DistillingCo., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4736, 4739 (plurality opinion)
(new rulings always or almost always apply retroactively) and id. at 4740 (Blackmun, L,concurring in the judgment) (new rulings always apply retroactively) and id. (Scalia, ., concurring
in the judgment) (same) and American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2331-32 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07) ("new" civil rules may be held retroactive upon a balancing of the new rule's "'prior history,'" its "'purpose and effect,' ".'whether retrospective
operation will further... [the rule's] operation,'" and whether "substantial inequitable results"
can be avoided if the rule is "'applied retroactively;"' accordingly, "conclusion that [a new
decision] established a new principle of law... does not necessarily end the inquiry') and
Halstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 312 (same) with Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1213, 1218 (1990)
(new criminal rule not retroactive unless "within one of the two recognized exceptions").
123. CompareJames B. Beam DistillingCo., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4737 (plurality opinion) (only
reason not to give new decisions full retroactivity is that "apply[ing] the new rule to parties who
relied on the old would offend basic notions of justice and fairness") and American Trucking
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2334 (plurality opinion) (citing and reviewing numerous civil decisions) ("In
determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively, this Court has consistently
given great weight to the reliance interests of all parties affected by changes in the law.") and
Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 312 (new decision retroactive because "petitioners [were] on notice")
with American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2341 (plurality opinion) (recent criminal retroactivity cases "implicitly rejected the rationale of our prior retroactivity doctrine: that new decisions
should not be applied retroactively so as to frustrate the expectations of parties who had justifiably relied on prior law") and Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 8) (fact
"that state courts 'would have found [that decision] to be a predictable development in Eighth
Amendment law'" does not forestall nonretroactivity decision).
124. See supra notes 9, 39, 96, 108.
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narrow, three-factor defense,125 applicable to all recent rulings upon which all
manner of litigants rely in all types of proceedings, to a far broader defense
applicable only to simultaneous or recent constitutional criminal procedure
rulings that incarcerated prisoners press in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 126 Given its breadth (in this single context), the nonretroactivity doctrine must now take its place not only among, but at the head of, the list of
1 27
defenses to the Great Writ.

Although clearly broad, the new habeas corpus defense is not yet fully
developed. As the lower federal courts immediately noted, "Teague left much
of the [nonretroactivity] restriction's content in doubt."'' 2 Four factors fueled
those doubts: (1) the fragmented Court in Teague,1 2 9 (2) the terseness of the
concurring opinions, 130 (3) the fact that the Court's first application of the new
doctrine in Penry v. Lynaugh seemed to deprive the doctrine of much of its
sting,13 1 and (4) the lack of briefing and oral argument on retroactivity in both
Teague and Penry,132 which prevented the Court from taking its usual cognizance of the objections and unclarities that the parties undoubtedly would
have identified. Although the 1990 decisions in Butler v. McKellar,1 33 Saffle v.
Parks,13 and Sawyer v. Smith 131 clarified Teague to a degree - and restored
its original sting and then some - commentators and lower courts still ex-

press deep confusion at the contours of the new doctrine, which, as the Court
36
itself acknowledges, remain "difficult" to discern.1
125. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
126. On the question whether new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure apply
retroactively in state postconviction proceedings as a matter of federal law, see infra note 428.
Even if such rules do not apply in state postconviction proceedings as a matter offederal law,
they may do so as a matter of state law. But cf. Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 422-23 (Iowa
1991) (assuming without analysis that Teague doctrine controls retroactivity in state courts of
new decision announced while case before court was pending in state postconviction
proceedings).
127. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, Part IV & § 22A.1 (Supps. 1989 & 1991).
128. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd sub nom.
Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
129. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 64.
131. The three Justices who joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Teague vigorously dissented from the Court's first application of Teague, in Penry, also authored by
O'Connor. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2965 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.) ("It is rare that a
principle of law as significant as that in Teague is adopted and gutted in the same Term.").
132. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra note 466 and accompanying text.
133. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
134. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
135. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
136. See, eg., Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260 ("it is ... difficult ... to determine whether we
announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases"); Butler, 110 S.
Ct. at 1216 (same); id. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because constitutional interpretation
is an evolutionary process, the analytical distinction between legal rules 'prevailing' at the time
of conviction and 'new' legal rules is far from sharp."); Williams v. Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472,
482 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (post-Butler,Parks, and Sawyer decision concluding that "[t]he Supreme
Court... has yet to provide a clear framework for demarcating the line between a closely
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By adopting a far reaching defense to habeas corpus relief in this abrupt
manner - no doubt in hopes of simplifying, hence speeding up, habeas corpus
and particularly capital habeas corpus proceedings 137 _ the Court in fact has
committed itself and the lower federal courts to lengthy exegesis of a number
of difficult concepts included within Teague's nonretroactivity defense.
Among the questions Teague presents are: (1) Is the retroactivity of the rule
of law on which the petitioner relies (and, if so, should it be) a "threshold
question" 131 that arises before the courts decide whether the rule is in fact the
law and whether it applies to the petitioner?1 39 (2) What constitutes a "new
(3) At what point do cases
constitutional rule[] of criminal procedure?""
'4
1
hence subject to the Teague nonretroactivity doctrine? (4)
"become final,"
What are the boundaries of the two exceptions to the nonretroactivity bar that
Teague identifies?14 2 (5) Who bears the burden of pleading and proving the
Teague defense, and under what circumstances does the state waive that defense? 4 3 (6) Does the Teague doctrine limit the retroactivity of new decisions
analogous application of facts to constitutional principle and an application that is susceptible
to debate among reasonable minds"); Arkin, supra note 6, at 390 n159, 399-400 (meaning of
Teague doctrine "remain[s] murky;" "new rule" definitions are "unusually oblique," "do not
appear to be mutually consistent," "give little direction to lower courts," and are in "disarray);
Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 180 (definitional issues posed by Teague's reformulation of "new
rule" concept "are, to say the least, questions without easy answers"); Weisberg, supra note 3, at
22-23, 28 (discussing post-Teague Court's "conceptually impossible distinction between ruling
that follows ineluctably from precedent and one which concededly expands precedent"). A
number of lower federal courts have reacted to the bewildering questions posed by Teague by
ignoring the decision and applying prior law. See, eg., Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549,
552 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (20 months after Teague, court assesses retroactivity of a prior circuit
decision without citing or following analysis in Teague); United States v. Dawes, 895 F.2d 1581,
1582 (10th Cir. 1990) (over 11 months after Teague, court applies traditional three-part retroactivity test to determine retroactivity of new circuit decision governing constitutional attacks on
self-representation by defendants who were incompletely informed about dangers of representing themselves); Allen v. Bunnell, 891 F.2d 736, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (nine
months after Teague, court applies traditional test to determine retroactivity of new circuit
decision governing constitutional attacks on voluntariness of guilty pleas by defendants who
were incompletely informed about parole consequences); Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819,
825-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (more than eight months after Teague, court applies traditional test to
determine retroactivity of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3219
(1990). Although one might read three of the four cases just cited for the proposition that the
preexisting retroactivity rules apply to new circuit rulings, as opposed to Supreme Court decisions, Teague contemplates no such distinction. See Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1357-58
(8th Cir. 1990) (applying Teague to determine retroactivity of recent circuit decision), cerL
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991).
137. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 9.
138. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069 (1989) (plurality opinion).
139. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
140. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075 (plurality opinion).
141. Id.
142. Compareid. at 1073, 1075, 1076-77 (plurality opinion) (apparently narrow definition
of exceptions) with id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (broader definition).
143. Compare supra note 19 and accompanying text (habeas corpus respondents given
benefit of nonretroactivity defense they never raised in Supreme Court or any other court) with
Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (refusing to address nonretroactivity defense waived by state) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2963 (1989) (Stevens, L, concur-
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(including Teague itself'") that cut back on habeas corpus and constitutional

relief? And (7) should Congress adopt Justice White's suggestion that it revise
the nonretroactivity doctrine that the Court adopted in Teague?"'5 The remainder of this Article takes up each of these questions in turn.
II.
WHAT'S FIRST?: THE PROPER ORDER OF THE RETROACTIVITY
AND MERITS DECISIONS

Until it decided Teague, the Court treated retroactivity in all (including
criminal/postfinality) contexts as an issue that a court appropriately could resolve either in the decision announcing a new rule but after the new rule was

announced 1" or in a subsequent decision in which the court was asked to
ring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Blackmun, J.) ("Nor am I at all sure that courts
should decide the retroactivity issue if it was not raised below.") and Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct.
1518, 1519 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the state "did not raise nonretroactivity as a defense to respondent's claim for federal habeas relief, and that defense therefore should be
deemed waived.... I see no reason to give [the state] a second opportunity to inteject the issue
of nonretroactivity as a defense") and id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (expressing "concern as to
whether petitioner should be permitted to raise the retroactivity issue at this point in the
proceedings").
144. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
145. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[i]f we are
wrong in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes, Congress can of course correct
us"). Numerous proposals calling for congressional modification of Teague have been made.
See, eg., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TOWARD A MORE
JUST AND EFFECTXVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES, A REPORT
CONTAINING THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS AND RELATED MATERIALS FROM THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S PROJECT ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS
3, 159-65 (I. Robbins, Project Director 1990) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA]
("The standard for determining whether changes in federal constitutional law should apply
retroactively [in capital cases] should be whether failure to apply the new law would undermine
the accuracy of either the guilt or the sentencing determination."); LITIGATION SECTION,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION REGARDING REFORM OF HABEAS CORPUS IN
CAPITAL CASES 4 (Adopted Sept. 9, 1989) (endorsing return to pre-Teague three-factor approach for guilt-phase claims in capital cases but recommending that all new constitutional
rules affecting sentencing phase of capital cases be made fully retroactive); Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Statement ConcerningLegislative Modification ofFederalHabeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 848 (1989) (all legal changes should be made
fully retroactive in capital cases); Hoffman, supra note 6. See generally Berger, Justice Delayed
orJustice Denied?- A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death PenaltyHabeas Corpus,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1674-713 (1990) (summarizing various proposals); Goldstein, Expediting the FederalHabeas Corpus Review Process in Capital Cases: An Examination of Recent
Proposals, 19 CAPITAL U.L. Rv. 599, 618, 640-45 (1990) (similar). During the last session of
Congress, one proposed revision passed the entire Senate but failed in Conference Committee, S.
1970, 101st Cong. § 2267, 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S6807 (1990) (all decisions nonretroactivc
unless they establish "fundamental rights"); another version-passed the Senate Judiciary Committee but was amended on the floor of the Senate, S. 1757, 101st Cong. § 2262, 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. S13474 (1989) (adopted by Sen. Jud. Comm. as S. 1970, § 2267) (repealing Teague
and returning retroactivity analysis to pre-Teague three-factor standard); and a similar version
passed the House Judiciary Committee, but failed on the floor of the House. H.R. 5269, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 1305 (1990); see infra note 320.
146. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-
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apply retroactively the rule announced in the previous decision.1 47 In the latter situation, when a litigant relied upon a possibly "new" rule adopted in an
earlier decision, the court typically decided the retroactivity issue first. Only if
the court deemed the rule announced in the prior decision to be retroactive
14
would the court apply the rule to the litigant's case. 1
88 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142-43 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 403 U.S. 471, 490
(1972); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-09 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 523 n.22 (1968).
147. See, eg., Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (addressing retroactivity of Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (addressing retroactivity of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979)); Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975)
(addressing retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)); Robinson
v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973) (addressing retroactivity of Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970));
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (addressing retroactivity of United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967)); other authority cited in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069 (1989) (plurality opinion). Resolving the retroactivity question in the opinion in which the new rule was
announced has permitted the Court to choose between three approaches to retroactivity: complete retroactivity, which gives the benefit of the new ruling to all litigants with the same claim,
see, eg., WVitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523 n.22; complete prospectivity, which denies the benefit of
the new ruling to all litigants whose claims arose prior to the new decision, including the litigant
in whose case the new rule was announced, see, eg., Northern Pzpeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at
88; and selective prospectivity, which gives the benefit of the new ruling only to the litigant who
secured the ruling but denies the benefit to some or all other litigants with pre-existing claims,
see, eg., Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 490. Resolving the retroactivity question in a subsequent opinion typically has meant that the Court gave the litigant in the case establishing the new principle
the benefit of that principle, thus limiting its choices in the later case to either complete or
selective retroactivity. See, eg., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735,
4741 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("the usual course in cases before this
Court is to apply the rule announced to the parties in the case" and to leave for later the
question of the rule's applicability to other litigants). But cf.American Trucking Ass'n, Inc.v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 297-98 (1987) (announcing rule and remanding case for determination
of rule's retroactivity). During the last 25 years, the Court typically used the complete retroactivity and, less often, the complete prospectivity approaches in civil cases, while frequently
resorting to the selective retroactivity approach in constitutional-criminal-procedure cases. See
James B. Beam DistillingCo., 59 U.S.L.W. at 4736-37 (plurality opinion). Recently, a plurality
of the Court concluded that selective retroactivity is never appropriate in the civil and criminal/
prefinality contexts because selective retroactivity inequitably treats similarly situated litigants
differently. See id. at 4737-38 (plurality opinion); id. at 4739 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment). Because another plurality of the Court believes that complete retroactivity is required in all civil and criminal/prefinality contexts, see id. at 4740 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), a majority of the Court now rejects
the use of selective retroactivity in those contexts. Locating the Teague doctrine in this line-up
of retroactivity options is difficult. Clearly, rulings falling within one of the two Teague exceptions are given complete retroactivity. All other new rulings are "completely" retroactive vis-avis prisoners whose cases were not final when the ruling was announced and "completely" prospective vis-a-vis prisoners whose cases were final when the ruling was announced - adding up
to "selective" retroactivity when all prisoners are considered. See id. at 4738 (plurality opinion)
("With respect to retroactivity in criminal cases, there remains even now the disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in collateral
proceedings."). As discussed infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text resolving the merits
before the retroactivity question neither precludes the possibility of complete prospectivity nor
compels selective retroactivity. Rather, that order of proceedings simply places the moving
party in the usual position of having both to win her affirmative case and, thereafter, to defeat
the opposing party's defenses in order to prevail.
148. See, ag., Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. at 920 (citing cases).
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Taken together, the Court's traditional approach to nonretroactivity

called for resolution: first, of the question whether a proposed rule of law is
constitutionally compelled; second (either in the same or in a subsequent
case), whether any new rule adopted is retroactive; and third (in a subsequent

case) whether the new rule applies to the same or some other set of facts. The
Court in fact continues to follow this practice in assessing the retroactivity of
new rulings in the civil 14 9 - and apparently also in the criminal/prefinality' 5 0
- sphere; and a plurality of Justices (the Teague plurality plus Justice White

and minus Justice Scalia 51) explicitly said recently that it intends to continue
following the established practice in civil situations."2
Four of the concurring and dissenting Justices in Teague continue as well

to support this general approach to the timing of retroactivity adjudication in
criminal/postfinality situations on the theory that any other approach would
require the Court to render what would amount to advisory opinions on the
merits of putative rules of constitutional criminal procedure in order to determine whether the putative rule is "new," and, if so, whether or not it should
apply retroactively.' 3 Two of those Justices, however, endorsed - and the
other two expressed support for - the proposition that a habeas corpus deci149. In James B. Beam Distilling Co., a majority of the Court assumed that the merits
determination precedes the retroactivity determination in the civil context. 59 U.S.L.W. at
4737 (plurality opinion); id. at 4739 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 4741
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202 (1990) (per
curiam); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989).
150. See, eg., Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (after-the-fact resolution of criminal/
prefinality retroactivity of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)); Truesdale v. Aiken, 480
U.S. 527 (1987) (after-the-fact resolution of criminal/prefinality retroactivity of Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (after-the-fact
resolution of criminal/prefinality retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
151. Because Justice Scalia believes there is no such thing as a nonretroactive new civil
decision, see supra notes 96, 106-08 and accompanying text, he has had no cause to express a
view on the question of when the nonretroactivity veI non of a new civil ruling ought to be
confronted. His concern for proper exercises of the "the Judicial power," however, should
make him particularly sensitive to avoiding advisory opinions. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc.
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
152. See American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2330, 2337, 2342 (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.) (Court's "practice [is] to
abstain from deciding" the retroactivity of civil ruling at time of rendering ruling; "[i]n the civil
arena, we have generally considered the question of retroactivity to be a separate problem [from
the merits], one that need not be resolved in the law-changing decision itself;" acknowledging
that unfairness potentially may arise from announcing new rule in one litigant's case then deciding that the rule is not to be applied retroactively to other, similarly situated litigants, plurality
seeks to avoid - and sees no advisory opinion impediment to avoiding - the problem by
permitting courts to announce a new rule in a case brought by a party whom the courts thereafter decide not to give the retroactive benefit of the new rule).
153. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1079 & n.2 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Blackmun, J.) (endorsing approach in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 523 n.22 (1968)); id. at 1091 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.)(endorsing
analysis in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934, 2958-59 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 2963 & n.* (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Blackmun, J.).
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sion recognizing a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure ordinarily
ought to address the question of the new rule's retroactivity in that same decision, but only after the court finds for the petitioner on the merits and concludes that the rule of decision is "new."154
The four-person Teague plurality also endorsed the proposition that "the
question 'of whether a decision [announcing a new rule should] be given prospective or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of [that] decision.' "155
But the plurality - in what potentially is its most radical conclusion, 15 6 and
the one that suffered most from the absence of briefing and oral argument1 57
- opined that the question of the retroactivity of any putatively "new" rule
for which a petitioner contends must be addressed as a "threshold" matter,
before the Court decides whether the rule the petitioner proposes isthe law:
Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question .... Thus,
before deciding whether [the rule the petitioner seeks is constitutionally compelled], we should ask whether such a rule would be applied
retroactively to the case at issue.
Were we to recognize the [substantive constitutional] rule urged
by petitioner in this case, we would have to give petitioner the benefit
of that new rule even though it would not be applied retroactively to
others similarly situated....
If there were no other way to avoid rendering advisory opinions, we might well agree that the inequitable treatment described
above is "an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of
decisionmaking." But there is a more principled way of dealing with
the problem. We can simply refuse to announce a new rule in a
given case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the
defendant in the case and to all others similarly situated.... We
therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt
today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle
to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those
154. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, I., concurring in thejudgment) ("The plural-

ity states that retroactivity questions ought to be decided at the same time a new rule of criminal
procedure is announced.... I agree that this should be the approach in most instances.'); id. at

1090-91 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing support for requirement that courts "decide

the retroactivity question at the same time that [they] decide[] the merits issue!" (emphasis in
original)); accordPenry, 109 S. Ct. at 2963 & n.* (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Stevens, along with Justice Souter, would probably limit the court's options,

when it reaches the retroactivity question, to either complete retroactivity or complete prospec-

tivity. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4737-38 (U.S., June 20,
1991) (plurality opinion); supra note 147.

64).

155. Teague, 109 S. Ct at 1069-70 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mishkin, supra note 37, at
156. See Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 182; infra notes 196-98 and accompanying
text.
157. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral
review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated.15 8

In the plurality's view, therefore, the proper order of decision is, first, whether
the rule the petitioner advocates - assuming, hypothetically, the rule were
adopted - would be "new" and, if so, retroactive; second (in the same case), if

the rule would not be new or, if new, would apply retroactively, should the
rule in fact be adopted; and third (in a later case), should that rule apply in
other situations.

Although the Teague plurality is at pains to call its discussion of the
proper order of decision a "hold[ing]," albeit an "implicit" one,15 9 that discussion is not a holding. Rather, four Justices expressly rejected the plurality's
approach 6" and a fifth Justice (White) expressed no view. Indeed, upon ex-

haustively reviewing the various opinions in Teague and the later decision in

Penry, 61 the Fifth Circuit concluded en bane in Sawyer v. Butler162 that "[ilt

158. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069-70, 1077-78 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)) (emphasis in original).
159. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1078 (plurality opinion) (quoted in text accompanying supra
note 158).
160. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Blackmun, J.)("When a criminal defendant claims that a procedural error tainted his conviction, an
appellate court often decides whether error occurred before deciding whether that error requires
reversal or should be classified as harmless. I would follow a parallel approach in cases raising
novel questions of constitutional law on collateral review, first determining whether the trial
process violated any of the petitioner's constitutional rights and then deciding whether the petitioner is entitled to relief... [in view of the] factors relating to retroactivity .... ."); id. at 109091 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); accord Peary v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934, 2963 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is neither logical
nor prudent to consider a rule's retroactive application before the rule itself is articulated."); id.
at 2963 n.* ("I believe that retroactivity should not be considered until after a right is
established").
161. In Penry, the entire Court subscribed to a passage in Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Teague, stating that "[u]nder Teague, we address the retroactivity issue as a threshold matter
because Penry is before us on collateral review." 109 S. Ct. at 2952. In a separate opinion,
however, two Justices explicitly rejected the proposition that the question of a new rule's retroactivity should precede the question of a new rule's existence. Id. at 2963 & n.* (quoted in
supra note 160). There are three additional reasons why Penry did not resolve the order-ofdecision question addressed here: First, a majority of the Court concluded that the only potentially "new" rule discussed in the case actually was not new, and therefore raised no retroactivity question. Id. at 2944-52. In other words, the order that the Court decided retroactivity and
the merits made no difference to the outcome of the case. Second, the potentially "new" rule at
issue in Penry arguably arose in a case decided the previous term. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487
U.S. 164, 183-85 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Blackmun, J.); id.
at 189-200 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.) (discussed in Penry,
109 S. Ct. at 2945, 2947-49). Consequently, the "threshold" question in Penry arguably was
not the retroactivity of some potentially "new" rule that might, hypothetically, have been announced in that case, but instead the retroactivity of an actual rule of decision promulgated in
an earlier decision. On that question - whether a court in a subsequent case should determine
a prior decision's retroactivity before determining whether the prior decision applies to the facts
of the case now before the court - there was virtual unanimity in Teague. See supra note 154
and accompanying text. Hence, the unanimity in Penry is neither surprising nor interesting.
Third, the Court in Penry based its retroactivity ruling on an extensive discussion of the underlying constitutional merits of the proposed rule, thus belying the view that it could have decided
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remains unclear... whether Teague necessarily operates as a threshold barrier
preempting full analysis of the constitutional claims asserted" and accordingly
saw its way clear to address the merits of the proposed constitutional rule
before addressing retroactivity.1 63 By affirming the Fifth Circuit's judgment in
Sawyer (and much of its analysis) without criticizing the Fifth Circuit's foray
into the merits, the Supreme Court did little to clarify the question, although
members of the four-person Teague plurality did manage to secure a fifth vote
(Justice White's) in favor of two post-Teague opinions containing dicta endorsing the Teague plurality's "threshold question" doctrine. 164
There are eight reasons why the proper order of decision ought to be,
first, the question whether a proposed rule of law is constitutionally compelled, second (in the same case), whether any rule adopted is retroactive; and
third (in a later case), whether the rule, if retroactive, applies to other facts.
First, the contrary view advocated by the Teague plurality has little support either in prior case law (separate and dissenting opinions included) or in
16 5
the scholarly literature.
Second, the injunction against "rendering advisory opinions" - which
the retroactivity of that rule without first adjudicating the rule's nature and scope. See Penry,
109 S. Ct. at 2943-47.
162. 881 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub nora. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
163. Id.; see also infra note 176. But see Hill v. Black, 932 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1991)
(assuming that the retroactivity issue must be decided first, but denying relief on other grounds
without finally resolving the retroactivity question); Hardy v. Wigginton, 922 F.2d 294, 296-98
(6th Cir. 1990) (Teague requires resolution of the retroactivity issue prior to resolution of the
merits); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir. 1989) (Teague "requirfes] courts
to determine retroactivity as a threshold matter in cases on collateral review"), cert denied, 110

S. Ct 3301 (1990).
164. See supra note 68. Treating the "threshold question" issue as open even afterSavyer

are, e.g., IFEDERAL
REPORTS 502-06

COURTS STUDY CoMb rrrEE, ,VORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMITEE

(1990); Arkin, supra note 6, at 395-99. Butsee Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6,

at 1746 & n.69.
165. In both places where the Teague plurality addresses the order-of-decision question, it

cites a single decision, in both instances preceded by a "Cf." signal. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 1069, 1078 (1989) (plurality opinion). The decision cited, Bowen v. United States, 422
U.S. 916 (1975), speaks not to the issue of the proper order ofthe initial announcement of a rule
of law and a determination of that rule's retroactivity, but rather to the much less controversial
question of the order of a determination of the retroactivity of a potentially new rule announced
in an earlier decision and that rule's application in a subsequent case involving different facts.
Indeed, in holding that the question of a prior decision's retroactivity should precede the question of the prior decision's application in a subsequent case, Bonen relies on the very policy avoiding advisory opinions, see id. at 920 - that has long caused the courts to decide whether a
new rule exists before deciding the rule's retroactivity, see, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
301 (1967), and that the Teague plurality explicitly had to subordinate in contending that the
traditional order of decision should be reversed. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
Unlike the rest of the Teague plurality opinion, therefore, which is peppered wNith citations of
separate opinions by Justice Harlan and of Supreme Court opinions and scholarly articles
prefiguring or endorsing the Harlan view, see Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1071-75, the portion of its
opinion dealing with the order-of-decision question is devoid of any support at all save the "Cf."
citation to a case that is not directly on point and that proceeds from a rationale that cuts
against the rule urged by the plurality.
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the plurality agrees probably ought to govern the matter 166 - cannot be satisfied (as the plurality proposed) by "simply" 16' 7 deciding whether a putative
rule is retroactive before deciding whether the rule is in fact the law. For
resolving the question whether a proposed rule is retroactive requires courts to
decide two subsidiary questions, the resolution of each of which in turn requires a complete and detailed determination of the scope and underlying constitutional merits of the proposed rule. Thus, in order to determine whether
the proposed rule is "new" (which in turn determines whether the rule applies
retroactively 68), it is necessary to ascertain the precise extent to which the
new rule departs from prior precedent. 169 To make that degree-of-departure
determination, it generally is necessary to know the precise boundaries of any
1 70
rule that the court is prepared to conclude is constitutionally compelled.
Likewise, to determine whether to apply the second Teague exception to the
nonretroactivity of new rules - Le., in determining whether the proposed rule
invokes "procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished" - it is necessary to understand the precise content and
17 1
even the effect of any new rule that the court is prepared to adopt.
In short, the Teague plurality's assurance notwithstanding, it is impossible for a court to discuss the retroactivity of a putative rule without first defining the sought after rule in the least constitutionally controversial way and
then deciding what effect the rule would have in practice. Almost inevitably,
both these tasks will require discussion of the merits. If retroactivity is treated
as a "threshold" matter, everything the court necessarily will have to say on
the constitutional merits of the proposed rule in the process of resolving the
retroactivity question will be hypothetical - in direct violation of the injunc172
tion that the plurality itself endorsed against "rendering advisory opinions."
The inevitability of advisory opinions under the plurality's thresholdquestion approach is illustrated by three major post-Teague decisions - the
Supreme Court's decisions in Parks and Penry and the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision in Sawyer v. Butler.1 73 In all three cases, the retroactivity analysis
166. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1078 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at
301) ("If there were no other way to avoid rendering advisory opinions, we might well agree
that the inequitable treatment described above is 'an insignificant cost for adherence to sound
principles of decisionmaking.' ").
167. Id.
168. See, eg., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944-47 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 (1988).
169. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
170. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079-80 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[U]ntil a rule is set forth, it would be extremely dificult to evaluate whether the rule is 'new'
at all.").
171. Id. at 1076-77 (plurality opinion); see Hardy v. Wigginton, 922 F.2d 294, 297 (6th
Cir. 1990) (resolution of retroactivity question "requires the court to take 'a peek at the merits' "); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (noting difficulty
of adjudicating second exception in advance of merits, given "uncertainty as to the scope of [the
underlying rule] itself"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990); infra Part V.
172. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1078 (plurality opinion).
173. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989);
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involved the court -

its majority as well as its dissenting judges -

in exten-

sive discussions of the constitutional merits. 7 4 In Penry, moreover, the dissenting Justices - who account for three-fourths of the Teague plurality acknowledged that "[t]he merits of [the proposed rule], and the question of

whether, in raising [that rule] on habeas, petitioner seeks application of a 'new
rule' within the meaning of Teague, are obviously interrelated." 175 Even more
to the point, the en banc court in Sawyer forthrightly concluded that it simply

could not assess the "newness" prerequisite to nonretroactivity and the second
Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110
S. Ct 2822 (1990).
174. See, eg., Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1259-60, 1262-63 (im course of holding that rule for
which petitioner contends is "new," Court disparages proposed rule as "difficult to reoncile...
with... long-standing" constitutional policies and as designed to "grant the jury the [unconstitutional] choice to make the sentencing decision according to its own whims or caprice"); ld. at
1270 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For the same reasons that Lockett and Eddings compel the
conclusion that respondent does not seek a 'new rule' ...,these cases also compel the conclusion that respondent was denied an individualized sentencing determination as required by the
Eighth Amendment."); Penry, 109 S. Ct at 2944-47 (extensive discussion of nature of rule for
which petitioner contends and of validity vel non of that rule under three prior Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the eighth amendment); id. at 2964-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (similar); Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1277-79; id. at 1296-301 (King, J., dissenting);
see also infra note 177 (discussing treatment of merits in Teague). The dangers ofproceeding by
hypothesis in regard to the merits are particularly evident in Parks, given that the rule the
majority gleaned hypothetically from the lower court opinions and briefs in order to address its
retroactivity (and, cursorily and haphazardly, its merits) is not the rule that the dissent, counsel
for the habeas corpus petitioner Parks, or the commentators thought the petitioner was making
in the case. Compare Parks, 110 S. Ct at 1262 (asserting that Parks never claimed that the
challenged instruction "barred the jury" from "giving effect to [his] mitigating evidence," which
argument, the Court acknowledges, would be "command[ed]" by prior precedent) with id. at
1265 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (interpreting Parks to be making precisely that claim and accusing majority of "mischaracteriz[ing Parks'] claim" so as to "address[] the retroactivity of a
claim not even raised" by Parks) and id. (oral argument of counsel for habeas corpus petitioner,
which, in terms, makes the claim the majority says petitioner did not make) and Berger,supra
note 6, at S12 (Court "[m]ischaracteriz[ed] the defendant's claim") and Goldstein, supranote 6,
at 405 ("the majority mischaracterized Parks' claim"). By giving itself license to speculate
about the merits without truly deciding them, the Court transcends the "judicial Power" in its
article III sense in two ways. First, as discussed in the text, the Court inevitably will render
advisory opinions about its likely future resolution of issues that the moving party has posed but
that it, assertedly, has chosen not to resolve. Second, the Court frees itself to render advisory
opinions not only on issues that the moving party poses but also - in full-blown legislative, as
opposed to judicial, style - to define for itself the issues upon which it proposes to advise the
world of its current disposition. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
175. Penry, 109 S. Ct at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Kennedy, JJ.); see cases cited supra note 171. Parks and
Penry are the crucial post-Teague decisions on the "threshold question" issue. Both involved
the claim that the petitioners were seeking in that case to declare and take adrantageof a new
rule. But cf supra note 161 (Penry arguably involved retroactivity of new rule announced in
earlier decision). In the Court's other post-Teague decisions, most especially Butler and Sayer,
the retroactivity issue in fact did not, and could not, arise as a threshold matter, because the
petitioners were attempting to take advantage of a rule that the Court already had adopted in an
earliercase reaching the Court on certiorari from direct appeal. Butler and Parks, therefore, are
entirely consistent with the Court's pre-Teague practice, see supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text, of addressing retroactivity after fully resolving the merits of a proposed and assertedly
"new" rule.
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Teague exception without first resolving the merits of the underlying constitu176
tional claim.
It is clear, therefore, that no litigant or lower court can read the so-called
"retroactivity" discussions in Parks,Penry, and Sawyer without also learning

exactly how the Supreme Court and the en banc Fifth Circuit feel about the
merits of the constitutional claims involved in those cases. Inevitably, therefore, litigants and lower court judges confronted with the "retroactivity" dis-

cussions in those cases also will be faced with opinions on the constitutional
merits - opinions that those litigants and courts cannot be expected to ignore
in arguing and deciding future cases, notwithstanding that the merits "opinions" on which those litigants and judges will be relying are explicitly "hypothetical," hence unequivocally "advisory." Because the Teague plurality
acknowledged that its order-of-decision proposal should be adopted only if the
"advisory opinion" problem could be "avoid[ed]," and because it seems clear
that the plurality's proposal does not avoid the advisory opinion pitfall, there
is little to commend the plurality approach.
Third, efficiency as well as prudential concerns argue against the plurality
approach. Given that courts effectively must define the constitutional rule in
every case in which they make a retroactivity determination with regard to
that rule, it makes little sense to insist that they duplicate their "hypothetical"
opinion on the issue in the first habeas corpus case with a "real" opinion on
1 77
the issue when it thereafter reaches the courts on direct review.
176. Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1276 ("Because we conclude that we cannot apply Teague without first defining the scope of [the constitutional rule the petitioner advocates], we turn [first]
... to the substantive constitutional questions."); id. at 1281 ("We thus choose to address the
merits of Sawyer's interpretation of [the constitutional rule] before applying Teague to [that
rule]."); see also Arkin, supra note 6, at 395-99 (comprehensive review of lower courts' treatment of Teague in 1989 and early 1990, concluding that, except when addressing "outlandish
novel" claims, post-Teague lower court decisions have routinely mixed discussions of merits
and retroactivity). Indeed, probably the largest group of lower court nonretroactivity holdings
after Teague simply recharacterize a traditional merits reason for denying relief as a nonretroactivity reason for denial. Thus, instead of holding that the challenged conduct violated no specific constitutional provision and did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process," Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643
(1974), see J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 8.4, at 103-04, the courts now simply rule that the claim
has so little basis in federal law that granting it would change the law. See, e.g., Evans v.
Muncy, 916 F.2d 163, 166-67 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 83
(1983)) (claim that 1990 execution based on 1982 finding of future dangerousness violates Constitution because petitioner did not in meantime behave dangerously in prison seeks "new" rule
because it posits a "'wrong [that is not] of a constitutional dimension' "); Wickham v. Dowd,
914 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1990) (claim that it is cruel and unusual punishment to revoke
parole based on behavior induced by petitioner's alcoholism), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2897
(1991); Barker v. Estelle, 913 F.2d 1433, 1440-42 (9th Cir. 1990) (challenge to juvenile fitness
hearing procedure), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 2060 (1991); Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 594
(9th Cir. 1990) (claim that conviction for fishing without a license violates due process because
state trial judge - whose decision was on appeal - had ruled (erroneously, it turned out) that
license requirement was invalid); Epps v. Iowa, 901 F.2d 1481, 1483 (8th Cir. 1990) (challenge
to procedure for change of venue).
177. For example, had the Supreme Court forthrightly said in Teague what already was
implicit there (and, in places virtually explicit, see Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069 (plurality opin-
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Fourth, by adopting Justice Steven's proposal in his concurring opinion
in Teague, it is possible to avoid both the "advisory opinion" and the "likes
treated differently" problems to which the various opinions in Teague advert.
Justice Stevens proposes that the court treat retroactivity in the same manner
as the courts routinely treat other affirmative defenses"'8 - for example,
harmless error 17 9 - namely, as a matter to be resolved in the same decision
as, but sequentially after, the court resolves the merits of the complaining
party's claim.'8 0 Under this approach, as is typically the case in other litigation, the courts first would resolve the moving party's claim on its merits,
then, if that resolution is favorable to the moving party, would resolve the
opposing party's defenses - including nonretroactivity - and either grant or
deny relief. In this way, all petitioners who have the same claim on the merits
and are in the same procedural posture vis-a-vis retroactivity not only would
receive (or be denied) the same relief but also would do so without the courts
being put in the posture of pretending not to resolve constitutional claims that
inevitably - and manifestly - are being resolved.
Fifth, deciding retroactivity after, but in the same decision as, the merits
probably increases somewhat the prisoner's "incentive to seek review" of incarceration that she believes to be unconstitutional - without, at the same
time, "breach[ing] the principle that litigants in similar situations should be
treated the same .... ,",I For the inhibitory effect on potential litigants of the
possible nonretroactivity of the ruling they seek would be offset somewhat by
ion)) - namely, that criminal defendants do not have a right to juries, as opposed tojury pools,
that mirror the population - then the Court would not thereafter have had to grant certiorari
and disavow that right in a subsequent case. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 810 (1990).
178. See Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (nonretroactivity treated as
essentially an affirmative defense that is waived if not invoked in a timely manner); supra note
160.
179. See, ag., Carella v. California, 109 S. Ct. 2419, 2420-21 (1989) (only after deciding
whether constitutional violation occurs is harmless error question reached; "although [the
Supreme Court has] the authority to make the harmless error determination [itself, it] dofes]
not ordinarily do so," instead remanding to the lower court to make the determination). The
example of an authoritative conclusion that a particular set of facts makes out a violation, albeit
one that is "harmless" in the particular case, illustrates the broader principle that "a ruling
[often] has sufficient authority to 'clearly establish' what the law is," hence to qualify as binding
precedent, even though no litigant in the case actually secured relief under the ruling. See
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1818 n.485.
180. The relevant passages from Justice Stevens' opinions in both Teague and Penry and
the supporting language in Justice Brennan's opinion in Teague are quoted supra notes 154,
160. Justice Stevens' approach conforms to the Teague plurality's conclusion that "the question
'of whether a decision [announcing a new rule should] be given prospective or retroactive effect
should be faced at the time of [that] decision."' Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Mishkin, supra note 37, at 64). Justice Stevens' approach also conforms to the procedure that the Court continues to utilize in civil nonretroactivity settings. See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2337, 2342 (1990) (plurality opinion); supra notes 92,
149.
181. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4737 (U.S., June 20,
1991) (plurality opinion) (posing following dilemma: absent some opportunity to secure relief
from incarceration as "the first successful litigant" of a claim, "the incentive to seek review ...
[is] diluted if not lost altogether;," yet, permitting the successful litigant, but not others in her
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the assurance that, at the least, the constitutional merits of their claims would
be resolved.

Sixth, there are certain kinds of claims - for example, the absence, or
ineffective assistance, of counsel on appeal 8 2 and the denial of constitutionally
mandated appellate procedures' 3 - that do not even in theory arise until
after the direct appeal is decided; and there are other kinds of claims - for
example, most ineffective assistance of counsel allegations - that as a practical matter cannot be raised until after direct appeal. 84 "Furthermore, some
irregularities [that could provide the basis for new constitutional rules], such

as prosecutorial misconduct, may not surface until after the direct review is
complete." 18 Under the plurality view, unless the point of "finality" were
extended in such cases, 186 these issues apparently could never become the basis
for constitutional decision because "threshold" determinations of nonretroacsituation, to gain the retroactive benefit of the new ruling "breaches the principle that litigants
in similar situations should be treated the same").
182. See, e-g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (claim first raised and rule announced
in postconviction proceedings); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (same); Wainwright v.
Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
183. See Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991) (claim advanced and first ruled upon in
postconviction proceedings); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (same). See generallyJ. LiEn.
MAN, supra note 3, § 8.4, at 55 n.17.1 (Supp. 1991), § 8.5, at 59-60 nn.20, 22 (Supp. 1991).
184. See Sanders v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (addressing retroactivity of
ruling holding that state's treatment of newly discovered exculpatory evidence violates Constitution, a type of violation that "typically doles] not occur until after the trial and direct review
are completed"); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 24.5b, at 355 n.20 (attorney who represents defendant at trial, on appeal, and in certiorari proceedings cannot be expected to allege her own
ineffectiveness in prior proceedings); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4798
(U.S., June 24, 1991) (although sixth amendment right to counsel normally does not extend to
prosecution of constitutional claims in proceedings after direct appeal, the right to counsel, and
to effective assistance of counsel, may attach to the prosecution of claims, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal, that, for practical or state law reasons, cannot be
litigated on direct appeal); Chappell v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1800 (1990) (percuriam) (accepting Solicitor General's view that ineffective assistance claims generally should be raised in
postconviction proceedings and not on direct appeal); Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765,
2778 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Virginia law contemplates that some claims ordinarily
heard on direct review will be relegated to postconviction proceedings. Claims that trial or
appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, for instance, usually cannot be
raised until th[e postconviction] stage.") (citations omitted); United States v. Gholston, 932
F.2d 904, 905-06 (1lth Cir. 1991) (court refuses to hear ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal and relegates appellant to his postconviction remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); United
States v. Murdock, 928 F.2d 293, 298 (8th Cir. 1991) (court "refuse[s] to address Murdock's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim [on direct appeal] since it is more properly raised in a
petition for habeas corpus" pursuant to which "the district court ...[can] develop a more
complete record on this issue"); United States v. Marroquin, 885 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (5th Cir.
1989) (federal prisoner's double jeopardy challenge to multiple sentences, initially asserted on
direct appeal, is deferred until postappeal filing of postconviction motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 so that an evidentiary hearing can be held), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1807 (1990);
O'Halloran v. Ryan, 835 F.2d 506, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1987) (where state direct appeal court refuses to hear issue, instructing appellant that only proper way to raise claim is in state postconviction proceedings, issue is not exhausted for purposes of federal habeas corpus).
185. Giarratano,109 S. Ct. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486
U.S. 214 (1988); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
186. See infra Part IV.
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tivity at the only stage of the proceedings in which such claims theoretically,
or at least practically, can arise would forbid the claims' resolution on the
merits.187 Because Justice Stevens' "affirmative defense" procedure not only
serves both prudential interests that the plurality identifies (avoiding advisory
opinions and treating likes alike') better than the plurality's own "thresholdquestion" procedure but also avoids carving out a whole class of constitutional
violations that inevitably would avoid adjudication and cure, the affirmative189
defense approach is superior to the retroactivity-threshold approach.
Seventh, far from being a merely technical matter, the order in which
courts decide the merits and nonretroactivity has a dramatic impact on the
legislative definition both of habeas corpus and of the jurisdiction of the lower
federal judiciary. Adoption of the plurality approach would forbid lower federal judges from interpreting the United States Constitution in habeas corpus
cases and would relegate those judges to the nearly ministerial task of putting
into operation decisions that the Supreme Court renders on direct review. If
retroactivity decisions not only could, but had to, be made without determining the constitutional merits of "new" claims,"' then all that district and
court of appeals judges could do in habeas corpus cases would be to adjudicate
"old" claims, Le., claims that do not arise directly under the Constitution and
instead are "dictated by [Supreme Court] precedent existing at the time the
19 1
defendant's conviction became final."
Given that Congress since 1867 has provided in mandatory terms that
district and circuit judges "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
ourt ... in violation of the Constitution... of the United States," 192 the vast
withdrawal from the lower federal judiciary of congressionally conferred jurisdiction that the Teague plurality approach proposes is too much to countenance, both constitutionally"' and statutorily, even on the part of a Court
187. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1090 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. See supra notes 158, 181 and accompanying text.
189. If retroactivity is treated as a threshold question, the courts - at least, insofar as they
seek to avoid countenancing irremediable violations arising after direct appeal - vill be

tempted to exempt such violations from treatment under Teague's nonretroactivity doctrine.
See Sanders v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (exempting claim that state's treatment of newly discovered exculpatory evidence violates Constitution from rule of Teague be-

cause violation is one that "typically do[es] not occur until after the trial and direct review are
completed").

190. Cf. supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (courts cannot reasonably expect to
avoid merits issues when resolving retroactivity questions).
191. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original); see Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1817-19 (lower courts at least should have the discretion to reach the
merits before deciding retroactivity).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988) (emphasis added); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2255
(1988); J. LEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 2.2b, 8.4 (lower federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction

under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and modem habeas corpus statutes).
193. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." (emphasis added)).
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that considers itself fairly free to amend the habeas corpus statute as it
wishes.19 4 Congress, that is, intended via habeas corpus to deputize the lower

federal judiciary to stand in for the Supreme Court in situations in which the
latter Court cannot be expected on its own to maintain the integrity of funda-

mental national law.19 The most basic reason for rejecting the Teague plurality's "threshold-question" approach, therefore, is that the approach
impermissibly countermands Congress' explicit conferral of this important authority on the lower federal courts.
Finally, by withdrawing the responsibility for adjudicating new rules of

constitutional law from the federal judiciary generally and assigning that task
exclusively to the Court itself, the plurality approach could expand the
Court's workload.1 96 Given the destruction of the lower federal courts' habeas

corpus jurisdiction, criminal defendants must either besiege the Court with
direct appeal certiorari petitions raising any and all potentially meritorious

constitutional claims that might lie dormant in the case (including claims that
did not arise until after the state courts' direct appeal decisions were announced' 97) or lose those claims forever.1 98 Given, moreover, that the states

are constitutionally permitted to withhold state-financed counsel from indigent direct appeal certiorari petitioners 99 (and most do so), the plurality view
would put great pressure on the Court to appoint and fund certiorari counsel

itself. Doing otherwise would saddle indigent and untutored pro se certiorari
litigants with the absolutely preclusive effect of having failed to raise "new"
constitutional claims that those litigants almost assuredly could not divine on
their own.
In sum, the "threshold question" doctrine is a bad idea given its own
rationale - avoiding advisory opinions - and given the violence it does to
Congress' longstanding design of the habeas corpus remedy. If the Court is
not disposed to abandon the Teague plurality's suggestion in this regard, Con-

gress ought to reclaim its prerogatives in the area and itself reject the Court's
suggestion.
194. See supra note 9.
195. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 5, § 28.1, at 439; 2 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3,
§ 35.1, at 539; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
196. Compare Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 167, 186-87, 190-92 (in wake of Teague,
Supreme Court will continue to review few habeas corpus cases because few are "certworthy;"
predicting downturn in number of certiorari petitions filed by prisoners) with Weisberg, supra
note 3, at 33 ("if the Court believes that the new [retroactivity] cases will get the federal courts
out of the general business of creating new rules of constitutional criminal procedure, it may
merely have shifted the pressure back to itself - on direct review").
197. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
198. Compare Schiro v. Indiana, 110 S. Ct. 268, 269 (1989) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting
denial of certiorari) (availability of habeas corpus relief in lower federal courts justifies Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari petition presenting what otherwise might be a review-meriting question) with Spencer v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2276 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (stating that if Teague "would prevent [the C;ourt] from reaching... issues on federal habeas review, I would have voted to grant certiorari").
199. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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M.
WHAT'S "NEWT1"
A.
1.

The Court's New Rule Defining New Rules

The Evolution of the Court's New Rule on New Rules

Explaining what constitutes a "new rule" of constitutional criminal procedure for Teague-retroactivity purposes has already engaged substantial
amounts of attention from the Supreme Court and the lower federal judici-

ary20 ° and no doubt will continue doing so for years to come. 20 ' The "new
rule" terminology is by no means self-defining. One can argue, for example,
that there is no, or almost no, such thing as a "new rule" ofjudge-made law in
a system that distinguishes the legislative function from the judicial function
and subjects the latter to the principle of stare decisis. 0 On the other hand,
one might argue that almost every decision is "new" inasmuch as almost every
decision extends preexisting rules to one degree or another simply by applying

them to new facts.-

3

Even now, the point between these two poles at which

the Supreme Court locates the "new rule" divide is not at all clear,2 °4 although

it is clear that Teague and the later decisions clearly mean to move that point
closer than before to the latter, all-is-new, understanding.

The confusion begins with the Teague plurality opinion itself. The plurality acknowledges that "[ilt is... often difficult to determine when a case
200. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827-30 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257,
1259-62 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1214-18 (1990); Peary v. Lynaugh, 109 S.
Ct. 2934, 2944-45 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1070, 1077-78 (1989); infra notes
241, 249.
201. See supra notes 128, 136 & infra note 204 and accompanying text (Supreme Court
and lower court acknowledgements of "difficulty" and unclarity posed by Teague's reformulation of the "new rule" concept).
202. See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("[P]rospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial
role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be."); Penry, 109 S. Ct. at
2965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In a system based on precedent and
stare decisis, it is the tradition to find each decision 'inherent' in earlier cases... and rarely to
replace a previously announced rule with a new one."); see also Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217
("Courts frequently view their decisions as being 'controlled' or 'governed' by prior opinions
even when aware of reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other courts.").
203. See Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1517 (1lth Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Roney, J., concurring) ("[A]ppl[ication of] an old principle of law to a new fact situation.., should be treated
as new law."), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3255 (1990). But see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
537, 549 (1982) (decision applying "settled precedents to new and different factual situations" is
not a new rule of decision "because the later decision has not in fact altered the rule in any
material way").
204. See Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting) ("The [Teague] plurality recognized that constitutional rules will fall along a 'spectrum' from those that fit neatly within the rubric of settled law to those that constitute a clear break
from prior precedent - but provided little additional guidance for determining at which point a
rule is not 'dictated' by precedent and, therefore, 'new' for retroactivity purposes." (emphasis in
original)), aff'd sub nomn. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990); see also Johnson, 457 U.S. at
548-54 (demarcating the two poles but noting ambiguity of prior case law as to which rulings
falling between the poles constitute "new rules").
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announces a new rule,"2 °5 then sets back analysis by offering conflicting
characterizations:
In general, ... a case announces a new rule when [1] it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (per se
rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal defendant's right to testify on his behalf);

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of prisoners who are insane). To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if [2] the result was not dictated
by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final. 206
Obviously, the Teague plurality's first definition - a "new" rule is one
that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation" - tends towards the
end of the spectrum of "new rule" definitions characterized by relatively rare
overrulings (such as the Ford v. Wainwright decision 20 7) and announcements
of rules to govern newly arisen procedural innovations (such as, arguably, the
Rock v. Arkansas20 decision). 2 9 To this extent, Teague fits easily within a
205. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e do not attempt to define
the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes."); accord
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2944; see also Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1288 ("Mhe Court's opinions in Teague
and Penry do not immediately yield a clearly articulable definition of a 'new rule.' ").
206. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). Justice
O'Connor twice quoted this same language in her majority opinion in Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2944,
2952, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy quoted both Penry and Teague to like
effect in their majority opinions in, respectively, Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216
(1990) (quoting Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2944 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070)), and Saffle v.
Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990).
207. See Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), overruledin Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986).
208. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). Rock was innovative in two ways. Initially, Rock was the first
Supreme Court decision addressing the difficult evidentiary issues posed by recent qualitative
advances in hypnosis technology. Id. at 56-61 (extensive discussion of new technology and of
state courts' varying reactions to that technology). Given that the strong majority rule among
lower courts in the years just preceding Rock had been to exclude evidence of posthypnotic
memories, see C. MUELLER & L. KILPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES,
AND PROBLEMS 551-53 (1988), Rock embodies a classic example of a decision that "overturns a
...widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body
of lower court authority has expressly approved," United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551
(1982) -- Le., of a case falling within the narrow, pre-Teague definition of a "new rule." See
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (new rule established by Court's resolution
of "an issue of first impression [in the Supreme Court] whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed"). Second, Rock was the first decision in which the Court applied the sixth amendment right to present defensive evidence to an entire category of evidence, rather than merely to
the evidence offered in a particular case. Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). But
see Hoffman, supra note 3, at 182 (Ford and Rock are "relatively minor" advances in the law).
209. Accord Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1067 (plurality opinion) ("In Allen v. Hardy, [478 U.S.
255, 258 (1986) (per curiam)], the Court held that Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),]
constituted an 'explicit and substantial break with prior precedent' because it overruled a portion of Swain [v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)]," and hence "concluded that the rule an-
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long line of prior retroactivity decisions defining new rules as ones that "overrul[e] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied... or...
decid[e] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed." 21 0

The Teague plurality lent further credence to this moderate definition of
new rules by approvingly citing Yates v. Aiken.21 In Yates the Court unanimously held that the rule announced in Francisv. Franklin,2 12 which forbade

the use of certain permissive presumptions in jury instructions on mens rea
questions, was not "new" and hence raised no retroactivity issue "because it
'was merely an application of the ["no mandatory presumptions"] principle
that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana ....

."

'I" Notably, the

Yates Court reached the "no new rule" conclusion with regard to Francis
notwithstanding that the "no permissive presumptions" rule announced in
Franciswas sufficiently different from the "no mandatory presumptions" ques-

tion decided in Sandstrom to prompt four Supreme Court Justices to dissent
from Francis' "extension" of Sandstrom.21 4
nounced in Batson should not be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that
became final before Batson."); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381-82 n.2 (1972) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (advocating Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity, which plurality adopted in
Teague, and noting that "[a]n issue of the 'retroactivity' of a decision of this Court is not even
presented unless the decision in question marks a sharp break in the web of the law [which
occurs] ... only when the decision overrules clear past precedent... or disrupts a practice long

accepted and widely relied upon ....." (citations omitted)); see also James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4742 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("new
rule" in civil context is one that is "unprecedented" or that "came out of the blue"); Johnson,
457 U.S. at 551 (citing authority) (generally a sharp break in the law "has been recognized only
when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court... or disapproves a practice
this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases... or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower
court authority has expressly approved" (citations omitted)); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481,498 (1968) ("new," hence prospective, rule in civil context
requires "such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule
which in effect replaced an older one").
210. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106; see other cases cited supra notes 42, 121, 209 & infra notes
326, 390.
211. 484 U.S. 211 (1988), cited in Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073.
212. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
213. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Yates, 484 U.S. at 216-17
(construing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979))); accord,e.g., Truesdale v. Aiken, 480
U.S. 527 (1987) (discussed infra note 214); Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549 (citing numerous cases)
(decision applying "settled precedent[] to [a] new and different factual situation[]" is not a new
rule of law "because the later decision has not in fact altered... [the preexisting] rule in any
material way"); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1333-35 (8th Cir. 1989) (rule of Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), governing the constitutionality of Oklahoma's "'heinous, atrocious or cruel"' aggravating circumstance, is not "new" because it was "an
application not an expansion" of the holding of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), governing the constitutionality of Georgia's "'vile, horrible or inhuman'" aggravating circumstance), cert denied, 110 S. CL. 3301 (1990).
214. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 330 (Powell, J., dissenting) (majority's interpretation of
Sandstrom "is neither logical nor justified"); id. at 332 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by
Burger, CJ. and O'Connor, J.) ("Today's decision needlessly extends our holding in Sandstrom
...to cases where the jury was not required to presume conclusively [as Sandstrom's jury was
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Also supporting this relatively narrow answer to the "new rule" question
is Justice Harlan's definition of the concept in the two separate opinions on
which the plurality drew so heavily in Teague:
First, it is necessary to determine whether a particular decision has
really announced a "new" rule at all .... One need not be a rigid
partisan of Blackstone to recognize that many, though not all, of this
Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental
principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to
year, but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation
succeeds generation. In such a context it appears very difficult to
argue against the application of the "new" rule in all habeas cases
since one could never say with any assurance that this Court would
have ruled differently at the time the petitioner's conviction became
final. 2 15
Finally, the Teague plurality's application of the "new rule" concept to
the facts of that case is consistent with a relatively narrow definition of the
"new rule" concept. Thus, the Teague plurality declared the rule for which
the petitioner contended in that case (namely, that the sixth amendment forbids prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to create juries not representative of the community) to be "a new rule" because its adoption would have
required the Court to overrule its own "strong language" and express statements in two prior decisions.216
required to do] an element of a crime under state law."); accord,e.g., Truesale, 480 U.S. at 527
(majority opinion); id. at 527-28 (Powell, J., dissenting) (decision in Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1 (1986), requiring state courts to permit capital juries to hear evidence of defendant's
prior good behavior in jail or prison not new rule because it simply applied rule of Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), to new circumstances; fact that a number of Justices and lower court
cases concluded that the rule of Lockett did not reach the circumstances of Skipper not sufficient
to render Skipper a new rule).
215. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263-64 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); accord
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 697 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989) (King, J., dissenting) (en
banc) ("[tihe process of constitutional interpretation routinely requires courts to articulate extant law and apply established principles of law to different facts and in different contexts;"
rules that are the product of "this gradual process of refining and developing doctrine are not
'new,' [else] the traditional understanding of constitutional jurisprudence as an evolving body of
principles rather than [a] jarring series of revolutionary pronouncements" would be overthrown), aff'd sub nor. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990); Mishkin, supra note 37, at 72
(retroactivity less controversial "[i]f
the course of [law] revision is through a pattern of development and particularly if it is accompanied by an articulation which enables some anticipation of
future holdings").
216. Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 1069 (plurality opinion) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975), and Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945)); see also Johnson, 457 U.S.
at 551 ("clear break" doctrine extends to decision that "disapprove[s] a practice this Court
arguably has sanctioned in prior cases," as well as to a decision that "overturns a longstanding
and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body
of lower court authority has expressly approved"); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1974)
(plurality opinion) (decision nonretroactive because it "effected a decisional change in [an] attitude that had prevailed for many decades").
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On the other hand, the Teague plurality's second definition - that any
rule "not dictated by [prior] precedent" is new - tends towards the opposite
end of the spectrum of "new rule" meanings. Under that kind of definition,
even workaday applications of prior rules to different fact situations might be
deemed "new."
Penry further muddied the water. Although Justice O'Connor, who authored the Teague plurality, also wrote the majority opinion in Penry, her
opinion in the latter case was joined only by Justices who had refused to join
her opinion in the former case."' On the other hand, the three Justices who
joined her opinion in Teague vigorously dissented on the retroactivity question
in Penry - concluding, along with Justice White, that Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Penry "gutted" the principle she had announced only a few months
before in Teague.2" 8
It is not hard to see why the Penry dissenters thought they discerned
Teague's evisceration - at least if one takes seriously, as the Penry dissenters
definitely did, the "dictated by precedent" language in Teague.2 19 Penry involved the question whether the Texas death penalty statute impermissibly
limited the ability of the sentencer to consider mitigating factors in the defendant's background by funneling the jury's consideration of most mitigating
circumstances into the jury's determination whether the defendant posed a
danger to society in the future. The difficulty with Penry's argument was that
the Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas' in 1976 had expressly upheld the constitutionality of the Texas statute on its face - including, explicitly, the statute's elision of most mitigating circumstances questions and the "future
dangerousness" determination." 1 Following Jurek, moreover, at least several
score of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, United States District Court, and
Fifth Circuit decisions unanimously ruled that the state's actual treatment of
mitigating evidence passed constitutional muster.'
Notwithstanding Jurek and its progeny, Justice O'Connor concluded in
Penry - simultaneously resolving both the retroactivity and the merits ques217. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944-46 (1989) (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, J.).
218. Id. at 2965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J. and White and Kennedy, JJ.).
219. See id. at 2964, 2965 (complaining that "dictated by precedent" language received
only "lip-service" in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Penry (emphasis in original)); id. at 2965 ("it

challenges the imagination to think that today's result is 'dictated' by our prior cases").
220. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
221. Id. at 272-73 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 277 (White, J., concurring).
222. This statement is based upon conversations with habeas corpus lawyers involved in
capital appellate and postconviction litigation in Texas. See also Bridge v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d
162, 164 (5th Cir. 1988) (constitutionality of practice Supreme Court later overturned in Penry

previously was "settled by [a] Supreme Court decision and by a more recent consideration of
the issue by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals"); Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 89, 92-94
(5th Cir. 1988) (claim on which Supreme Court later granted relief in Penry theretofore had
"enjoyed virtually no support in this circuit"), vacated & remandedsub nom. Selvage v.Collins,
110 S. Ct. 974 (1990) (per curiam).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

tions -

[Vol. XVIII:537

(1) that the Texas statute as it had come to be applied was unconstitu-

tional and (2) that the Court's decision saying so was not "new." The Court
justified both conclusions on the basis that the statute as applied failed to "fulfill
the assurance[s]" of Jurek and two intervening Supreme Court decisions
requiring plenary admissibility and consideration of mitigating evidence.22 3
The Penry majority opinion, that is, wiped out a good part of the effect - if
not any identifiable holding - of Jurek and reversed a huge state and lower

federal court jurisprudence that did in fact hold that Jurek permitted the practice the Court disapproved in Penry.22 4
Only in the 1990 decisions in Butler, Parks, and Sawyer did a five-person
majority of the Court settle upon a single, internally consistent verbal formulation of the "new rule" definition. In those decisions, the Court essentially

abandoned the conflicting definitions of "new" that Justice O'Connor set out
in Teague22 5 and adopted the still more encompassing definition that Justice
Scalia devised in dissent in Penry. 2 6 Going beyond the analysis demanded by
the facts of the cases,22 7 the majority defined as "new" any ruling that decided
a question susceptible to "debate among reasonable minds"22 or as to which
there previously were, or could have been, "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents" going the other way.22 9 Under this definition,
223. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2945 (1989); see id. at 2947 (discussing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976)).
224. See Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2965 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If Teague does not apply to a
claimed 'inherency' as vague and debatable as that in the present case, then it applies only to
habeas requests for plain overruling .... ").
225. Although Sawyer, Parks, and Butler all quoted the "dictated by prior precedent" language from Teague, Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct.
1257, 1260 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216 (1990), they went on to criticize
the potential breadth of words such as "controlled" or "dictated," id. at 1217, refused to
"appl[y]" the "dictated" test at a high "level of generality," Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828, and
pointedly substituted the "reasonable jurists may disagree" formulation, id. at 2827.
226. See Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(paraphrased in Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827; Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260; Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217).
227. The holding of Parks, insofar as it addressed the definition of new law, is discussed
supra note 34. The holdings of Sawyer and Butler are as follows: Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2824,
2828-29 (quoting Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 49, 56 (1983)) ("Caldwell [v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985),] announced a new rule," because prior to its announcement, there were
indications in the Court's prior decisions that the Caldwell rule "was not a requirement of the
Eighth Amendment" (citing two previous Supreme Court decisions that appeared to reject the
rule the Court later adopted), and those decisions "did not put other courts on notice that the
Eighth Amendment compelled the... result" in Caldwell but instead characterized the Cald.
well claim as worthy of" 'little discussion'" and "'insubstantial' "); Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1215,
1218 (quoting Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1988)) (decision on which petitioner
relies adopted "new" rule because, prior to decision's announcement, judges reasonably could
and did characterize position adopted in new decision as a "'dramatic' extension" of existing
precedents).
228. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
229. All three 1990 decisions recite the same passage stating that the new rule principle
"validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions." Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217, cited
in Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827; Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1990-91]

ROUT OF HABEAS CORPUS

every newly announced or currently advocated rule is "new" unless "a state

court" previously "would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule... was required by the Constitution."230 Moreover, com-

pulsion to reach the conclusion the Supreme Court ultimately reached is
absent as long as there is any "simple and logical difference" between the
Court's conclusion and the "precise holding[s]" of prior decisions. 3 1

Applying this definition, the majority emphasized that rulings may be
"new," and hence are presumptively nonretroactive: (1) although they were

"lent general support" by prior decisions, 2 or were "congruent with" those
or "pointed to" the
decisions;1 3 (2) although prior decisions "inform[ed]"
rulings; and (3) "even" if the rulings concededly are "control[led] or govem[ed]" by prior decisions.' s Indeed, under Butler, Parks, and Sawyer,
"new" rules include developments that are "within the 'logical compass' of...
a prior decision"'- 6 and even minor or "gradual developments in the law [as

long as they are ones] over which reasonable jurists [may] disagree."' , Finally, the majority took as evidence of "reasonable" disagreement not only the
fact that circuit courts theretofore had split on the question2 8 but also the fact
230. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260.
231. Id. at 1261.
232. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828.
233. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828.
234. Id. at 2829-30.
235. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (1990). The dissenting Justices inButler,Parky,
and Sawyer did little to disguise the breadth of the majority's "new rule" definition. See, a&,
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219, 1221, 1227 (Brennan, I., dissenting) (under majority's definition,
"state prisoner can secure habeas relief only by showing that the state court's rejection of the
constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that the
decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist;" majority's labeling as "'new' any rule
of law favoring a state prisoner that can be distinguished from prior precedent on any conceivable basis, legal or factual," and majority's confinement of "old" rules to ones "applying binding
precedents to factual disputes that cannot be distinguished from prior cases in any imaginable
way" limits habeas corpus actions to "a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review" and leaves
habeas corpus "available in only the most egregious cases, in which state courts have flouted
applicable Supreme Court precedent that cannot be distinguished on any arguable basis" (emphasis in original)); see also Arkin, supra note 6, at 389-90 (Court is "committed to an extremely
expansive view of novelty" encompassing "[a]Imost any decision handed down after a petitioner's conviction is final"); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1816-17 ("Teague's definition of
the claims that will be deemed to rest on new law... is far too expansive" because it includes as
"new" decisions those that "are clearly foreshadowed, or reflect ordinary legal evolution");
Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 182-83 (under Justice Scalia's definition in Penry "almost all new
[decisions] ...qualify as 'new. ..'"); West, supra note 6, at 58 ("Under [Parks] virtually any
extension of preceding doctrine articulates a 'new rule' that defendants are not entitled to raise
on habeas review.").
236. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
237. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827. Contrast Sawyer's statement that new rules include
"gradual developments in the law," id., with Justice Harlan's conclusion that "many, though
not all, of this Court's constitutional decisions [are not new because they] are grounded upon
fundamental principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but
whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation." Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263-64 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
238. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
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that a few state court decisions previously had gone the other way. 2 3 9
Juxtaposed to the apparent breadth of the Court's recent "new rule" definitions, are: (1) the majority's continued recognition of the interpretive "diffi-

cult[y]" posed by the "new rule" concept;2"

(2) the Court's apparent

placement of some as yet ill-defined set of rules outside the ambit of "new"

-

for example, the "mere[] . . . application of the principle that governed" a
prior decision to a slightly different set of facts2 41 or an outcome disputable
only on the basis of "an illogical or . . . grudging application" of existing

precedent;242 (3) the Court's rejection of the state's invitation 24 3 in another
1990 case, Lewis v. Jeffers, 2' to treat the Court's prior decision in Maynard v.
Cartwright,24 5 which applied the rule of Godfrey v. Georgia,246 as a "new"
rule;2 47 (4) the continued vitality, on paper at least, of Penry - which in con-

239. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828; Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1261; see also Butler, 110 S. Ct. at
1217 (rule is "new" in part because it was characterized by "a significant difference of opinion
on the part of several lower courts that had considered the question previously"). Compare
Weisberg, supra note 3, at 29 (under Butler, fact "that lower courts had split on the... issue
was enough to establish that the ruling in the defendant's favor was a new rule" (emphasis
added)) with The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 312-13 (under
1990 decisions, "reasonableness" of state-court rulings that are contrary to ruling Supreme
Court ultimately makes depends not only upon the question of whether "lower courts reached
differing results" but also upon "the Court's own [independent] analysis of the reasonableness of
[the lower courts'] debate").
240. See supra note 136.
241. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989) (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,
216-17 (1988) (holding that Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), did not announce a new
rule)); see also Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217. A number of lower court decisions, see infra note 249,
have relied upon this concept to find that newly announced rules were not "new." See, e.g.,
West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Indiana, 910 F.2d 1413, 1416-17
(7th Cir. 1990); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 3301 (1990); Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393-94 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 378 (1989); Williams v. Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472, 483-84 (N.D. 111. 1990); Reddy v.
Coombe, 730 F. Supp. 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 916 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1990).
242. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218; see Spencer v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2276 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (claim of racial bias in capital sentencing does not seek
announcement of new rule, hence is not barred from future habeas corpus review); Dodson v.
Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1254-55, 1256-60 (10th Cir. 1990) (violation of Uniform Code of Military
Justice warranted habeas corpus relief despite Teague because the statutory provision that the
court martial violated was clear and permitted no exceptions, the military's own manuals dating
back to 1969 interpreted the statute the way the petitioner did, and the lower courts had unanimously followed the same interpretation).
243. See Tr. of Oral Argument in Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990), at 16.
244. 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990).
245. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
246. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
247. But cf Stringer v. Black, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991) (granting certiorari to consider
whether Maynard, taken together with Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990), constitutes a new rule of law). The Jeffers Court's unanimous silence on nonretroactivity is revealing
because at least a plurality of Justices believes that the Court must postpone discussion of the
merits until after resolving any retroactivity questions in the case, see supra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text, and because the Court - sua sponte - did just that, not only in Teague
itself but also in Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990), Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934
(1989), and Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989). See supra note 19 and accompanying text;
infra note 466 and accompanying text. The Court's implicit refusal to characterize Maynard as
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junction with the later cases stands for the admittedly curious proposition that
a rule that the lower courts previously were unanimous in rejecting and over
which the Court itself split 5-4 is not a matter over which "reasonable minds"
could differ;" 2 4 and (5) the lower courts' willingness, even after announcement of Butler, Parks, and Sawyer, to place outside the "new rule" concept a
number of recent Supreme Court decisions that were not free of controversy.2 49 Apparently, there remains some class of rulings by the Court a new rule hardly seems controversial. As of now, all 27 federal judges who have considered the
matter on the merits - the nine Justices in Maynard itself, the ninejudges of the en bane Tenth
Circuit in the lower court decision in that case, six Eighth Circuit judges, and three Tenth
Circuit judges in a subsequent case addressing Maynard'sretroactivity - have treated the Maynard holding as squarely within the Godfrey holding. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362-64; Davis v.
Maynard, 911 F.2d 415, 418 (10th Cir. 1990); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1331-33
(8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. CL 3301 (1990); Mercer v. Armontrout, 864 F.2d 1429,
1435 (8th Cir. 1988); Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987) (en bane),
aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). Both Davis and Newlon actually addressed the retroactivity question, concluding that Maynardis not "new" because it was "an application, not an expansion, of
Godfrey." Newlon, 885 F.2d at 1333; accordDavis, 911 F.2d at 418. Compare Stringer v. Jackson, 909 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1990) (combination of Maynard and Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S.
Ct. 1441 (1990), the latter of which overturned Mississippi's practice of automatically affirming
death sentences that were based on an invalid "heinousness" aggravating circumstance as long
as other, valid circumstances were present, constitutes a new rule), cerL granted sub nora.
Stringer v. Black, 111 S. CL. 2009 (1991) and Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 982-86 (5th Cir.
1990) (same) with Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 738-39 (1991) (implicitly giving Clemons
retroactive effect) and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.VI. 4735, 4737-39
(U.S., June 20, 1991) (plurality opinion) (Court's retroactive application of new decision to one
litigant automatically obliges Court, in order to assure horizontal equity, to apply decision retroactively to all other similarly situated litigants, even if the initial retroactive application was
implicit only, ill-considered, and erroneous) and id. at 4739 (White, J., concurring inthe result)

(same).
248. See Williams v. Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472, 484 (N.D. 111.
1990) (Penry stands for
proposition that "even though only a majority of the [Supreme Court, rather than a unanimous
Court] may have rendered [a] decision ....[the decision] nonetheless may be construed as not
having announced a new rule. The fact that there was disagreement in the court as to the
validity of a specific application of a more general principle does not in and of itself mean that
the rule adopted was either a break with prior law or not compelled by existing precedent').
249. See, e-g., Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 306 n.19 (3d Cir. 1991) (rule of
Mdills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), not "new"). Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 135861 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,
216-17 (1988))) (recent circuit decision, which held that prosecutors' announcement of reasons
for exercising peremptory challenges to prospective jurors automatically bursts the presumption
that peremptory challenges are exercised lawfully, is not "'new... because it was "merely an
application of [existing] principle[s]" '), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991); Thomas v. Indiana, 910 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (7th Cir. 1990) (despite split in circuits on some of the issues
presented by the application of the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), in Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), latter decision is not "new" and is merely an application of
former decision); Hill v. McMackin, 893 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1989) (rule of Harris v. Reed,
109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989), not "new," although it overruled considerable circuit precedent, because
it was "dictated" by prior Supreme Court precedent announced in direct-appeal context, which
Harris simply applied for first time in habeas corpus context); Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497,
1506-08 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (majority of court concludes that rule of
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), is not "new" although it was Court's first application of
Miranda principle to "interrogations" conducted by psychiatrists and its first decision excluding
fruits of improper interrogation from capital sentencing, as opposed to guilt-phase, proceedings), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3255 (1990); id. at 1527 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (same); Newlon,
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including rulings that do more than simply replicate a prior holding in a factually identical case - that even the majority does not consider "new," and that
it is prepared to apply retroactively to cases that had become "final" before the
Court issued the new ruling. What, then, constitutes that class of cases?
Fully answering this question may be impossible. As one commentator
suggests, the Court has reason to be
embarrassed at invoking a distinction that law students soon learn to
deconstruct - the conceptually impossible distinction between a ruling that follows ineluctably from precedent and one which "concededly expands precedent - all this in a judicial world where courts
rarely acknowledge that they do any more than draw ineluctable
conclusions from precedent.25 °
At risk, however, of venturing forth into the "jurisprudential morass involved
in distinguishing cases dictated by precedent from those merely 'informed' by
885 F.2d at 1333 (because recent decision in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), is
"an application, not an expansion of," Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), Maynard rule
is not "new"); Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393-94 (8th Cir.) (Lowenflield v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231 (1988), not a new rule although it overruled circuit precedent because it "merely...
applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations" and did "not in fact alter[]
that [previous] rule in any material way"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 378 (1989); Singleton v.
Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1395, 1401 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 207 (1989); Williams,
742 F. Supp. at 483-84 (rule of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v.
Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), adopted by 5-4 majorities in both cases, not new because
decisions "merely applied" "well settled [rule] that the state cannot submit evidence that is not
relevant to the... defendant and the... crime... to a specific type of evidence - victim
impact evidence"); Reddy v. Coombe, 730 F. Supp. 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting Cruz v. New
York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987)) (Cruz rule not new because it "'reaffirmed the central proposition'" of prior precedent), aff'd, 916 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1990); cases cited supra notes 241, 242;
see also Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 738-39 (1991) (discussed supra note 247) (implicitly
giving retroactive effect to rule of Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990)); Granviel v.
Texas, 110 S. Ct. 2577, 2578 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (decision
in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1975) (state must provide indigents with resources necessary
to prove colorable psychiatric defenses), is not new and dictates conclusion that providing indigent defendant with psychiatric assistance on condition that any report psychiatrist files is available to state as well as defense violates Constitution). But cf McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d
518, 539 (4th Cir. 1990) (rule of Mills is "new" and not retroactive), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2840 (1991); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1990) (decisions in Ake and
Estelle v.Smith constitute "new" rules; so would holding that petitioner has right to confront
author of report used as basis for sentencing petitioner to die), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639
(1991); Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 620 (9th Cir. 1990) (claim seeking extension of Ake to
require assistance of competent state-provided psychiatric expert is "new"); Stringer v. Jackson,
909 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1990) (in combination, decisions in Maynard and Clemons, constitute a
"new" rule), cert. granted sub nom. Stringer v. Black, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991); Hanrahan v.
Greer, 896 F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1990) (dicta) (rule of Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186
(1987), may be "new" because Cruz was a "close case" under existing precedent); Collins v.
Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1510 (11th Cir.) (extension of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)
(request for counsel during interrogation forbids police thereafter to question defendant outside
presence of attorney), in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (request for counsel at arraignment forbids police thereafter to question defendant about indicted offense outside presence of attorney), probably constitutes "new rule"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 225 (1990); cases
cited supra note 176.
250. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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it,"' 51 I propose a partial answer to the question posed above, an answer that
proceeds by identifying three categories of cases that federal courts typically
confront in habeas corpus proceedings.
2

The Court's New Rule on New Rules Applied: Three Paradigmatic
Situations

One type of habeas corpus case applies an established rule of law that is
framed in terms of one or more elements of historical fact that the trier must
find in each case in order to determine the outcome under the rule. For example, criminal defendants have longstanding sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights to trial by "impartial" jurors" 2 and to forego trial when they are "incompetent" to understand the proceedings and to assist in their defense. 5 3 In
both situations, the Supreme Court has held recently that the circumstances
upon which the right turns - the "impartiality" vel non of the challenged
juror and the "competency" vel non of the defendant - are questions of historical fact.2 5 In such cases, if the state courts have made factfindings on the
controlling questions on the basis of "full and fair hearings," then federal
habeas corpus courts are bound by statute to abide by those findings .unless the
findings are shown to be erroneous by "clear and convincing" evidence.25Rather evidently, cases falling into this first category are not subject to
the Teague nonretroactivity defense. To begin with, the habeas corpus statute
already requires federal court deference to state court decisions in this category of cases, inasmuch as those decisions turn upon findings of historical fact.
Accordingly, this is not a category of cases in which "the application of new
rules... forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison
defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional
standards." 6 Rather, (1) the federal court is required to respect the outcome
of the state court's initialmarshaling of resources because the state court made
the determinative factfinding in a "full and fair" manner, or (2) that marshaling of resources did not conform to existing legal standards and is not due
deference because it was not "full and fair;" or (3) the fact-finding made by the
state courts so "clearly" required those courts to decide the case in favor of
251. Id. at 28.
252. See, eg., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.
1025, 1031 (1984).

253. See, eg., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).
254. See, eg., Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct 2223, 2225 (1990) ("competency" a question of historical fact); Witt, 469 U.S. at 429 (juror "impartiality" a question of historical fact).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); Sumner v. Mata I, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981); J.LIEWMAN,
supra note 3, §§ 20.2, 28; see also Burden v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 862 (1991) (per curiam) (district

court must defer to findings favorable to petitioner as well as to state).
256. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989) (quoted in, eg., Butler v. McKelar, 110
S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)).

257. In certain circumstances, state appellate as well as trial court factfindings are due a
presumption of correctness under section 2254(d). See, eg., Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731,

739 (1991); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 388-89 n.5 (1986); Sumner v. Mata II, 455 U.S.
591, 593 (1982); Mata 1, 449 U.S. at 546.
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the defendant that their failure to do so is an issue on which reasonable minds
cannot differ. Because of the unequivocally determinative nature of one or
more well-specified historical facts in this situation, granting relief does not
even require the "mere[] ...application of [preexisting law] to a slightly different set of facts, '2 58 and only requires the application of preexisting law to
the very same set of determinative facts that the Court's prior decisions have
identified.
A second category of cases is similar in many respects to the preceding
category. In these cases, however, the Court has said that the circumstances
that prior precedent makes determinative of whether the claim succeeds or
fails is a "'mixed question of law and fact,'" which is subject to de novo review in appellate and habeas corpus proceedings.2 59 In this category, for example, the Court has placed the questions whether a confession made by a
criminal defendant was "involuntary" in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments; 26 whether the police lacked "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause" for a stop, search, seizure, or arrest in violation of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments;2 6 1 whether a pretrial identification procedure used by
the police was "suggestive" or "unreliable" in violation of the fourteenth
amendment; 262 whether jury selection procedures resulted in ajury (as distinguished from individual jurors)that was not "fair and impartial" in violation
of the sixth and fourteenth amendments; 263 whether jury instructions were
insufficient to inform "reasonable juror[s]" of their fourteenth amendment responsibility to find each element of the offense "beyond a reasonable
doubt;''264 whether the legal assistance rendered the defendant at trial or on
appeal was "ineffective" in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments
26 5
because it was "not reasonably competent" and "prejudiced" the defendant;
whether the evidence used to convict the petitioner was constitutionally "sufficient; '' 26 6 whether the defendant lacked the "intent to kill" or degree of participation in "actually kill[ing]" that is necessary to elevate a homicide to the
level of culpability for which the eighth and fourteenth amendments allow the
258. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217 (emphasis added).
259. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1985) (emphasis added).
260. See, eg., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991); Miller, 474 U.S. at
112-13; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
261. See, eg., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985) (independent review of
"reasonable suspicion"); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (same); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (independent review of "probable cause"), overruled on other grounds,
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
262. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata II, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
198-200 (1972).
263. See, eg., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-69 n.3 (1986); Irwin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
264. See, eg., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1985).
265. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980).
266. See, eg., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979).
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death penalty;26 7 whether state law or practice impedes "consideration of mitigating circumstances" at the penalty phase of capital trials in violation of the

eighth and fourteenth amendments;268 and whether the jury instructions were
sufficient to inform "reasonable jurors" of their ability to vote against a death
sentence on the basis of mitigating circumstances even as to which the entire
panel of twelve jurors did not reach consensus.2 6 9 The lower courts have ad-

ded to this list, for example, the questions whether evidence improperly suppressed by the prosecution before trial is "material;" 2 70 whether the state
denied the petitioner a "speedy" trial;271 whether admission of hearsay state-

ments violated defendant's sixth amendment right to "confrontation;

2r

whether the defendant's guilty plea was "involuntary;""7 3 whether the defen-

dant "requested counsel" during interrogation, thereby requiring the police to
suspend further questioning;27 4 whether the "functional equivalent" of inter-

rogation occurred;27 whether the petitioner "waived" her right to silence2 76
and to a lawyer;2' whether the defendant was suticiently "indigent" to require provision of counsel at state expense;278 whether prosecutorial, judicial,
or other "misconduct" 7 9 occurred that "prejudiced ' 2y 1 the defendant sufficiently to violate due process;2 8 and whether any error committed in the case

was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

'282

267. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 155-56 n.ll (1987); Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. 376, 382, 390 (1986).
268. See, ag., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2950 (1989).
269. See, eg., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375, 384 (1988).
270. See, ag., United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1829 (1990); Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1306 (3d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988).
271. See, eg., Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 1982).
272. See, e-g., Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1071 (1984).
273. See, e-g., Moore v. Jarvis, 885 F.2d 1565, 1570 n.9 (11th Cir. 1989); Oppal v.
Meachum, 851 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 911 (1988).
274. See, ag., Bailey v. Hamby, 744 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1984).
275. See, eg., Endress v. Dugger, 880 F.2d 1244, 1249 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1923 (1990).
276. See, eg., Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424,428 (9th Cir. 1988). But cf. Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 108 n.3 (1985) (reserving question).
277. See, e-g., Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 947 (1lth Cir.), cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1210
(1983).
278. See, eg., Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1988).
279. See, eg., United States ex rel. Shaw v. De Robertis, 755 F.2d 1279, 1282 n.2 (7th Cir.
1985).
280. See, eg., Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3169 (1989); Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988).
281. See, eg., Williams v. Maggio, 730 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1984).
282. See, ag., United States ex rel Lee v. Flannigan, 884 F.2d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3277 (1990); see also Gunn v. Newsome, 881 F.2d 949, 964 (1lth Cir.)
(en banc), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 542 (1989); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1388-89 (10th
Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990). The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that
harmless error is a mixed question of fact and law. See Yates v. Evatt, 11 S. Ct. 1884, 1893-94
(1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. CL 1246, 1257 (1991). See generallyJ. LIEBMAN, supra
note 3, § 20.3d.
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The "mixed question" rubric, and the de novo review that follows from it,
are apparently designed to allow appellate and habeas corpus courts to exer-

cise continuing control over legal principles that are suffused with a "'complex of values' " and that "can be given meaning only through... application
to the particular circumstances ' 2 8 3 presented by "a series of closely related
situations."28' 4 Because this definition of a "mixed question" proceeds from
the need in unsettled areas of law for additional "norm elaboration" via "caseby-case development of constitutional [standards], 2 8 5 one might predict that

the Court will conclude that the self-conscious legal "elaboration" and "development" invited in "mixed question" situations constitutes the announcement

of "new" rules. After all, the premise for retaining appellate control via the
"mixed question" rubric is the presence of a legal principle sufficiently unclear
or unsettled that one could anticipate "debate among reasonable
minds" in
286

regard to the principle's application to new sets of facts.

Were this approach taken, the end of habeas corpus would be at hand.

Either the Court would characterize a question reaching the federal courts via
habeas corpus as "factual," in which case the habeas corpus statute would
require presumptive deference to the state courts' determination of the ques-

tion as long as that determination was fairly rendered.287 Or, the issue would
be deemed legal, in which case the Court's recent revision of habeas corpus
jurisdiction via the Teague line of cases would require conclusive deference to
the state courts' determination, no matter how that determination was ren-

dered. The traditional argument by habeas corpus petitioners in favor of de
novo, as opposed to deferential, federal review 288 - namely, that the questions

involved are ones of law, or are "mixed" with questions of law - would constitute an escape from the frying pan of presumptive deference to state court
factual findings into the fire of conclusive deference to state court legal
determinations.2 89
283. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114, 116 (1985) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
284. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFactReview, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 273 (1985) (cited in
Miller, 474 U.S. at 114).
285. Id.
286. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990). See generally West, supra note 6, at
58 ("It is a well-worn truism that the application of precedent to new facts always requires
judgment and that no case is literally compelled by precedent. Consequently, [under the 1990
decisions,] almost every habeas petition, if successful, would create a new rule.").
287. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
288. See, eg., Miller, 474 U.S. at 114-18 (collecting numerous cases in which petitioners
secured or attempted to secure habeas corpus relief on this basis); cases cited supra notes 260-82

(same).
289. A new parlor game among habeas corpus writers is to identify Teague's "whipsaw,"
or "frying-pan-into-fire" effect on arguments that used to discourage federal courts from deferring to state court determinations. See, eg., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA, supra note
145, at 163 n.698 (Teague undermines prisoners' "new-law" response to state's procedural default defense); Arkin, supra note 6, at 407-08 (by arguing that a "decision was sufficiently 'new'
to excuse [the filing of] a second habeas petition[, prisoner] virtually... mandate[s] a finding of
novelty under Teague"); Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 186 ("any claim in a second or subsequent
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Although not without support in the Court's post-Teague decisions, this
understanding of "new" ultimately seems misguided. To begin with, the
Court recently declined to give up de novo habeas corpus review of one of the
longest recognized "mixed questions" - the voluntariness of confessions on the ground that "Congress patterned [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) after... case
[law] that clearly assumed that... voluntariness... was an issue for independent federal determination."2 9' For the Court now to ignore this acknowledged "congressional guidance" on the "independent" review due
mixed questions, and for it to preclude not only independent, but all, "federal
determination" of voluntariness and similar "mixed" questions, would flout
"congressional intent" in ways that at least some members of the post-Teague
majority would find offensive.2 9 1 Moreover, the Court simultaneously recognized that "mixed question" review is not an exercise of a questionable judicial
power to make new law,2 92 but rather part of the Court's routine and 'primary function as an expositor of law" already made.293 The mixed question
function, that is, calls only for the "elaboration" 294 or "exposit[ion]" of a previously settled "legal principle... through its application to the particular
petition based on a new rule that is sufficiently 'dictated' by prior precedent to avoid the label,
'new law,' will be barred because it either was or should have been raised inthe first petition");
Weisberg, supra note 3,at 32 n.138 ("Catch 22 is that a new rule is not cognizable on habeas
unless it is so new as to be one of the last remaining unrecognized watersheds. Catch 22A is
that a petitioner may suffer a procedural default... unless his 'cause' for default is that he did
not anticipate a new intervening constitutional ruling, in which case that ruling may be a 'new
rule' to which he is not entitled" under Teague); infra note 457. Consider also the following:
Until Teague, any lawyer worth her salt knew that the most reasonable method of rationing
space among equally strong Supreme Court precedents was to emphasize the most recent one.
By penalizing petitioners who cite recent decisions that "control" the result relative to those
who cite older decisions that "dictate" the outcome, Teague changes this rule of practice. Over
the long run, the new rule of practice will simply send lawyers back to the books to seek support
in older Supreme Court, circuit court, and district court precedents and back to their thesauruses to find words to convey the extent to which those cases "dictate," "ordain," and "command" the desired result. In the short run, however, Teague's effect is a whipsaw: Prisoners
with the good fortune to have lawyers partial to state-of-the-art, as opposed to passe, citations
and leery of verbal escalation from "supports" to "dictates" and beyond are more likely to lose.
Illustrating the extent to which subtle characterizations of the rule being promoted has become
the name of the game are, eg., West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 1991) (court chides
state's attorney for "erroneous" characterization of petitioner's run-of-the-mill constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence claim as a challenge to the "facial validity of a permissive inference"
in order to establish a nonretroactivity defense); Harriman v. Lynn, 901 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir.
1990) (court sees through petitioner's effort to rely on earlier precedent, rather than upon later
decision that is on all fours with petitioner's claim but is not retroactive).
290. Miller, 474 U.S. at 115 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
291. Id. (opinion for the Court by O'Connor, J.); see Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1079
(1989) (White, J., concurring) (expressing commitment to follow Congress' lead in regard to
retroactivity of new decisions in habeas corpus proceedings); Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301,
1303 (1983) (White, Circuit Justice, in Chambers) (questioning wisdom of rule permitting successive petitions absent proof of deliberate bypass, but acceding to Congress' intention to adopt
that rule).
292. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
293. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added).
294. Monaghan, supra note 284, at 274.
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circumstances of a case ' 295 or to a series of closely related cases.29
Decisions based upon established constitutional principles defined in
terms of "mixed" questions accordingly embody the "mere[] ... application

of [preexisting law] to a slightly different set of facts" - an endeavor that the
post-Teague majority suggested does not qualify as the making of "new" legal

rules.297 An endeavor of this sort, indeed, may explain the Court's actions in
the otherwise perplexing Penry and Jeffers cases, which, as noted above, establish that even controversial rulings - that is, rulings that controversially apply noncontroversial or well-established rules to new facts - are not, by their
controversial nature alone, rendered new. 98

Based on the above analysis, one rough and ready way to describe a type
of claim that escapes "new rule" difficulties is this: A claim is not premised on

a "new" rule as long as a court can grant relief simply by reciting some relatively, but not wholly, inelastic verbal "principle" that was announced in a
case decided before the petitioner's conviction became final. In other words,
assuming some substantial definiteness in regard to both the constitutional
provision being applied and the overall factual scenario being scrutinized, in-

congruity between the individual facts giving rise to the current claim and the
individual facts giving rise to the earlier, prefinality decision should not defeat

the claim.2 99 Thus, for example, if a claim can be granted simply by stating
that it is an instance of the rule that X, where X is the rule of a decision

rendered before the petitioner's case became final - for example, the rule that
"involuntary confessions violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments," or that
"precluding capital sentencers from considering mitigating evidence" violates
the eighth and fourteenth amendments, 30° or that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments forbid "aggravating circumstances that focus generally on the

egregiousness of the offense but do not provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing murders that deserve the death penalty from those that do not '

301'

295. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
296. Monaghan, supra note 284, at 274-75.
297. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990).
298. See supra notes 217-24, 244-48 and accompanying text. Also explained by this analysis are the Yates and Truesdale decisions discussed supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
299. This approach is not a new one. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (rulings are not new if they are "grounded upon fundamental principles
whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are altered
slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation"); T. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 16 (2d
ed. 1888) (quoting Palsey v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 63, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 456 (1789)) (" 'Where
cases are new in theirprinciple,... it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in
order to remedy the grievance; but where the case is only new in the instance, and the only
question is upon the application of a principle recognized in the law to such new case, it will be
just as competent to courts of justice to apply the principle.' ").
300. The latter rule is the one the Court extracted from Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (plurality opinion), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and applied in Penry
v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989), the conviction in which became final after Lockett
and Eddings were decided. See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
301. This rule is the one the Court extracted from Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980), and applied in Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990), and Maynard v. Cart-
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then the claim is immune to the nonretroactivity defense.3 "

This interpretation helps explain the statement in Parksthat a necessary,
if perhaps not sufficient, attribute of "newness" is a "simple and logical difference between [the] rule[]" in question and the "precise holdingfsJ" of prior
cases.33 A simple and logical difference between the facts of the two cases

will not suffice. Or, as the Court phrased the concept in UnitedStates v. Johnson, a precursor of Teague,3" the application of a rule to "new and different
factual situations" does not render the result itself "new" as long as the pro-

cess did "not in fact alter[] [the existing] rule in any material way.

3 °5

The third category of cases that habeas corpus courts can expect to con-

front are ones in which the petitioner cannot secure relief unless a court
adopts a verbal standard different from the standards contained in cases decided before the petitioner's conviction became final. Although most cases in

this category satisfy the prevailing post-Teague definition of "new rules," some
cases do not, because they present situations in which no reasonable jurist
could fail to realize that an existing holding or set of holdings predestines the
wright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), the convictions in both of which became final after the announcement of Godfrey. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
302. The Court in Sawyer refused to apply the "dictated by precedent" test at too high a
"level of generality." Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827-28 (1990). That refusal, however,
accompanied the petitioner's attempt to bring a number of prior cases under the umbrella of a
principle that was broader than the holding or "rule" of each of the cases and that was stated as
such in none of them. See id. Still, the test proposed in text remains rough and ready. Consider Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990). The issue there was the novelty vel non of
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), given the Court's earlier decision in Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards, the Court stated its "holding" as follows: "Wie...
hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him.. .." Id. at 484-85. The Court did not "hold that an accused, such as
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject
to further [uncounseled] interrogation by the authorities on the same charge that was the subjcct
ofthe interrogationduringwhich he askedfor counsel ...... Accordingly, when confronted with
a defendant who had been interrogated on a second charge following a request for counsel on
the first charge, the Roberson Court not only could and did grant the defendant relief using the
precise verbal holding of Edwards but also could and did characterize its decision as a refusal to
create an "exception" to Edwards for separate investigations. Roberon, 486 U.S. at 677, 685.
How, then, could the Court in Butler rule that Roberson created a new rule? Perhaps, the best
answer, other than that Butler is wrong, is this: The Edwards standard clearly had to b- time
constrained in some way. Otherwise, the case would stand for the clearly unintended rule that a
request for counsel would immunize an arrestee from "further interrogation by the authorities"
for the rest of her life. Once it was clear that the verbal holding of Edwardswas incomplete, the
missing "term" could only be supplied by the overall factual scenario of the case, which involved subsequent interrogation about the same offense. On this reading, the holding of Roberson (prohibiting further interrogation during "continuous custody," 486 U.S. at 690-91) went
beyond the rule of Edwards as that rule was supplemented by Edwards' facts in regard to a
missing, but clearly implied, limitation on the rule.
303. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (1990) (emphasis added).
304. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
305. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982); accord, e g., Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (retroactivity appropriate if new decision "simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely
analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law").

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. XVIII:537

rule for which the petitioner contends. It is not hard to imagine a decision, for
example, that presents its "holding" or "rule" no more broadly than the facts
of the case require but that on its face or in its historical context establishes perhaps even beyond peradventure - that the principle lying behind the holding or rule will take the law further as soon as a case arises that calls for the
extension.3 06
Take, as an example, the Court's move from Lockett v. Ohio3 07 to Eddings v. Oklahoma,30 ' a move that the Court in both Penry and Parks implied
had nothing new about it.3" In Lockett, the Court held that the state could
not by statute preclude the defendant from presenting evidence of any mitigating circumstance about herself and her offense that supplied a potential basis
for a sentence less than death. 310 In Eddings, the Court held that, having let
the defendant introduce all the mitigating evidence he had, the sentencing
judge could not then refuse to consider that evidence. 3 11 A holding requiring
the admission of mitigating evidence at the capital-sentencing phase logically
assumes that the sentencer must be required to consider that evidence. Lockett thus seems to dictate the result in Eddings, notwithstanding that Lockett
did not in terms express the Eddings holding.
3 12
Take as a second example, the Court's move from Edwards v. Arizona,
which held, under the fifth amendment, that a request during police interrogation for an attorney forbids subsequent uncounseled questioning, to Michigan
v. Jackson,31 3 which held, under the sixth amendment, that a request at arraignment for an attorney forbids subsequent uncounseled questioning. Consider that the Supreme Court recognized the sixth amendment right to counsel
during postarraignment interrogation, the right at stake in Jackson, before recognizing the fifth amendment right to counsel at prearraignment interrogation, the right at issue in Edwards.3" 4 Consider next that the Court has
generally treated the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel as either
306. For example, although the Court expressly limited its initial ruling that racial segregation laws violate the fourteenth amendment to "the field of public education," see Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), the lower courts understood immediately that the decision also outlawed laws segregating public parks, beaches, and golf courses, and when they so
ruled, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed without opinion. See, eg., New Orleans City
Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
307. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
308. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
309. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-62 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934, 2947 (1989).
310. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
311. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-11.
312. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
313. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
314. Compare Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (first recognizing automatic
sixth amendment right to counsel during postindictment interrogation) with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (recognizing more limited fifth amendment right to counsel during
preindictment interrogation). Although Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), looked for a
time as if it would extend the sixth amendment right to counsel back to the preindictment
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equal to, 315 or greater than, 316 the scope of the fifth amendment right. Consider finally that the Jackson Court explicitly found that the postindictment
context in Jackson presented a "stronger" case for application of the no-further-interrogation rule than the prearraignment context of Edwards.317 Under

these circumstances, Jackson is a classic case of a "lesser included rule" that
follows a fortiorifrom the "greater including" rule of Edwards.? e
B. A Newer New Rule on New Rules: A Policy-Based Proposal
Having slogged through the "jurisprudential morass' 3 1 9 created by the
Court's new rule on "new rules," let me suggest a way around the difficulty on
the firmer ground of retroactivity and habeas corpus policy. Although the

Court is unlikely soon to consider alternative retroactivity routes, Congress
may still be on the lookout.32
L

Deterrence

The Teague plurality and the post-Teague majority justify the nonretroactivity defense on the basis of a deterrence policy attributed to Justice

Harlan:
interrogation stage, that case since has been treated "as nothing more than a 'false start.'" W.
LAFAVE & J.ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROCEDuRE 275 (1985).
315. See, eg., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159
(1985); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
316. See, eg., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (discussed infra note 317); Maine
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (police informant's "interrogation" of accused on offenses
already formally charged violates sixth amendment right to counsel, but same interrogation on
offenses not already formally charged does not violate fifth amendment right to counsel);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (unlike preindictment interrogation, which may proceed, upon waiver of right to silence, in absence of counsel, postarraigament interrogation cannot properly occur upon waiver of right to silence in absence of counsel, and courts should be
more reluctant in postarraignment than in prearraignment setting to find waiver of right to
counsel); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no fifth amendment right to counsel at lineups
conducted prior to arraignment, by contrast to existence of sixth amendment right to postindictment lineups). But see McNeil v. Wisconsin, 59 U.S.L.W. 4636, 4638 (U.S., June 13,
1991) (because sixth amendment right to counsel is "offense-specific," while fifth amendment
right to counsel is not, invocation of sixth amendment right does not, although invocation of
fifth amendment right does, forbid subsequent interrogation on different offense in absence of
counsel).
317. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631 ("the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged").
318. Butcf.Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1510 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
225 (1990) (rule of Jackson probably is "new" and nonretroactive in postfinality cases).
319. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 28.
320. Both the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees heard testimony during the last
two sessions of Congress calling for Teague to be overruled. See, ag., ABA Testimony, supra
note 15, at 25-26, 42-43, 47; Lay, Statement of ChiefJudge DonaldA Lay, Eighth CircuitCourt
of Appeals, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee in re. Habeas Corpus Reform in Capital
Cases, 19 CAP. U.L. REv. 659, 672-73 (1990). In 1990, both Committees reported out legislation, which failed on the floor, proposing that Teague be overruled, at least in capital cases. See
S. 1757, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2262, 135 CONG. REc. S13474 (1989); H.R. 5269, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. § 1305 (1990). See generally supra note 145; infra Part VIII.
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As [Justice Harlan] had explained..., 'the threat of habeas serves
as a necessary incentive for trial and appellate judges throughout the
land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional principles. In order to perform this deterrence
function, the habeas court need only apply constitutional standards
that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.' 394
U.S. at 262-263. See also [Solem v.] Stumes, 465 U.S. [638],... 653
[(1984)]... (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("Review on habeas
to determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the
law in effect at the time of the conviction is all that is required to
'forc[e] trial and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional
32 1
mark.' ") (citation omitted).
The deterrence policy is helpful to a degree. Clearly, the Great Writ is
designed to deter police officers, prosecutors, jury commissioners, state judges,
and other actors in our decentralized criminal justice system from ignoring or
flouting established Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional edicts.
Consequently, new decisions reversing state-level practices that clearly were
proscribed by existing law deserve fully retroactive application in habeas
corpus.
Just as clearly, habeas corpus is designed, and full retroactivity is necessary, to give state-level participants in the criminal justice system an incentive
to apply existing federal constitutional precedents to reasonably analogous circumstances - or, as the Court phrased the concept in United States v. Johnson, to "new and different factual situations" that do "not in fact alter the
[existing] rule in any material way."'3 22 Otherwise, the procession of moderately different fact situations confronting actors in the criminal justice system
each day would present them with a continuous parade of opportunities to
apply the law as they please, regardless of prior federal precedents, and would
remove any "'incentive... to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional principles.' ,323 A nonretroactivity rule in
situations involving the application of old law to reasonably analogous new
facts also would put an overwhelming burden on the Supreme Court. Such a
rule would make the Court, on certiorari review, the single federal judicial
arbiter not simply of basic principles of constitutional law but also of the application of that law to each and every one of the myriad slightly distinctive
fact patterns that arise in tens of thousands of police stations and courthouses
321. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); accord Sawyer v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827, 2830, 2831 (1990); Sale v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990); Butler v.
McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2964-65 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982) (citing authority).
323. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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across the country on a daily basis.3 24 Likewise, such a nonretroactivity rule
would denigrate the Teague plurality's injunction against treating "similarly

situated" persons differently by turning it into a meaningless proscription
against treating identically situated persons differently. 3z

This same habeas corpus policy of holding state criminal justice participants to prior federal precedents supports a firm nonretroactivity rule for a
new decision that "[1] explicitly overrules a past precedent of th[e] Court...,

[2] disapproves a practice th[e] Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases
...
,[3] overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which th[e] Court

has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority
has expressly approved, ' 326 or [4] violates "assurance[s]" found in prior law
that the case would be decided differently. 32 7 Thus, the same deterrence pol-

icy that prompts habeas corpus courts to send a negative message (reversal of
the relevant state-level practice or decision) whenever state-level actors have
deviated from existing federal constitutional law also should prompt habeas
corpus courts to send a positive message (affirmance of the relevant state-level
action) whenever state-level actors have adhered to existing, even if later modified, federal law.328
The deterrence policy does not by itself solve the "new rule" mystery,
however. For the policy does not by itself specify what state-level practices
habeas corpus is designed to deter and how habeas corpus should do so. 32 9 On
324. See, eg., J.LmBmAN,supra note 3, § 22A.lh (Supp. 1991); see also Spencer v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2276 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari) (implying that
Teague obliges Court to grant certiorari on direct review to consider substantial claims seeking
establishment of new rules as to which Teague would forbid habeas corpus review).
325. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070, 1078 (plurality opinion).
326. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551 (citations omitted); accord,eg., Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070
(plurality opinion) ("case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government"); id. (rule of Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986), which overruled portion of Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), constitutes "new
rule"); id. (rule of Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), which overturned Court's prior practices of (1) treating sixth amendment right to present defensive evidence as a matter for case-bycase, not categorical, adjudication, eg., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and (2)
leaving the states free to treat hypnotically induced or affected testimony as they chose, free of
constitutional constraints constitutes "new rule"); Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986)
(per curiam) (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), not retroactive because it constituted an
"explicit and substantial break with prior precedent" and overruled a portion of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646-47 (1984) (decision nonretroactive if it "has explicitly overruled past precedent;" holding that rule of Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981), is nonretroactive because it replaced established practice of treating custodial requests for counsel as only one aspect of the case-by-case analysis of whether the suspact
invoked or waived Miranda rights with a bright line rule interpreting all requests for counsel as
automatically invoking Miranda rights); other cases cited supra notes 42, 121, 209.
327. Desist, 394 U.S. at 264 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
328. See Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1288-89 (5th Cir. 1989) (ea banc) (no justification for overturning decisions reached "in complete conformity to constitutional standards in
place when the convictions became final"), aff'd sub non Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990).
329. See, eg., Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. CL 1212, 1222 & n.5 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority opinion begs question, "deterrence of what?;" majority's approach deters only

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. XVIII:537

one view, habeas corpus is intended only to deter state courts from defying

clear prior law. On this view, whenever existing law is ambiguous, a state
judge can be said to have acted responsibly if she reached any one of the al-

most certainly plural conclusions that a reasonable jurist could reach based on
existing law. If the state judge's conclusion turns out to be different from the
one the Supreme Court ultimately reaches, the federal judiciary should not
subject the state judge to the negative message of reversal because of the state
judge's responsible, albeit erroneous, interpretation of ambiguous prior law.
Put the other way around, the deterrent policy simply does not come into play
unless the state judge acted in demonstrable "bad faith"3 30 - the very concept
the post-Teague Court adopted, citing the Court's decision limiting the deter-

rent exclusionary remedy for some fourth amendment violations to "bad
faith" police conduct.331
Consider some of the problems with viewing habeas corpus from this
minimal-deterrence perspective. To begin with, the view either deprives

habeas corpus of virtually all deterrent impact 3 3 2 or invites an insulting and
"completely indefensible rejections of federal claims" and "'illogical' defiance of a binding precedent precisely on point"); Hoffimann, supra note 3, at 180 ("Beneath this (deterrence-based
definition of new rule] lurks the following question: What is the appropriate standard of care
[to which] state judges deciding federal constitutional issues... should be held by their federal
counterparts?"). The only answer the Teague plurality and Butler-Parks-Sawyermajorities give
to Justice Brennan's question "deterrence of what?," Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1222 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), is circular - the habeas corpus statute is designed to deter state courts from failing
to apply "existing" law defined as that law which the habeas corpus statute is designed to deter
state judges from ignoring. The majority, that is, does not explain why, for example, habeas
corpus is "....a necessary additional incentive [for state] trial and appellate courts throughout
the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards" '" - with "established" defined to mean fully formed and entirely dispositive rather than in a manner consistent with, say, "obviously developing" or "manifestly foreshadowed" standards? Id. at 1217 (majority opinion) (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (quoting
Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting))) (emphasis added).
330. See Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 181 (pre-1989 Term analysis predicting that "[t]he
only kind of case that [could] be reversed on federal habeas, under [the] 'reasonable good faith'
standard" that Justice Scalia advocated in his Penry dissent, "is one in which the state judge
misapplies clear, binding federal precedent," a view "analogous to the minimal duty imposed on
a police officer in a search warrant case under the current construction of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule").
331. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257,
1260 (1990) (quoting Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217 (citing with "Cf." signal United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984))) (" 'The "new rule" principle... validates reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be
contrary to later decisions.' "). Discussing the deterrence policy in the fourth amendment context is, eg., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-13; discussing deterrence in both the fourth amendment and
habeas corpus contexts is Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480-82 (1976).
332. See generallyFallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1816 (Court's "too expansive" definition of new rules in the Teague line of cases "reduces the incentives for state courts, and state
law enforcement officials to take account of... [federal] law"); West, supra note 6, at 86
(Court's 1990 decisions "explicitly undermine judicial responsibility... [by] strip[ping] the state
judge of responsibility for all but the most egregious constitutional errors and [by] strip[ping]
the federal judge of the duty to do anything but reverse patently unreasonable decisions" (emphasis in original)); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 316
(under Court's 1990 decisions, "there is little incentive for state courts to interpret Supreme
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unadministrable case-by-case inquest into the good faith of state judges.
On the one hand, a categorical rule that simply assumes that state judges
did in fact arrive responsibly at any conclusion at which a court potentially
could have arrived responsibly, would have little deterrent effect; it would immunize state judges who, for example, proceeded according to the "principle"
that all, even slightly, ambiguous legal questions should be resolved as a matter of course, and without further legal inquiry, against criminal defendants.
Although this "principle" might well be the most politically prudent one for
elected state judges to follow, it is legally indefensible, hence precisely the kind
of rule that habeas corpus is meant to deter.33 3
On the other hand, a case-by-case inquiry into the bona fides of state
judges' motivations is a palpably unsatisfactory means of avoiding this problem. How, for example, can habeas corpus petitioners expose state judges who
are determined to find for the state whenever even the slightest ambiguity in
the law exists? May the federal courts, by analogy to the burden Batson v.
Kentucky3 4 places on prosecutors in the peremptory challenge arena, require
state trial and appellate judges, on the occasion of every ruling against a defendant, to intone a "neutral" explanation for their actions? 335 Or, must the federal courts, by analogy to the Swain v. Alabama3 3 6 rule - the deterrent
unworkability of which prompted the Batson substitute33 7 - forbid a prisoner
to recover until scores of other prisoners have laid down their liberty and lives
in the course of establishing a "pattern" on the part of a given state judge of
3 38
deciding for the state whenever ambiguity in the law allowed her to do so?
Court precedent in a way that gives a criminal defendant the full benefit of current constitutional protections," so that "the deterrent force of the habeas writ is substantially and unacceptably diminished").
333. See J. LmBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.2c, at 17 n.62 and accompanying text; see also
Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 191 & nn.92, 94 (citing authority) ("state courts... continue to
construe both their state constitutions and the federal constitution narrowly, recognizing defendants' claims only when compelled to do so by controlling precedent"); Neuborne, supra note
30, at 1105-06. But see Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827, 2831 (Court eschews "skepticism of state
courts[']" willingness to "recognize federal constitutional protections (when] ...they are [not]
compelled to do so" because "State courts are coequal parts of our national judicil system and
give serious attention to their responsibilities for enforcing the commands of the Constitution").
Generally reviewing the lively debate over the last 15 years concerning the existence vel non of
"parity" between state and federal courts in the exposition of federal constitutional law is
Chemerinsky, supra note 30.
334. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
335. See id. at 97-98. The common preference of state appellate judges - not to mention
state trial judges - to rule by one-sentence orders, even in situations involving multiple claims,
is revealed in the line of procedural-default cases, typified by Coleman v. Thompson, 59
U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S., June 24, 1991), and Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1039 (1989), in which
difficulties are encountered because the ground of the state-court decision is ambiguous. See J.
LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 24.2c, 24.2d (collecting cases).

336. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
337. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
338. Consider, for example, the track record of the Georgia state court judge who is
elected by citizens of the rural county in which the correctional facility housing death row sits
and who hears all state postconviction petitions filed by capitally sentenced prisoners in the
state. A study of the 49 capital postconviction petitions that the judge adjudicated between
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And what would such a pattern look like? Moreover, even assuming federal
judges could identify adherents of the rule "when in any doubt, decide for the
state" - and even assuming federal judges could or should brand such adherence bad faith - it is hard to imagine a greater indignity inflicted upon state
339
judges by a federal inquisition into the bona fides of state judges' motives.
Nor does the Court's fourth amendment analogy help. For in the fourth
amendment context, the Court has limited the good faith defense to police
officers proceeding under a warrant. 34 These situations arise only after a separate, more neutral and detached judicial 341 process has been substituted for a
lower-level bureaucratic process that we have reason to distrust. 342 The use of
a "good faith" defense to habeas corpus relief has exactly the opposite effect.
It does not encourage resort to a separate, broader-minded, and more neutral
and detached process to supplement a process that is locally embedded, highly
charged politically, and subject to doubts about its neutrality.3 43 Rather, the
"good faith" defense to habeas corpus relief acts entirely to deprive persons
victimized by the more suspect process of access to the less suspect one.
Remember, too, that a sanction's deterrent effect is a function not only of
the sanction's certainty but also of its severity. a44 In this regard, there is reason to doubt the deterrent effect of a rule that forbids federal court intervention until the unlikely discovery of an egregious, essentially nose-thumbing
1983 and 1988 reveals that the judge granted relief in only one case (and the Georgia Supreme
Court granted relief in only one other case), leaving the federal courts to correct constitutional
errors in 16 of the 35 cases (12 cases remaining under consideration) that the federal courts had
resolved as of the date of the study. Thus, the 2% rate (1/49) at which the trial judge (and the
4% rate (2/49) at which Georgia postconviction courts as a whole) found constitutional error in
all capital cases may be compared with the 46% rate (16/35) at which the federal courts found
constitutional error in only those cases in which the Georgia courts found none. Statement of
Elaine R. Jones, Deputy Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., Concerning Reform of the Capital Habeas Corpus Review Process, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 6, 1990), at 11-12 n.35; see also supra note
15 (overall, federal courts find constitutional error in 40-46% of the capital cases in which state
courts find none).
339. Among the numerous decisions seeking to avoid indignities that habeas corpus might
inflict on state judges are Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4793 (U.S., June 24, 1991)
(explicitly invoking the state courts' "dignitary interest" as a basis for limiting habeas corpus
review); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33
(1982).
340. Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923-25 (1984) ("bad faith" requirement applied to police officer proceeding under judicial warrant) with United States v. Curzi,
867 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
349 (1987)) (rejecting "bad faith" requirement for police conduct undertaken without judicial
warrant or specific legislative authorization).
341. Or legislative. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349 (good faith defense for officers
acting in objectively reasonable reliance upon state statute specifically authorizing search). Or
administrative. See United States v. Ortiz, 714 F. Supp. 1569, 1577-80 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (good
faith defense for officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance upon FAA regulation specifically authorizing search), aff'd, 899 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1990).
342. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 172 (1980).
343. See supra note 338.
344. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 288 (1968),
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violation, then limits the intervention permitted to telling the offending party
to "run the play over again." Things might have been different had the courts
during the first half of this century refrained from replacing the traditional
habeas corpus remedy - "unconditional release" orders actually liberating
victims of unlawful incarceration - with "conditional release" orders freeing
only those prisoners whom the state fails to retry within a reasonable period.3 4 But now that retrial, not release, is the presumptive result of successful habeas corpus litigation, the deterrent penalty exacted for a state official's
constitutional violation is not - as one proponent of the "deterrence" rationale mistakenly argues - to "set" the prisoner "free,"'" but merely to prosecute or sentence the defendant again. Accordingly, as Professors Cover and
Aleinikoff have so elegantly demonstrated, it is not the federal judge's occasional slap on the state judge's wrist that improves the quality and tempers the
parochialism of constitutional adjudication in state criminal courts, but rather
the routine, continuous - indeed, repetitive - "dialogue" in which habeas
corpus traditionally has impelled the two judiciaries to engage.A1 7
An alternative view of the deterrence policy might define responsible constitutional interpretation and adjudication as an effort to bring the Constitution and prior precedents to bear on the question at hand and to replicate, as
best the interpreter can, the decisionmaking process that a responsible and
legally adroit Supreme Court assumedly will apply when that Court finally
resolves the question.'" This view holds that the only truly effective way to
give state-level actors an incentive to treat ambiguous questions of federal constitutional law responsibly is to require state-level decisions to be remade
whenever they deviate from the Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of the
question, as long as the Supreme Court's resolution is not clearly inconsistent
with preexisting law." 9 Assuming, as the drafters of the Constitution arguably did,35 0 that the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Constitution
are authoritative precisely because that Court is best placed to interpret federal law responsibly, the most effective way to encourage state courts to conduct constitutional interpretation consistent with Supreme Court precedent is
345. See . LIEBmAN, supra note 3, § 5.2, at 39-40, § 8.5, at 108-09; 2 J. LiEBMAAN, supra
note 3, §§ 31.4, 31.4d.
346. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 178; see also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Recent
Decisions, supra note 6, at 319 ("to set the guilty free").
347. Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L.L 1035, 1049 (1977). This same concept lies behind the appellate understanding of habeas
corpus. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; infra notes 367-69 and accompanying
text.
348. See generallyFalon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1816 (criticizing Court's "new rule"
definition for muting state officials' "incentives... to take account of the evolving direction of
the law"); West, supra note 6, at 59 (criticizing Court's "new rule" definition because it does not
encourage "state []or federal judges... [to] understand the prevailing law to include the articulation and enforcement of principles not yet formulated as positive law").
349. See infra note 351.
350. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,386-87 (1821); THE FEDERALIST No.
81, at 486 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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to give them negative feedback whenever they resolve ambiguous questions
differently from the way the Supreme Court has resolved those questions.3 5 '

Although the words, 352 if not the actual holdings, 353 of the Court's Butler, Parks, and Sawyer decisions tend towards the former, minimal-deterrence
approach to habeas corpus, and Teague is of two minds on the issue, 35 4 the

Court's "full retroactivity" decisions in Yates v. Aiken 355 and Penry v.
Lynaugh 35 6 seem to reject the minimal-deterrence approach. 35 7 In both Yates
and Penry, the Supreme Court refused to characterize rulings as "new." In

both cases, moreover, the majority did so although four members of the Court
vigorously dissented on the explicit ground that the rulings were not justified
by prior law and on the ground that many - in the case of Penry, all - lower
state and federal courts had reached conclusions contrary to the Supreme

Court's 5-4 rulings.3" 8 In neither case was it possible to conclude that the four
Justices in dissent and the various lower state and federal judges whose decisions were reversed or overruled had proceeded "irresponsibly," under the
minimal-deterrence understanding of the term,3 59 in reaching a conclusion

contrary to that eventually reached by a majority of the Supreme Court under
conditions of precedential ambiguity. As Justice Scalia, a partisan of the minimal-deterrence understanding, put the matter in his Penry dissent, "[i]t... [is]

utterly impossible to say that a judge acting in good faith and with care should
have known the rule announced today, and that future fault similar to that of
which the Texas courts have been
guilty must be deterred by making good on
' '3 6
the 'threat' of habeas corpus.
The deterrence policy thus provides neither a clear definition of "new
law" nor a principle that harmonizes the Court's recent criminal retroactivity
decisions. Rather, it is possible to reason from a deterrence policy to two
351. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 377, 415-19. This interpretation of the deterrence
policy regarding new Supreme Court decisions on previously ambiguous constitutional issues
does not require retroactive application of Supreme Court decisions that constitute a clear break
with theretofore unambiguousprior law. For, in the latter instance, unlike the former, responsible lower court adjudication deviates from responsible Supreme Court adjudication because of
the greater latitude available to the highest court than to lower courts to reconsider and reject
the highest court's prior precedents. The "new rule" definition that a "maximal deterrence"
understanding would require - that a Supreme Court ruling is not "new" unless reasonable
state judges would have been compelled to decide the case differently on the basis of preexisting
law - is something like the opposite of the Court's current definition - that a Supreme Court
ruling is "new" unless reasonable state judges would have been compelled to decide the case the
same way on the basis of preexisting law.
352. See supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 34, 227.
354. See supra note 321 and accompanying text; infra note 384 and accompanying text.
355. 484 U.S. 211 (1988).
356. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
357. For an attempt to bring Penry within something like the minimal-deterrence approach, see supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
358. Penry and Yates are discussed supra notes 211-14, 217-24 and accompanying text;
accord, e.g., Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (discussed supra note 214).
359. See supra notes 329-30 and accompanying text.
360. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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polar positions on the "new rule" question - and to the varying points in
between that the Court's recent decisions arguably occupy. Accordingly, resort to supplementary policy considerations is necessary, whether to provide a
clearer understanding of the malefactions habeas corpus is designed to deter,
to indicate how much deterrence is enough, or simply to resolve the uncer-

tainty left after both questions are answered.3 6 ' In Teague and subsequent
cases, the Court mentioned two policies in addition to deterrence. Both, however, are unsatisfactory.
2. Finality
First, the Court made the traditional genuflection 36 in the direction of
"finality." "' "The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose"' " and in relieving the States of having "' "continually... to marshal
resources in order to keep in prison [convicted] defendants,"'" the Court
said, "' "may quite legitimately be found by [the officials] responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the
competing interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when the habeas petition is filed." ' ,,363
This statement wears the difficulties with the "finality" policy on its
(slightly retro?) sleeve. To begin with, the passage does not identify the "officials responsible for defining the scope of the writ." But surely those officials
include the drafters of the habeas corpus statute, who (1) extended federal
jurisdiction to all "custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court... [that]
violat[es]... the Constitution; ' 3 6 (2) directed federal courts to remedy unlawful custody "as law and justice require;'3 6 and, more recently, (3) identified all pertinent legal and "mixed" legal-factual issues as matters "for
independent federal determination. '13 6 Whatever else Congress meant by
these actions, it surely did not intend to make "final" either the judgments of
state courts establishing custody or the legal conclusions those courts reached
in holding that custody to be constitutional. Indeed, the evolution of habeas
361. See generally The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases,supra note 6, at 315
(criticizing Court's 1990 decisions for their "reluctance to recognize that habeas corpus serves
purposes other than deterrence").
362. See, eg., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 489-94 (1976).
363. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216-17 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 109 S.
Ct. 1060, 1072, 1075 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis and bracketed material in
original)); accord Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. CLt 2822, 2831 (1990) (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at

1074) ("[a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became
final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our
criminal justice system' ").
364. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
365. Id. § 2243.
366. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (discussed supra note 290 and accompanying text).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. XVIII:537

corpus from a pretrial means of substituting federal for state jurisdiction3 67 to
a post-appeal means of supplementing state constitutional remedies, once exhausted, with federal remedies 368 suggests that Congress more recently has
intended to place federal courts in an appellate relationship to state courts
(insofar as federal legal issues are involved) such that finality does not arise in
the normal course until completion of habeas corpus review. 69
Moreover, as the previously mentioned Court's discussion of finality goes
on to acknowledge, the best that can be said about finality interests is that they
"may quite legitimately be found by the officials responsible for defining the
scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing
interest in readjudicating convictions according to legal standards in effect
when the habeas petition is filed." Finality analysis thus ends at the same
unsatisfactory point as deterrence policy: On a continuum running from 0 to
100% of all decisions being counted as "new," the proper placement of the
"new rule" definition is such that either "some, many, or most" decisions
ought properly to be so categorized.
3. Judicial Counterweight to CongressionalRemedies
The last policy that one may extract from Teague and later decisions is no
more satisfactory. It may, however, expose the pretense in the Court's reliance on the deterrence and finality policies and reveal the Court's true attitude
towards what "the officials responsible for defining the scope of the writ" actually wrought. "'Given the "broad scope of constitutional issues [that Congress has made] cognizable on habeas,"' " the Court says, "'it is "sounder, in
adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time
a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the
basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation." ' ,370 In other
words, Congress made the range of issues cognizable on habeas corpus so
broad that it behooves the Court to do what it can to narrow those issues.
Precisely, that is, because Congress wanted something more like maximal than
minimal deterrence to occur - and because Congress apparently meant to
defer to finality in only "some," and not in "many or most," respects - the
Court seems to feel both compelled and empowered to adjust the scale dramatically in the opposite direction.
The Court thus made a policy out of what commentators have identified
as the principal effect of Teague: It took the constitutional violations that
"previously [were] viewed by some as virtually deontological in their signifi367. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat.
385-86; Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 819-25.
368. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), 2254(c) (1988).
369. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 5.2, 26.1, 26.2, 27.1, 28.1, 35.1; Friedman, supra
note 22, at 254, 329; Higginbotham, supra note 3, at 1012-16.
370. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216-17 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 109 S.
Ct. 1060, 1072, 1075 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part))).
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cance" and "reduced [them] to instruments of deterrence of certain forms of

state misconduct, instruments whose value might... be exceeded by their
costs .
,371 The question the Court's motivation raises is not whether in an
ideal, or in our own, world deterrence of judges disposed to ignore the law
deserves deontological significance while remedying constitutional violations
does not. Indeed, a system - for example, the pre-Teague habeas corpus system - can give both values significance by using constitutional remedies not
only for their own sake but also as a means of deterring state court disrespect
of federal law.3 72 Rather, the question is whether the Court is authorized to
deemphasize constitutional remedies in favor of the "lesser included" concern

for deterrence on the ground that Congress' opposite emphasis is immoderate
or misguided.373
For me, the answer to this question is not difficult. However spacious the
Court's power to interpret, revise, and refine the habeas corpus statute may
be,374 that power ought not to extend to the deliberate frustration of the legis-

lative body's express statutory intention. 375 The nonretroactivity doctrine
supports this proposition. An important basis for giving lesser, Le., nonretro-

active, status to some decisions and greater, .e, retroactive, status to other
decisions is that the lower-status decisions tend toward the law-making side of
the spectrum of judicial conduct while the higher-status decisions tend toward
the law-elaboratingside of the spectrum. Moreover, however one ranges judicial conduct along that spectrum when a constitution is being expounded,
surely when instead a statute is being construed, the lowest-status - or most
clearly law-making - activity of all is a court's deliberate decision to counter

the policy, especially a constitution- and liberty-protecting policy, 376 that con371. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 14 (emphasis added); see also Hoffmann, supra note 3, at
167, 170, 178 (Teague proceeds on a " 'deterrence of state courts' theory" of habeas corpus and
devalues "the 'vindication of federal rights/protection of liberty' theory"); The Supreme Court,
1989 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 315-16 (Teague substitutes weak deterrence policy for policy of remedying denials of constitutional rights of personal liberty).
372. See Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 178-79 ("In the typical habeas case... a grant of
habeas relief... vindicates the petitioner's federal rights, and by doing so it serves to deter the
state courts from ignoring or misconstruing such rights in the future.").
373. Nor is there any question about Congress' "broad" remedial emphases, even had the
Court not so candidly acknowledged them. For the habeas corpus statute manifests those emphases in its two jurisdictional prerequisites: "custody" - the state's consequential withdrawal
of personal liberty or life - and a "violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 9.
375. It is perhaps the Court's acknowledged transformation of what Congress deemed the
major virtue of habeas corpus into a vice that led a strong supporter of Teague to criticize the
"reasonable minds could differ" approach to new rules as "inappropriately crabbed" and "unseemly." Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 181-84 (advocating "new rule" test requiring "conceptual
faithfulness" and not "mere decisional obedience" to prior law).
376. When statutory policy clearly clashes with constitutional - and even, possibly, with
historically and culturally accepted - policy, then some interpretive accommodation might be
required. Here, however, the constitutional and statutory policies run in the same direction,
and the only other policies the Court has identified either are accommodated by the vindication
of the conjoint constitutional and statutory policies, as is true of the "deterrence" policy, see
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cededly motivated the legislature's design of the statute.
Even if, in law and logic, the post-Teague majority's preference for narrowing the breadth of issues cognizable in habeas corpus may supersede Con-

gress' opposite preference when the matter is before the Justices, the ball is not
377
now in law's and logic's or even the Justices' court but, rather, in Congress'.

And there is no reason why Congress must concede judicial supremacy as it
contemplates revising or codifying Teague. The question remains, therefore,

what Congress ought to do and, as we have seen, the policies discussed by the
Court in Teague -

deterrence, finality, and the need to moderate the existing

statute's violation-remedying emphases - do not provide sufficient answers to
that question. Against the possibility that Congress will want to inform its
judgment on the question with additional policy considerations, let me turn to
one such consideration that charts the way to a middle ground between the
two polar nonretroactivity positions to which both the deterrence and the finality rationales led us above.3 78
4. Reliance

The policy I have in mind does not underpin habeas corpus but rather
nonretroactivity. As noted above, the usual presumption is that judicial decisions are fully retroactive.3 79 The one generally recognized exception to this
rule comes into play when a party disadvantaged by the new decision reason-

ably relied to its detriment on the law being other than the new decision
states.3"' As Justice O'Connor recently noted in the civil retroactivity context,
supra note 372 and accompanying text, or have insufficiently clear historical or cultural acceptance to overcome the other policies, as is true of the "finality" policy. See J.LIEBMAN, supra
note 3, § 26.2 (Supp. 1991) (300-year-old Anglo-American practice of subordinating finality to
habeas corpus remedies). But see McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1462-70 (1991) (noting,
then rejecting, that longstanding practice). Although Teague refers to a potentially competing
value with constitutional status, namely, federalism, see infra note 418 and accompanying text,
that policy is not necessarily competing. Rather, because of the close historical link between the
habeas corpus remedy and the fourteenth amendment's extension of national constraints upon
the states, I am inclined to think that a broad habeas corpus remedy does not offend, but rather
implements, the arrangement of federal and state powers that the post-bellum Constitution contemplates. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 2.2a, 2.2b.
377. See supra notes 146, 320 and accompanying text.
378. See supra text following notes 360, 369.
379. See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990) (plurality
opinion); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
380. See, eg., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4737 (U.S.,
June 20, 1991) (plurality opinion) (nonretroactivity is most appropriate when "apply[ing] the
new rule to parties who relied on the old would offend basic notions ofjustice and fairness"); id.
at 4741 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rule before Court ought to be held nonretroactive because
"every jurisdiction in the Nation... reasonably relied" on a contrary rule); Northern Pipeline
Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (ruling that portions of 1978
Bankruptcy Act were unconstitutional is nonretroactive, else the Court "would... visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act's vesting ofjurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199 (1973) (although
statute requiring state to reimburse private religious schools for certain educational services is
unconstitutional, state could reimburse religious schools for expenses incurred in reasonable
reliance on statute before it was ruled unconstitutional; a "fact of legal life [that] underpins our
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"[i]n determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively, th[e]

Court has consistently given great weight to the reliance interests of all parties
affected by changes in the law."3 ' "When the Court concludes that a lawchanging decision should not be applied retroactively, its decision is usually
based on its perception that such application would have a harsh and disrupmodem decisions recognizing a doctrine of nonretroactivity" is that "statutory or even judgemade rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in... shaping their conduct");
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (congressional enactment adopting short
statute of limitations would not be applied retroactively to cut off rights of litigants who bad
relied on longer preexisting limitation periods; nonretroactivity appropriate when the "new
principle of law.
overrul[ed] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied");
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam) ("Where a decision of this
Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis
in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."); Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481,496 (1968) (similar to Chevron Oil;
Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) ("decisions of...
[the] highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions"); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 686 (1879) ("we have never felt ourselves
bound to follow the latest decisions, if thereby contract rights which have accrued under earlier
rulings will be injuriously affected"); Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 WaiL) 175, 206 (1863)
(quoting The Ohio Life & Trust Co. v. Debalt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 432 (1853)) (bonds valid
under judicial decisions in place when bonds issued remain valid and enforceable even after
those decisions were overruled and the legislature's issuance of the bonds was deemed constitutionally ultra vires: "'The sound and true rule is, that if the contract, when made, was valid by
the laws of the State as then expounded by all departments of the government, and administered
in its courts ofjustice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of
legislation, or decision of its courts altering the construction of the law;"' "[t]o hold otherwise
would be as unjust as to hold that rights acquired under a statute may be lost by its repeal");
Corr,Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L REV. 745, 769
(1983) (discerning in Court's cases a "heightening" of the importance of "reliance" in retroactivity adjudication); Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operationof an
OverrulingDecision, 18 COLuM. L. REv. 230, 243 (1918) (courts "do not, with but few exceptions, allow a change of construction of a statute or constitutional provision to retroact to the
impairment of rights acquired in reliance on the first construction"); Mishkin, supra note 37, at
73 ("The most commonly accepted ground for denying retroactive operation to new judicial
precedent... is that such operation might unjustly inflict harm on those who justifiably relied
on preexisting authority."); Note, Limitation of JudicialDecisions to Prospective Operation, 46
IOWA L. REv. 600, 601 (1961) ("The bond common to almost all cases refusing to apply a
decision retroactively is the element of justifiable reliance;" nonretroactivity designed "to prevent the impairment of rights acquired in reliance on a prior decision"); Note, RetroactiveApplication of Statutes. Protection of Reliance Interests, 40 MAINE L. REv. 183 (1988); Note,
Prospective Overrulingand RetroactiveApplication in the FederalCourls, 71 YALE W. 907, 919
& n.68, 923 (1962) (citing extensive authority) (Gelpcke v. Dubuque and succeeding cases "recognized that state courts may sometimes and for some purposes be regarded as making law
prospectively, much as legislatures do, rather than merely as declaring it retroactively, and that
such regard would particularly be forthcoming when significant reliance had been placed upon
the overruled decisions;" GreatNorthern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref Co. encouraged state courts
to "honor bonafide reliance and reasonable expectations"). Although the Warren and Burger
Courts narrowed the nonretroactivity doctrine somewhat in regard to new constitutional criminal procedure decisions, they continued to treat reasonable reliance as a, if not always the only,
consideration. See, eg., Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646, 647-50 (1984); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); decisions cited infra note 390. The analysis presented here thus seeks
to restore to reliance the determinative status that it once enjoyed in the retroactivity sphere
generally and that it continues to enjoy in the civil sphere.
381. American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2334-35 (plurality opinion).
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tive effect on those who relied on prior law."' 382 This same principle, focused
in the present context on reasonable reliance by state-level participants in the
criminal justice system,3 83 also helps explain much of the plurality's discussion
of "new rules" in Teague, the otherwise errant-seeming decisions in Yates and
Penry, and even the narrow holdings, if not the broad language, of Butler,
Parks, and Sawyer.
Consider, first, the Teague plurality opinion. Although the plurality uses
the term "finality," its exegesis of the concept draws instead upon the Court's
longstanding equitable policy of avoiding the frustration of interests that arose
because of an actor's reasonable reliance on existing law:
[I]t has long been established that a final civil judgment entered
under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change
in that rule. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371 ... (1940), the Court held that a judgment based
on a jurisdictional statute later found to be unconstitutional could
have resjudicataeffect. The Court based its decision in large part on
finality concerns. "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannotjustly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration.... Questions of...
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly... demand examination." Id., at 374.
...[T]he application of new rules to cases on collateral review
[is] ... intrusive . . . [because] it continually forces the States to
marshall resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials
and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.
Furthermore, as we recognized in Engle v. Isaac, [456 U.S. 107
(1982),] "[s]tate courts are understandably frustrated when they
faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal
court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional
commands." 456 U.S. at 128 n.33.3" 4
These passages focus the retroactivity doctrine and its "new rule" concomitant on the extent to which, if applied retroactively, a new decision would
undermine consequences that legitimately accrued when state judges justifiably relied upon "then-existing constitutional standards." On the other hand
quoting now from Justice O'Connor's more forthrightly reliance-based retroactivity jurisprudence in the civil sphere - when state judges can "be expected to foresee that a decision of th[e Supreme] Court would overturn" their
382. Id. at 2338.
383. These authorities can roughly be said to be the "real responding parties in interest" in
habeas corpus cases.
384. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074, 1075 (1989) (plurality opinion) (all emphases
added, except on word "continually").
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resolution of a matter, their "reliance interests may merit little concern," and
retroactivity may be appropriate. 8 5
Under a reliance-based analysis, the critical question is whether, when
state judges imposed and affirmed the prisoner's conviction, those judges justifiably relied on the law's being other than the Supreme Court subsequently
declared it to be. Or, to use Justice Harlan's formulation - which in so many
other respects the Teague Court is disposed to follow - a rule is "new" only
if, "at the time the petitioner's conviction became final," the state courts could
predict "with any assurance that this Court would... rule [] differently" from
the way the Court actually ruled thereafter. 386 If such "assurance" is lackdng
- that is, if the state courts were reasonably forewarned of the possibility of
legal development or change, and accordingly cannot be said reasonably to
have relied on the law being other than the Supreme Court subsequently declared it to be - then retroactive application is appropriate.
This approach not only assimilates "finality" to reliability3" 7 but also connects reliability to deterrence. For making a decision's retroactivity turn on
the absence of justifiable state court reliance on the law's previously being
different gives the state courts an incentive, when the law is ambiguous, to try
conscientiously to predict the direction the Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation will take the law. As another authority whom the Teague plurality considers persuasive38 8 writes:
The key to this analysis lies in the concept of "justified" reliance.
For if the old law is clearly unjust or immoral by community standards or if adequate judicial warning has been given that it is subject
to imminent reconsideration, reliance upon it should not be considered justified ....
[T]he fact that... holdings will have retroactive operation can
produce an advantage in a different direction. For, if such holdings
can be reasonably anticipated, some incentive may be provided for
those who will be affected in the future to seek to conform in advance to the expected standards.38 9
Defining "new rules" in terms of reliance thus effectuates Congress' deterrence policy:3 90 A reliance-focused definition simultaneously gives state
385. American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2333 (plurality opinion); accord James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4739 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("reasonably foreseeable" rulings deserve retroactive application);
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 312 (1989) (prior "notice" of demands recognized in recent decision favors making the decision retroactive).
386. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 264 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
387. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
388. See Teague, 109 S. CL at 1069, 1074-75 (plurality opinion) (relying on Mfishkin, supra
note 37).
389. Mishkin, supra note 37, at 70, 72.
390. Defining "new rules" in terms of reliance is not innovative. Rather, that kind of
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courts an incentive (the "reward" of nonretroactivity of later, contrary decisions) to follow existing constitutional precedents, when such precedents are
available to be relied upon, and another incentive (the "'threat' ,391 of reversal) to try to predict and emulate the Supreme Court's likely future interpretation, when the Court's existing precedents do not by themselves provide or
suggest a rule that the Court can be expected to follow when it thereafter
addresses the issue.
Next, consider the capacity of the reliance policy to explain the outcome
in Teague and in other recent criminal nonretroactivity decisions. In Teague,
a seven-person majority reiterated the Court's earlier holding that its decision
in Batson v. Kentucky39 2 - which overruled part of Swain v. Alabama3 9 3 in
regard to the standard for proving that a prosecutor unconstitutionally exercised her peremptory challenges on the basis of race - announced a new
rule. 394 Given Batson's overruling of Swain, the "new rule" question would
seem to have been an easy one. Yet, even after making the "overruling" point,
the majority felt compelled to address the petitioner's claim that the Court
had telegraphed its Batson ruling three years earlier (before the petitioner's
case became final) in McCray v. New York."' 5
In McCray, five Justices, in two separate opinions respecting the denial of
certiorari, stated that the rule of Swain either did, or might soon, deserve reexamination. 39 6 The argument Teague bottomed on McCray was, of course, a
reliance-based argument - that, after McCray, state courts could not reasonably rely on Swain. The Court's explanation for rejecting the petitioner's argument also relies on a 'justifiable reliance" rationale, however - namely,
that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari, like the denial itself, have
definition is implied by the frequent characterizations of decisions deemed not to be "new" as
ones that were "evident from" or "anticipated" or "foreshadowed" by prior decisions, hence
ones that upset no reasonable state court expectations. Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461, 462
(1979); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 734 (1966); accord, eg., Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3205 (1990) (per curiam) (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 106 (1971)); American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2330-31 (1990) (plurality opinion); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
537, 549-50 (1982); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 336 (1980). Reliance analysis also explains the "out of the blue, .... revolutionary," ., substantial' " or "sharp break in the web of the
law," and "disrupt[ive]" formulations long used to refer to "new" decisions. James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735, 4742 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ashland Oil, 110 S. Ct. at 3205 (per curiam); Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1067 (majority opinion)
(quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986) (per curiam)) (" 'substantial break with prior
precedent' "); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 382 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
391. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
392. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
393. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
394. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (reaffirming Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per

curiam)).
395. 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
396. Id. at 963 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by Blackmun and
Powell, JJ.); id. at 964-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Marshall,

J.).
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no "precedential values," hence provide no basis for undermining the state
39
courts' reasonable reliance on existing and directly controlling precedent. 7
(Likewise, the Court held nonretroactive the alternative principle for which
Teague contended, namely, that the sixth amendment's representativeness requirement, as well as the fourteenth amendment's discrimination proscription,
applies to the process of configuring actual juries, because the Court had "expressly" rejected that principle in a prior leading case. 398 )
Consider, finally, the ability of the reliance policy to explain the Court's
outcome, if not its language, in the otherwise errant-seeming decisions in
Penry and Yates and also, possibly, in its most recent decisions in Parks and
Sawyer. Recall that in Penry the Court held retroactive a ruling that the application of Texas' death sentencing statute violated the Constitution by narrowly channeling the consideration of mitigating circumstances. 39 The
difficult question - starkly posed in Justice Scalia's dissent 4° - was how the
rule of Penry could be anything other than "new" given (1) the Court's prior
decision in Jurek upholding Texas' death sentencing statute on its face, (2) the
statute's fairly clear intention to divert most mitigation questions into the narrow channel the Court found unconstitutional in Penry, (3) the state and lower
federal judiciaries' unanimous interpretation of Jurek as validating the practice the Penry Court ruled unconstitutional, and (4) the like interpretation
given by four of the Court's members in Penry itself.
The answer to this question is found in Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in Penry. Although Jurek indeed upheld the Texas statute on its face, it
did so based on the stated assumption that the statute as applied would permit
the jury to consider fully and rely upon all mitigating circumstances in the
defendant's background. Moreover, when capital sentencing procedures used
in other states were subsequently found to violate that assumption, the Court
in Lockett v. Ohio4 01 and Eddings v. Oklahoma4I reversed the resulting death
sentences.' 3 In sum, although Jurek surely permitted a court responsibly to
397. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (majority opinion). Although this ruling is patently

formalistic, hence contrary to the flexible and practical approach that typically informs equitable reliance analysis, the Court may be forgiven, perhaps, for attempting to maintain some
control over the uses to which its members' least constrained flights of obiter dicta may be put.
398. See id. at 1065 (majority opinion); id. at 1069 (plurality opinion) (quoting Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).

399. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
401. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
402. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
403. Justice O'Connor put the point as follows in Penry:
Thus, at the time Penry's conviction became final, it was clear from Lockett and Eddings that a State could not, consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the
defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against imposing the death penalty. Moreover, the facial validity of the Texas
death penalty statute had been upheld in Jurek on the basis of assurances that the
special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to enable sentencing juries to con-

sider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present. ... [I]n light
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conclude that the Texas practice was constitutional - indeed, that conclusion
was the only one drawn by any Texas court prior to the Supreme Court's
ruling on the issue over a decade after Jurek - Jurek's own discussion of
mitigation, together with the holdings of Lockett and Eddings, clearly put
courts on notice that an alternative interpretation might also be appropriate.
In the face of Jurek, Lockett, and Eddings, therefore, the lower courts could
not reasonably have relied on the law being different from that announced in
Penry.
Likewise, in Yates v. Aiken,' the Court faced the retroactivity of a rule
that a number of lower courts and four members of the Supreme Court did not
theretofore consider to be compelled by the Court's prior case law, most nptably Sandstrom v. Montana."5 Sandstrom ruled unconstitutional an instruction telling a jury to presume that the defendant intended the natural
consequences of his actions. One could read Sandstrom to rule unconstitutional either (1) instructions requiring jurors irrebuttablyto presume the existence of the intent element of an offense, 4 0 6 or (2) in addition, instructions
requiring the defendant, in order to overcome a rebuttab!e presumption, to
bear the burden of disproving the intent element.' 7 Although prior to the 5-4
decision in Francisv. Franklin," courts responsibly could - and some did adopt the first interpretation, the Court in Yates unanimously recognized that
the latter approach also was a viable "application of the principle that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana."'
Hence, in essence, the Yates
majority determined that courts prior to Francis could not justifiably have
relied on the law being different from that which the Court announced in
4 10
Francis.
Finally, the Court's own characterizations of the rules on which the prisoners relied in Parks and Sawyer also bring the nonretroactivity outcomes in
those cases, if not all aspects of the Court's language, within a reliance-driven
analysis. Thus, the Court concluded that the rule contended for in Parks
"would contravene well considered precedents" and would be "difficult to reconcile... with our long-standing recognition that... capital sentencing must
be reliable, ' 41 ' while it noted that the Court previously had held the claim on
of the assurances upon which Jurek was based, we conclude that the relief Penry seeks
does not "impos[e] a new obligation" on the State of Texas.
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2946-47 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 (plurality opinion)).
404. 484 U.S. 211 (1988).
405. 442 U.S. 510 (1979); see supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.

406. See, ag., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 327 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at
332-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
407. See Francis,471 U.S. at 313-14 & n.2.

408. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
409. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 217 (1988).
410. A like analysis can explain the retroactivity holding in Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S.
527 (1987) (discussed supra note 214).
411. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1259, 1260, 1262 (1990) (discussed supra note 34).
But cf. supra note 174 (to reach this conclusion, Court arguably had to mischaracterize the
petitioner's claim).
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which Sawyer relied to be "'insubstantial"'

discussion.'

and deserving of "'little

"412

5. Summary
The "new rule" formulation that best accommodates the relevant deter-

rence, finality, remedial, and reliance policies, and the words and acknowledged intent of the habeas corpus statute, is this: A decision is "new" if, prior
to the decision's announcement, the state courts can be said reasonably to
have relied on the law being different from that which the decision declared
the law to be.

IV.
WHAT'S "FInAL?"
Under current doctrine, all new decisions announced prior to the time a
criminal conviction and sentence becomes "final" apply retroactively to that
conviction and sentence; all new decisions announced after the point of finality
are nonretroactive unless one of the two Teague exceptions is present. 1 3 The

point at which "finality" sets in is accordingly critical for nonretroactivity
purposes. Clearly, convictions and sentences are not final for nonretroactivity

purposes until they have been (1) rendered at trial, (2) upheld on direct appeal
by the highest available state court (unless an appeal was not filed on time), (3)

reviewed on petition for a writ of certiorari (unless certiorari was not sought
on time), and (4) if the certiorari petition was granted, reviewed on the merits
in the United States Supreme Court.4 14

What existing case law does not completely resolve is whether there are
some cases or claims that must get beyond the four steps delineated above
before "the curtain of finality [is]... drawn."4 '5 Teague permits an affirmafive answer to that question, given its description of nonfinal cases as ones
"'pending on direct review or not yet final.' "4,6 Moreover, as Justice Powell
412. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2824, 2828-29 (1990) (quoting Maggio v. Williams,
446 U.S. 46, 49, 56 (1983)) (discussed supra note 227); see also supra notes 227, 302 (discussing
possible notice- or reliance-based interpretation of Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990)).
413. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
414. See, eg., Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2826 (petitioner's "conviction and sentence became
final on April 2, 1984, when we denied certiorari .... .");Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260 (petitioners
"conviction became final in 1983," the year the Supreme Court denied the direct appeal certiorari petition in his case, and the year after the Oklahoma high court denied his direct appeal);
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 n.1 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)) (focusing on time "judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal [was] exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed"); Hamilton v.
Jones, 907 F.2d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 1990) (petitioner, whose direct appeal was denied on March
25, 1986, given retroactive benefit of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), decided on April
30, 1986, because time for certiorari petition did not expire until May 24, 1986).
415. Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 60 (1985).
416. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1072 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)) (emphasis added); accord American Trucking Ass'n, Inc.
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2331 (1990) (plurality opinion) (discussing Griffith) (new criminal
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noted in 1987, "[tlhe Court [has not] decided whether the same retroactivity
rules should apply to state post-conviction proceedings... [as] apply to fed'4 17
eral habeas corpus proceedings.
There are a number of reasons why equating "finality" with the end of

the direct appeal process is troublesome, at least in some cases. First, certain
policy concerns favor a line between state and federal, not direct and postcon-

viction, proceedings.418 Second, state law sometimes extends the period of
nonfinality of criminal judgments beyond direct appeal. 41 9' Third, in contrast
decisions are fully retroactive to cases "pending on direct review, or not yet final" (emphasis
added)).
417. Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(suggesting that state postconviction court's decision to address merits of claim based upon new
law creates exception to nonretroactivity rule forbidding federal habeas corpus court to do
same); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 651 (1984) (rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), nonretroactive to case pending on federal habeas corpus at time Edwards announced,
but noting that Court had not defined "j]ust where the [retroactivity] line should be drawn as
to Edwards"). Nor do Justice Harlan's separate opinions help in this regard, because the sharp
distinction they draw between "RETROACTIVITY ON DIRECT REVIEW" and "RETROACTIVITY ON [FEDERAL] HABEAS CORPUS" leaves a good bit of uncharted territory in
between. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258, 260 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part).
418. See Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) ("Teague rule is grounded in
important considerations of federal-state relations" (emphasis added)); see also Coleman v.
Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4790 (U.S., June 24, 1991) (as is true of most of Court's recent
habeas corpus jurisprudence, "[tihis is a case about federalism"). The equal status that federal
habeas corpus courts adjudicating exhaustion questions have given state direct appeal and postconviction proceedings supports a state-federal rather than direct-collateral line. See, e.g.,
Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) (case not ripe for federal habeas corpus review because
petitioner failed to exhaust state postconviction remedies); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 5.3a; see
also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982) (federal habeas corpus review is of reduced
importance because petitioner previously has secured review either in state appellate or postconviction setting). The state-federal line squares as well with policies that favor (1) giving all state
courts an "incentive" to follow federal law, see supra notes 321-61 and accompanying text; (2)
discouraging federal, and promoting state, judicial (including, it would seem, state postconviction) oversight of state criminal justice systems, eg., Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984)
(Powell, J., concurring); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and (3) drawing as bright a finality line as possible. But cf
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2769 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987)) (state "'[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from
the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review'" and "'is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and... is in fact considered to be civil in nature' "). Generally discussing federalism notions of a sort that distinguish state from federal, not direct from collateral, proceedings
are, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 53839 (1976); Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,
205 (1950); Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886).
419. For example, North Carolina's postconviction remedy, a "motion for appropriate relief," is considered part of the original criminal action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411(b) (1988)
("A motion for appropriate relief, whether made before or after the entry of judgment, is a
motion in the original cause and not a new proceeding."). Likewise, Tennessee postconviction
proceedings are "criminal in nature," not "civil," see State v. Scales, 767 S.W.2d 157, 158
(Tenn. 1989), and are part of a single, continuous process that gives the same trial and appellate
courts the same remedial powers with regard to two nonoverlapping sets of issues, the first set
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to the "civil" and "collateral" section 2254 remedy for state prisoners, 420 the
section 2255421 remedy for federal prisoners bears the markings of an integral
part of a continuous criminal proceeding that is segmented by no event or
condition decisive of finality.422 This characteristic of section 2255 proceedcognizable at trial and on direct appeal, the second set cognizable only in trial-level and appellate postconviction proceedings. See, ag., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-103 (1988) (criminal trial
judge who presided at trial also generally hears postconviction motion); id. §§ 40-30-114(a), 4030-114(d)(1) (local prosecutor not state attorney general represents state); id. § 40-30-102 (poAconviction motions must be filed within three-year time limit); id. §§ 40-30-111, 40-30-112
(postconviction motion limited to issues that were not and could not have been raised at trial
and on appeal); i. §§ 40-30-105, 40-30-118 (trial and appellate postconviction courts have same
powers they have immediately after trial and on direct appeal to "void," "vacate .."set aside,"
and hear a (delayed) direct appeal from conviction and sentence); id. § 40-30-122 (postconviction appeals heard by Tennessee Court of CriminalAppeals). But cf Johnson v. Tennessee, 797
S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn.1990) (court might have "decid[ed] against retroactive application" of
new United States Supreme Court ruling handed down during petitioner's state postconviction
proceedings but instead reaches and rejects merits under state's "plain error" rule). Virginia
also effectively has bifurcated the appellate process of reviewing the constitutionality of criminal
judgments, relegating some claims to direct appeal and other claims (which cannot be heard on
direct appeal) to the postconviction process. See, eg., Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.LW.
4789, 4798 (U.S., June 24, 1991); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986);
see also Koosed, Some Perspectives on the Possible Impact of Diminished Federal Review of
Ohio's Capital Sentences, 19 CAP. U.L. REv. 695, 734-37 (1990) (similar analysis of Ohio's
postconviction procedures). Accordingly, if the state-federal line discussed, supra note 418, is
eschewed in favor of a line between remedies that are and are "'not part of the criminal proceeding itself,"' and that are and are not "'considered to be civil in nature,"' Murray, 109 S.
Ct. at 2769 (plurality opinion) (quoting Finley, 481 U.S. at 556), then pvstconviction processes
of the sort discussed in this footnote still may, and perhaps must, be said to precede finality.
420. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988); see J.LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.1.
421. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
422. When it adopted section 2255, the Senate Judiciary Committee contrasted that procedure with the civil and collateral habeas corpus remedy, describing section 2255 as being "in the
criminal proceeding [such that] this section affords the opportunity and expressly gives the
broad powers," typically given criminal judges after trial, but not given habeas corpus judges
after appeal, "to set aside the judgment" and to "discharge the prisoner or resentence him or to
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." S. REP. No. 1526, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948) (emphasis added). Compare Advisory Committee Note to R. Gov.
§ 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN U.S. DIsr. CTs. 1 ("motion under § 2255 is a further step in the
movant's criminal case and not a separate civil action") and, eg., Grady v. United States, 929
F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1991) (challenges to probation revocation generally not cognizable in
section 2255 proceedings because such proceedings are "a further step in a criminal case, rather
than a separate civil action") with ExparteTom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 560 (1883) (habeas corpus
motion is not part of criminal process and initiates separate, civil proceeding). See generally J.
LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.1; 2 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 36.2. This allocation ofauthority
not only gives section 2255 judges the trial judge's traditional power, withheld from section
2254 judges, to release prisoners on grounds of insufficient evidence, see id. § 2.2;, but also
means that retrial relief ordered under section 2255, unlike section 2254, immediately nullifies
the original judgment and returns the case to a pretrial status such that conceptually no appealable final judgment exists. See Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963); cf. Browder
v. Director, 434 U.S. 257, 265-67 (1978) (habeas corpus relief requiring retrial is final order
appealable before retrial). In addition, section 2255's drafters designed it to "restate[], clarifly]
and simpliffy] the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of coram nobis," 1948 Revisor's
Note to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the Supreme Court long had treated as part of the original
criminal process. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954). Also connecting
trial, appellate, and section 2255 proceedings and removing any meaningful point of "finality"
between them, are the following attributes of section 2255 motions, each of which is contrasted
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ings creates the possibility, ignored by most courts and commentators that
have faced the issue,42 3 that Teague does not apply either to section 2255 proceedings or to cases that, at the time the "new" rule was announced, were
pending in state postconviction proceedings patterned after section 2255. Finally, irrespective of when the finality of criminal judgments generally or formally sets in, finality as to some kinds of attacks on those judgments cannot
possibly set in - because those claims cannot possibly arise, or at least usually
do not arise - until after the direct appellate process has ended.4 24
Pending further clarification from Congress or the Supreme Court, the
following three-part approach to the finality question seems most consistent
with the relevant policy concerns. First, finality ought not to set in with regard to claims as to which state law does not provide an "opportunity for full
and fair litigation" at "trial and on direct review" 425 or that the petitioner
could not theretofore have raised because of "'interference by officials'" or
some other "objective [impediment] external to the defense. '426 Otherwise,
state officials effectively could forestall the federal courts from considering,
declaring, and enforcing new constitutional rules by excluding claims seeking
with the contrary attribute of section 2254 petitions: (1) Compare 2 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3,
§ 36.4b (parties to section 2255 proceedings are same as parties to trial and appeal and have
same status - moving party, in case of government, responding party, in case of defendant;
docket number and caption are the same) with J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 2.1, 10.1 (in habeas
corpus, warden substitutes for state as party; government and prisoner exchange places procedurally and in caption; new docket number is used). (2) CompareAdvisory Committee Note to
R. Gov. § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN U.S. DIST. Crs. 3 (section 2255 proceedings begin with filing
of "motion" and without payment of fee) with R. Gov. § 2254 CASES IN U.S. DisT. Crs. 3(a)
(habeas corpus proceedings inaugurated by filing of "petition" together with fee required to
initiate new proceedings). (3) Compare Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.
1960) (discussing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1952)) (section 2255 gives
"[t]he court which heard the case and gave judgment thereon... the opportunity and responsibility of hearing and determining attacks against the judgment") with Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S.
333, 337 (1923) (habeas corpus is a civil proceeding designed to secure review of original judgment in different court). (4) Compare R. Gov. § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN U.S. DIsT. Crs. 12
(Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure govern section 2255 proceedings) with R. Gov. § 2254
CASES IN U.S. DIST. COrs. 1I (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern habeas corpus). (5)
Compare R. Gov. § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN U.S. DIsT. Crs. 2(c) (section 2255 movants incarcerated under multiple criminal judgments may not challenge judgment of conviction or sentence other than one entered in first phase of same criminal proceeding in which motion is filed)
with R. Gov. § 2254 CASES IN U.S. DIsr. CTS. 2(d) (habeas corpus petitioner must challenge
all bases of prisoner's current incarceration, including, where applicable, as many separate judgments of conviction and sentence as petitioner contends are unlawful). (6) Compare the Rules
Governing § 2255 Proceedingswith the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
423. See, e.g., Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1990) (Teague doctrine
applies in section 2255 proceedings); United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (same); Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 63-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (same). Compare Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1084 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (identifying as
open question whether Teague applies in section 2255 proceedings) with Arkin, supra note 5, at
395 & n.172 ("well established" similarity between section 2254 and section 2255 suggests that
Teague applies in both contexts).
424. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
425. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 & n.37 (1976).
426. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
486 (1953)); see McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991).
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declaration of a new rule from direct appellate consideration and relegating

those claims to postconviction proceedings at which time the rule sought
could not be applied retroactively and, in one view, would not even be
justiciable.4 27
Second, the onset of finality always should await the Supreme Court's
denial of (or expiration of the time for seeking) certiorari following the last

nonfinal state court ruling in order, again, to assure that the petitioner has at
least one opportunity for federal judicial declaration of a new rule following
428
the state courts' refusal to declare it.

Third, the nonretroactivity defense serves the interests of the states, not
the federal courts.4 29 Accordingly, if a state legislature or the state courts
choose to delay the point of finality of criminal judgments beyond the first

opportunity for United States Supreme Court review, the federal courts should
- and may be required to - respect the state's implicit conclusion that a
conviction's and sentence's constitutionality is more important to the state

than the conviction's and sentence's finality.43° Consequently, although "fi427. See supra Part H. Reaching a similar conclusion by a different route are: Sanders v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Teague does not come into play when the state's
constitutional violation" - here, the state courts' unconstitutional response to a critical witness' recantation of decisive trial testimony - is of a sort that "typically do[es] not occur until
after the trial and direct review are completed;" otherwise, Teague would "emasculate[]" the
right in question); Hoffman, supra note 6, at 213-15 (advocating exception to Teague for claims
capable of repetition yet evading review). Established lines of habeas corpus authority explicate
the "no opportunity for full and fair litigation" and the "objective impediments" exceptions to
finality. See J. LmBMAN, supra note 3, § 24.5b, at 354 n.17, 356 n.22 and accompanying text,

§ 25.3.
428. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377, 386-87, 415-19 (1821).
But see Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 184 ('finality" should set in following highest state court
decision on direct appeal, not following certiorari proceedings thereafter). Under the Supreme
Court's rules, finality generally will occur upon the denial of certiorari, not the later denial of a
petition for rehearing of the certiorari decision. See S. Cr. R. 16.3 ("The order of denial [of
certiorari] will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for rebearing except by order
of the Court or a Justice.").
429. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("The 'costs
imposed upon the Statefs] by retroactive application of new rules... on habeas corpus...
generally far outweigh the benefits'... for it continuallyforces the States to marshall resources
in order to keep in prison defendants whose [cases are final]." (citation omitted) (emphasis
added, except on word "continually")); see also Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216
(1990).
430. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979) ("purpose of" defenses to
habeas corpus relief "is to accord appropriate respect to the sovereignty of the States in our
federal system. ... But if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal
constitutional claim is barred by some state [interest], a federal court implies no disrespect for
the State by entertaining the claim" (citation omitted)). Thus, just as the federal courts are
bound by a state legislature's or state court's decision to forego enforcing a procedural bar
against the defendant in a particular case or type of case, see, eg., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 59
U.S.L.W. 4808, 4810-11 (U.S., June 24, 1991); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985);
Ulster County Court, 442 U.S. at 154, and just as the federal courts are bound by a state legislature's decision to make certain remedies discretionary, not mandatory, and thus to allow prisoners to exhaust their state remedies without taking advantage of the procedure, see, eg., Harris v.
Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1040, 1043 & n.9 (1989); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 460 (1942), so,
too, should the federal courts be bound by a state legislature's or state court's decision to sus-
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nality" should not set in before defendants have had one full and fair opportunity to litigate claims seeking declaration of a new rule in the state courts and
in at least one federal court (the first and second points above), neither should
finality be required to set in at that time as a matter of federal law when it is
the policy or practice of the state to delay the onset of finality until some later
juncture in the proceedings.4 31
V.
WHAT'S LEFT?: THE TWO TEAGUE EXCEPTIONS

Again following Justice Harlan, Teague identifies two exceptional types
of constitutional rulings that always apply retroactively, including in cases
that were final when the new ruling was announced: "First, a new rule should
be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' ,,432 This exception "should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules
prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because
of their status or offense."'4 33 "Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those procedures that... are "implicit in
pend finality in a case or class of cases. See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963)
(state courts' decision to forego holding evidentiary hearings on controverted factual questions
both allows and requires federal courts to conduct such hearings themselves). This analysis is
not undermined by recognizing that "[tihe determination whether a constitutional decision of
this Court is retroactive.., is a matter of federal law" and by "requiring that state courts
adhere to [federal] retroactivity decisions." American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2323, 2330 (1990) (plurality opinion); cf. id. at 2348, 2353 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (state
may not give new decision less effect than federal law requires but may give "effect greater than
that which a federal court would provide"). For the analogous federally governed requirements
that "procedural defaults" generally bar habeas corpus relief and "unexhausted petitions" require dismissal (see, e-g., J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 24.5e) have not prevented the Supreme
Court from religiously following the state legislatures' and state courts' lead in determining the
precise point at which "procedural defaults" and "exhaustion" occurs. The reliance-based approach to retroactivity advocated above, see supra notes 379-412 and accompanying text, also
demands federal sensitivity to state definitions of finality inasmuch as state law will determine
whether or not state judges justifiably can expect their decisions to terminate the case or, simply, to make it ripe for review by another state court. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
627 (1965) (presumptive availability of appeal contributes to common law rule that case is not
final and new legal developments apply pending appeal).
431. See, eg., the North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia rules discussed supra
note 419.
432. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); accord Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2952 (1989); Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
433. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952-53 ("a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond
the State's power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond
the State's power to punish at all"); accord Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990) ("The
first [exception] applies to new rules that place an entire category of primary conduct beyond
the reach of the criminal law.., or... prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment for a
class of defendants because of their status or offense. .. ." (citations omitted)); Saffle v. Parks,
110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990); cf. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990) (first excep-
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the concept of ordered liberty." ' ""
Explaining the first exception, Justice Harlan stated that "[tihere is little
societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it
ought properly never to repose," and gave as an example "[n]ew 'substantive
due process' rules" that "free[] individuals from punishment for conduct that
is constitutionally protected."43 5 Justice Harlan's supporting citations refer
to rules immunizing from prosecution: (1) expressive conduct protected by
the first amendment;4 "6 (2) silence protected by the fifth amendment; 4" (3)
intimate or personal behavior protected by the penumbral rights in various
constitutional amendments;4"' (4) conduct carried on in the constitutionally
protected privacy of one's home;43 9 (5) conduct beyond that which the legislature has defined as criminal;" 0 and (6) persons selected for prosecution not
because of their actions but because of their race, ethnicity, or some other
characteristic or status not legitimately made the basis for criminal
44 1
punishment.
Penry likewise listed examples of new penalty-focused rules that are fully
retroactive under the first exception, including rules immunizing from execution does not apply to rule that allows state to punish, but restricts means by which it assesses
guilt of, capital murder).
434. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.))); see also Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1080 (Stevens, L, concurring in
the judgment).
435. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (Harlan, ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
436. Id. at 692 n.7 (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)).
437. Id. at 692 n.7, 693, 700-01 (discussing United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)).
438. Id. at 692 n.7 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
439. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
440. Id. at 693 n.8 (citing Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Exparte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 (1880); cases collected in Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 384 n.30 (1964)). Applying this rule, a number of circuit courts
recently have held fully retroactive the decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987), which held that Congress did not intend the mail fraud statutes to criminalize actions
depriving persons of purely intangible rights. See, eg., United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056,
1058 (3d Cir. 1988) ("A ruling that a trial court lacked power to convict a defendant for proven
activity must necessarily be retroactive."); cases cited supra note 110; see also Ostrosky v.
Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1990) (given constitutional principle that behavior cannot amount to a crime absent a culpable mental state, claim that petitioner was convicted of
crime without any criminal intent falls within first Teague exception).
441. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886));
see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminal sanctions for status of b-ing a
drug addict held unconstitutional under eighth and fourteenth amendments). Recent decisions
holding retroactive rules defining the double jeopardy immunity against conviction for certain
conduct previously subjected to criminal prosecution also seem to fall within the first exception.
See Dubois v. Lockhart, 859 F.2d 1314, 1316 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988) (pre-Teague decision holding
double jeopardy decision in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), retroactive).
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or (8) mentally impaired."

3

Penry's

discussion suggests that the exception also would cover rules immunizing
from execution persons (9) whose offenses did not rise to the level of culpabil-

ity constitutionally required to justify a death sentence because (a) the defendant did not participate in the homicidal act or intend that life be taken, 4 " or
because (b) no statutory aggravating circumstance or other factor meaningfully distinguished the offense from the class of all first-degree murders. 445
As the Erie rule classically demonstrates on the civil side,446 a distinction
between substance and procedure is not always easy to apply. Nonetheless,

the first exception might be interpreted as distinguishing new rules of substantive criminal law (which always apply retroactively) from new rules of criminal procedure (which generally do not apply retroactively in cases that were
final when the time the new rule was announced). 47
In defining the second exception, Justice Harlan disagreed with himself," 8 the Teague plurality (favoring Harlan's earlier view) disagreed with the
442. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (execution of defendants under 16 years old at time of offense is
unconstitutional)).
443. Id. at 2952-53 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (execution of
insane constitutionally forbidden)) ("if we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry ... [, then]
such a rule would fall under the first exception").
444. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (death penalty for murder absent proof
that defendant acted with extreme recklessness, or some higher degree of culpability, is unconstitutionally disproportionate); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (cited in Penry, 109 S.
Ct. at 2953) (death penalty for murder absent proof that defendant killed, intended to kill, or
foresaw that life would be taken is unconstitutionally disproportionate); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (cited in Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2953) (death penalty for rape forbidden as
disproportionate).
445. As a prerequisite to a death sentence, the eighth amendment requires the state, in
each case, to establish an aggravating circumstance that "provide[s] a '"meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not .... Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313
(1972) (White, 3., concurring in the judgment))). Because this rule "circumscribe[s] the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty," Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983), the rule falls
within the first Teague exception: It places "a certain class of individuals" - those as to whom
the state has not established a valid aggravating circumstance - "beyond the State's power to
punish by death... at all." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952. But cf Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950,
986-87 (5th Cir. 1990) (taken together, rule forbidding state to execute defendant based on
invalid "heinousness" aggravating circumstance and rule requiring state courts to reweigh additional, valid aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances once "heinousness"
circumstance is invalidated are "new" and not within Teague exceptions), followed in Stringer
v. Jackson, 909 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. grantedsub nom. Stringer v. Black, 111 S. Ct.
2009 (1991).
446. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
447. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (lower courts reaching this result in practice, if not in theory).
448. Compare Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
with Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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concurring Justices (endorsing Harlan's later view),"

9

and the post-Teague

majority (fusing both Harlan views) disagreed with all prior views.4 50 Proceeding from the same formulation of rules "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,

'45 1 the

Teague plurality emphasized factfinding reliability -

"proce-

dures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction [or sentence] is
seriously diminished;

'4 2

the concurring Justices emphasized fundamental

fairness - ""fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions;" v,,453 and the post-Teague majority demanded both - a contribution to factfinding reliability and a place in
the pantheon of "fundamental," "bedrock," or "watershed" rules."
The second exception is narrow, probably encompassing only a handfuM
of rulings, at least outside the eighth amendment area,4 55 that have been ren449. Compare Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct 1060, 1075-78 (1989) (plurality opinion) with id.
at 1080-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
450. Compare id. at 1076-77 (plurality opinion) (rulings retroactive under second exception if they overturn procedures that "undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a
conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction" (emphasis
added)) with Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990) (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076,
1077 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)))
("A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fairness of a proceeding."
(emphasis added; original emphasis deleted)). See generally Saffie v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257,
1263-64 (1990) ("the precise contours of this exception may be difficult to discern").
451. See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
452. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076-77 (plurality opinion); see id. at 1076, 1077 (quotingDesist,
394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (rulings forbidding procedures that "'create[] an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted' "or "seriously diminish the likelihood
of obtaining an accurate conviction;" rulings that "'significantly improve the pre-existing
factfinding procedures" and are "central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt!);
see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944 (1989) ("the two exceptions to [the] general
rule of nonretroactivity" are "applicable in the capital sentencing context"); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) ("Presumably, the [second] exception
applies to the accuracy of the defendant's sentence as well, and to Eighth Amendment violations."), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1292 (5th Cir.
1989) (en bane) (similar), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990); id. at 1303
(King, J., dissenting) (similar).
453. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)));
see also Hoffmann, supra note 6, at 213-15 (advocating return to "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" approach to second exception).
454. Sawyer, 110 S.Ct. at 2831-32; Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1263 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1076 (plurality opinion)) ("second exception is for 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding"). An important
attribute of all three versions of the second exception is that they are rule-specific, not petitioner-specific. All three, that is, apply to rules that in the run of cases affect reliability or
fairness, irrespective of whether the rule would have that effect in the particular case before the
Court. In this respect, the second exception is distinguishable from recent habeas corpus proposals to limit the exceptions to other habeas corpus defenses to particular cases in which individual petitioners can demonstrate a "colorable claim of factual innocence." Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion); see McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454,
1470, 1474-75 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). See generally J. LmmAN,
supra note 3, § 2.2, at 20 n.83 (distinguishing claim- and individual-focused innocence tests).
455. Obvious candidates for inclusion within the second exception are the eighth amend-
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dered since Earl Warren left the bench.4" 6 I do not agree, however, that the
ment decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (discussed supra note 310 and accompanying text), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 228 (1972).
456. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 (plurality opinion))
("because the second exception is directed only at new rules essential to the accuracy and fairness of the criminal process, it is 'unlikely that many such components of basic due process have
yet to emerge' "). The Court already has held nonretroactive a number of decisions that might
have been thought to qualify under the second exception. See, e.g., Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832
(quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1077) (rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), rule
forbidding inaccurate prosecutorial argument that diminishes responsibility of jurors in regard
to capital-sentencing duties, is not within second exception because, although "directed toward
the enhancement of reliability and accuracy," it is not "an 'absolute prerequisite to fundamental
fairness' "); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990) (rule derived from Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), forbidding interrogation following invocation of right to counsel,
not within second exception because its violation "would not seriously diminish the likelihood
of obtaining an accurate determination"); Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1989), forbidding racial discrimination in prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges, not retroactive); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) (rule of Edwards v.
Arizona not retroactive). See generallyArkin, supra note 6, at 390 ("only decisions which radically alter the legal terrain regarding procedural fairness and accuracy fit within the second
Teague exception as now formulated"); Berger, supra note 6, at S12 (second exception is "lip
service"); Weisberg, supra note 3, at 24 ("Put... bluntly, if the claimed ight did not seem as
essential as that of Clarence Gideon, then it [is] not fundamental enough;" Court has "adopted
about as stringent a test as imaginable"). Among the remaining contenders for application of
the second exception, assuming it is "new," is the rule of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985),
requiring states to provide indigent defendants with necessary expert assistance. Compare Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1990) (argument that Ake falls within second
exception sufficiently strong to justify stay of execution) with Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d
932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990) (Ake rule "new" and not within second exception), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1639 (1991) and Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 622-25 (9th Cir. 1990) (decision on
merits, one judge dissenting, holding that the "extension" of Ake sought by the petitioner (establishing a right to competent expert assistance for indigents) does not fall within second exception). See also Swindler v. Lockhart, 110 S. Ct. 1938, 1940 n.* (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (requirement of impartial jurors falls within second exception); Allen,
478 U.S. at 259 (same, by implication); Sanders v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 1990)
(right to reversal of conviction manifestly premised upon credibly recanted testimony falls
within second exception); United States v. Dawes, 895 F.2d 1581, 1582 (10th Cir. 1990) (United
States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir. 1990), holding that failure to advise defendants of
dangers of proceeding to trial pro se can never be harmless error, is retroactive "[b]ecause the
right to counsel is fundamental to insuring the very integrity of the fact finding process"); Sulie
v. Duckworth, 864 F.2d 1348, 1354-56 (7th Cir. 1988) (pre-Teague holding that Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), is retroactive because inference of guilt based on exercise of
privilege against self-incrimination, which Greenfield rule forbids, impairs truth-finding function of trial), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 93 (1989). CompareUnited States v. France, 886 F.2d 223,
228 (9th Cir. 1989) (Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), forbidding federal magistrates to pick juries, retroactive because it "touches on one of the most 'basic rights' of the
accused, the right to a fair and accurate trial"), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 111 S. Ct. 805
(1991) with Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1990) (Gomez not within
second exception and not retroactive). Compare also Bassette, 915 F.2d at 938-39 (neither of
following rules fits within second exception: rule of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), forbidding state psychiatrists to interview capital defendants without warning them that statements they make may be used against them at sentencing; and sentencing phase confrontation
rule of Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983)) and Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1514, 1516, 1517 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (neither
of following rules fits within second exception: rule of Profitt; and rule of Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977), establishing defendant's right to access to presentence report in capital
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second exception is so narrow that a prisoner cannot take advantage of it without conceding that the rule for which she contends is both "new" and nonmeritorious.4 57 For I can imagine rules that are simultaneously meritorious, not
"new," and yet "fundamental" - rules that never before were announced precisely because they are so fundamentally the law that no one previously
thought of violating them.4 5 Rules falling into this category might be ones
called forth by previously untried investigative and prosecutorial methods that
"'recall[] the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor
knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based
on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods.'" 59 An attempt to sentence a defendant to death at a penalty proceeding that was not
bifurcated from the guilt-innocence phase of trial might call forth another
example. 4" 0
Other examples of rules combining reliability and fundamental-fairness
attributes are found in the sources cited in Teague that advocate confining
habeas corpus relief of any sort to violations of just such rules - most particularly, the writings of Paul Mishkin"' and Henry Friendly"' and the opinions
cases), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3255 (1990) with Moore, 885 F.2d at 1522-23 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (Proffittand Gardnerfit within second exception because former is critical to reliability
and latter is part of "bedrock" procedures in capital cases; E&telle is not a new rule) and id. at
1525-26 (Kravitch, I., dissenting) (same).
457. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 24 (second exception requires petitioners "to stretch
[claims] to something so hyperbolic" that claims will "undermine the very premise of state
prosecution in first place" and probably lose on the merits).
458. Cf. Swindler v. Lockhart, 110 S. Ct. 1938, 1940 n.* (1990) Marshall, J.,dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (rule forbidding second change of venue following initial transer to
equally tainted county falls within second exception).
459. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076-77 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted)).
460. Although the Court upheld nonbifurcated capital sentencing procedures in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), and has never formally overruled that holding, see
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 & n.43, 195 n.47 (1976) (noting that McGautha has not
been overruled), the decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 228 (1972), and Gregg make clear
that bifurcated capital sentencing proceedings are constitutionally required and fundamental.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92, 195; Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. Cr.REV. 305, 306
& n.5, 309 & n.16, 315 & n.36, 319 & n.59.
461. See Mishkin, supra note 37, at 79-86 (cited in Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069, 1074 (plurality opinion)) (citing numerous cases) (retroactivity and habeas corpus relief tied to "constitutional requirements of procedural due process" that "have a substantial and intended impact
upon the degree of reliability of the conviction process for establishing guilt;" giving as exampies decisions upholding (1) "the right of an indigent criminal defendant to counsel during the
process that adjudicates his guilt," (2) the right of indigent criminal appellants to a trial transcript and to freedom from "discriminat[ion] against [them] ... on the basis of poverty in
controlling access to appellate review," and (3) the protection against "introduction of confessions extracted in violation of due process").
462. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttacks on CriminalJudgments, 38 U.
Cm. L. REV. 142, 151-52 (1970) (cited in Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1074 (plurality opinion)) (citing
numerous cases) (habeas corpus relief should be reserved for violations of rules that improve
accuracy and reliability; giving as examples "failure to complete the court" and proof that "the
criminal process itself has broken down," as when "the defendant... lacked the assistance of
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Indeed, a nascent jurisprudence exists on the question of

what types of procedures are so fundamental to the truth-seeking and other
critical aspects of our criminal justice system that their absence should almost
always result in reversal no matter what procedural obstacles otherwise would
stand in the way. The components of this jurisprudence may be found not

only in the sources listed above but also in the Court's recent decisions recognizing exceptions to the procedural default 46 and harmless error rules.4 65 Recourse also may be had to preexisting retroactivity law, which long has made

"[r]etroactive effect... 'appropriate where a new constitutional principle is
designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials'" and "'goes to the heart
of the truthfinding function.' ,4"6 Perhaps the core attribute of rules that are
counsel," there was "racial discrimination in the selection of the jury," the "jury was subjected
to improper influences by a court officer or had been overcome by excessive publicity," or
"where the state has failed to provide a proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on
appeal").
463. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976) (quoted in Teague, 109 S.
Ct. at 1076 (plurality opinion)) (habeas corpus should favor rules that "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty"); see Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 586 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 490) ("[I]any Fifth and Sixth
Amendment claims arise in the context of challenges to the fairness of a trial or to the integrity
of the factfinding process," but "Fourth Amendment claims uniformly involve evidence that is
'typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of
the defendant' ").

464. See, eg., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986) ("'fundamental miscarriage of
justice'" exception to procedural default rule for errors that "preclude[] the development of
true facts [or] result[] in the admission of false ones;" "foreclos[e] meaningful exploration" of
"defenses;" result in the admission of evidence that "was false or... misleading;" or "serve to
pervert the jury's deliberations"); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 24.6.
465. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991) (majority opinion
on this point of Rehnquist, C.J.) (in addition to violations discussed in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570 (1986), see infra, denials of rights to self-representation and public trial can never be harmless); id. at 1255-56 (opinion of White, J.) (in addition to violations discussed in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion and in Rose, following violations can never be harmless: state's failure to
adduce enough evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, court's failure to instruct
jury on state's reasonable doubt burden, denial of right to counsel at preliminary hearing); Rose
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 & n.6 (1986) (citing numerous cases) (harmless error rule does
not apply to procedures that "necessarily render[ed the] trial fundamentally unfair" because
they "aborted the basic trial process... or denied it altogether" or they "cannot reliably serve
[the trial's basic] function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence;" examples include denial of counsel, denial of trial by jury, adjudication by biased judge or jury, trial by jury
selected in racially discriminatory manner, and procedures that effectively direct verdict for
state); see J.LEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 24.5d, 24.6.
466. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting Solem v,Stumes, 465
U.S. 638, 643-45 (1984)); accord United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 544 (1982) (citing
numerous authority) (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality
opinion)) ("Court has regularly given complete retroactive effect to new constitutional rules
whose major purpose 'is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its
truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in
past trials' "); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240-42 (1977) (rule of Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), forbidding state to place burden of persuasion on defendant fully
retroactive because rule contributes to reliability of convictions); Ivan v. City of New York, 407
U.S. 203 (1972) (rule of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), placing burden of proof beyond a
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fully retroactive under the second exception is those rules' inclusion among
the components of "the basic trial [and appellate] process" that enable the
trial and appeal "reliably [to] function as a vehicle for determination of guilt
or innocence."'46 7

VI.
WHOSE BURDEN?: PLEADING AND PROVING THE TEAGUE
DEFENSE

In two 1988 Term decisions and one 1989 Term decision, the Supreme
Court denied habeas corpus relief on nonretroactivity grounds notwithstanding the state's failure to raise the defense in a timely fashion." Thereafter, a
few lower court decisions excused habeas corpus respondents' failure to raise
Teague-type defenses in advance of the "'novel!" decision in Teague."69
More recently, however, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have indicated that, in litigation occurring after February 22, 1989 (the date Teague
was announced), the burden of asserting nonretroactivity belongs to the state
and not to the federal courts sua sponte.470
reasonable doubt on state in juvenile delinquency settings, fully retroactive because rule contributes to accuracy of truth-determining function); Williams, 401 U.S. at 653 n.6 (plurality opinion) (citing numerous decisions holding retroactive, on accuracy/reliability grounds, rulings

establishing and extending rights to counsel and to cross-examine one's accusers and protection
against state efforts to secret witnesses and evidence relevant to the proceedings).
467. Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78.
468. Saffie v. Parks, 110 S. CL 1257 (1990); Pemy v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989);
Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); see supra note 19 and accompanying text. Criticizing
this practice are: Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penry, 109 S. Ct. at
2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 10S4, 1086
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
469. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1288-91 (10th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990); accord Hill v. McMackin, 893 F.2d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 1989);
Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (assuming arguendo that state did not waive defense because "the proper time to raise it ha[d] not
arrived"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3255 (1990).
470. See Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. CL 2715, 2718 (1990) ("[a]lthough the Teague rule
is grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations, we think it is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense that this Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari, must raise and decide
the issue sua sponte; Court accordingly does not reach retroactivity issue because state "did not
address retroactivity in its petition for certiorari or its briefs on the merits, and when asked
about the issue at oral argument, counsel answered that the State had chosen not to rely on
Teague" (emphasis in original); Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129, 1137 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The
State has not made an objection under Teague ... to the retroactive application of [prior decision] ... and therefore there is no need to address that issue."); Hanrahan v. Greer, 896 F.2d
241, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1990) (court need not determine whether decision handed down after
petitioner's case became final is "new," because state did not preserve an objection to decision's
retroactive application; "[n]ot phrasing an objection to retroactivity in the precise terms the
Court adopted in Teague is one thing;, not phrasing any objection to retroactivity is another"
(emphasis in original)); see also Thomas v. Indiana, 910 F.2d 1413, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1990) (by
conceding retroactivity of recent decision in initial brief and by waiting until "much too late"oral argument on appeal - to raise Teague issue, the state "waived" nonretroactivity defense;
court expresses uncertainty whether it has discretion to raise the waived issue itself but avoids
the problem by concluding that the recent court ruling is not "new").
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This allocation of the burden of raising the nonretroactivity defense, and
the concomitant assignment to the state of the burden of proving the facts
necessary to establish the defense, 47 1 are appropriate in light of several established principles. First, the nonretroactivity rule is nonjurisdictional.4 7 2 Second, in Granberryv. Greer,47 3 the Supreme Court placed upon state's attorneys
the presumptive burden of raising comity-based defenses in habeas corpus
contexts. 474 Third, the responding party typically bears the burden of pleading and proving not only all habeas corpus defenses4 75 but all civil affirmative
defenses generally.4 7 6 Finally, and most importantly, the reliance- and finality-based interests that the nonretroactivity defense serves belong to the states,
not the federal courts, and ought therefore to be the responsibility of the states
and their representatives to assert or not assert, as they choose.4 77
VII.
WHAT

ELSE?: THE RETROACTIVITY OF TEAGUE AND OTHER
RULES LIMITING PRISONERS' RIGHTS

Violating their own expressions of concern that like habeas corpus peti471. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 22.1b.
472. Lacking either constitutional or statutory status, retroactivity is not a "'jurisdictional' " bar that applies irrespective of the actions of the party benefited thereby. Collins, 110
S. Ct. at 2718; Thomas, 910 F.2d at 1416; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1988) (habeas
corpus statute extending relief to prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution" without
mention of retroactivity); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) ("the Constitution
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect" and "has no voice upon the subject"); Moore,
885 F.2d at 1524 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827,
830 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975)) (nonretroactivity is an affirmative defense that
is lost if not timely raised); see also Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 369-70 (1971)
(pretermitting retroactivity issue and applying earlier decision of uncertain retroactivity); supra
note 39 and accompanying text (retroactivity is a judge-made prudential doctrine).
473. 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
474. See id. at 132 ("unwise to adopt a rule that would permit, and might even encourage,
the State to seek a favorable ruling on the merits in the district court while holding [a] ...
defense in reserve for use on appeal if necessary"); Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 1407, 1438 (11th
Cir. 1989) ("The state has never in the entire course of the direct appeal or collateral proceedings raised the argument that [the dissenting judge] now takes up. The state selected its defenses and arguments on appeal, and it must accept the ramifications of those choices. Waiver
of claims is not a principle that works only to the detriment of [habeas corpus] petitioners.").
475. See, eg., McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1461, 1470 (1991) ("the government has
the burden of pleading abuse of the writ" defense to second or successive habeas corpus petitions); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 228 n.6 (1988) (state "conceded" absence of procedural
default bar to habeas corpus claim "in both courts below... [and] will not be heard to dispute it
here"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (exhaustion bar is not jurisdictional
and was forfeited because the state failed to raise it in a timely fashion); Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 (1963) ("abuse of the writ" bar is nonjurisdictional and unavailable if not
asserted by state); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 16.2, 23.2b, 24.3, 25.3a, at 374 n.3, § 26.5
(state's burden to raise nonexhaustion, prejudicial-delay, procedural-default, Stone v. Powell,
and successive petition defenses to habeas corpus).
476. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (1989); Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 815-16 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443 (1984); FED. R.
CIv. P. 12(b), 12(h); Sup. Cr. R. 15.1.
477. See supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text.
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tioners be treated alike,4 "8 the Teague plurality and the post-Teague majority
retroactive application to Teague's own unequivocally
repeatedly have given
"'novel' "479 rule.4"' Accordingly, a habeas corpus petitioner who completed
her direct appeal proceedings, for example, in 1987 and, prior to the announcement of Teague, was on the verge of securing habeas corpus relief in
1989 on the basis of decisions announced in 1988 is now liable to be denied
relief, even if that same petitioner's codefendant had the luck to draw a
quicker district judge and to be granted relief on the same claims prior to
Teague.4"' As Judge King wrote in dissent in the Fifth Circuit decision in
Sawyer:
It is indeed ironic that the majority invokes Teague, undoubtedly a new rule, to prevent us from applying Caldwell [a recent
Supreme Court decision]. If any case should be considered as having
established a new rule not retroactively applicable to habeas petitioners whose convictions have become final, it is Teague itself. Had the
majority decided [the petitioner's] case on the basis of the Supreme

Court decisions in existence when Sawyer's case was argued and submitted to this court, the majority opinion would have granted him a
478. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1071-72, 1077-78 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("harm
caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants alike cannot be exaggerated").
479. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1989) (ea band) (quoting
Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990).
480. The Court applied Teague's nonretroactivity rule retroactively not only to Frank
Dean Teague himself, but also to the habeas corpus petitioners in Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2822 (1990); Saffie v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989). See supra
notes 97-100 and accompanying text; see also McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1472-74
(1991) (retroactively applying new and drastically narrower approach to successive habeas
corpus petitions to capitally sentenced petitioner in whose case new rule was announced); id. at
1485 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('The Court's utter indifference to the injustice of retroactively
applying its new, strict-liability standard to this habeas petitioner stands in marked contrast to
this Court's eagerness to protect States from the unfair surprise of 'new rules' that enforce the
constitutional rights of citizens charged with criminal wrongdoing." (citing Butler,Parks, and
Teague)). Because the Teague and McCleskey "new rules" are civil, statutory rules, not rules of
constitutional criminal procedure, see supra note 110, the Court presumedly should apply its
civil retroactivity standards to those innovations. Those standards are in flux. See supra notes
91-100 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, a majority of the Court acknowledges that some
"new" civil rulings may deserve nonretroactive treatment because - as is arguably true of the
new Teague andMcCleskey rules - the rulings violate settled expectations upon which litigants
relied to their detriment. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 4735,
4736-37, 4739 (U.S., June 20, 1991) (plurality opinion); id. at 4739 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 4742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); infira text accompanying notes 484-86.
481. This outcome mirrors exactly the example Justice O'Connor gave of the "unfortunate
disparity in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review" that the Teague
plurality assertedly was endeavoring to avoid. Teague, 109 S. CL at 1072 (between the time the
Court announced Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and ruled Edwards nonretroactive
in Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984), some habeas corpus petitioners secured relief under
Edwards, while others, including Stumes, did not). Petitioners blindsided by Teague include
those in, ag., Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497 (1lth Cir. 1989) (en bane), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct.
3255 (1990); Coleman v. Saflle, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989) (en band), cert. denied, 110 S.

Ct. 1835 (1990).
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new sentencing hearing. The majority instead reaches out to an
opinion rendered by the Supreme Court 16 months after submission
of [petitioner's] case and 8 1/2 years after Sawyer's trial to find a

reason to deny him constitutional protection. That to us is a finality
of sorts, a final and irretrievable absurdity.4 8 2
Yet another irony is that the courts, although not disposed to view

Teague's novelty as a basis for applying that decision nonretroactively to petitioners, already have held the decision's "novelty" sufficient to excuse respondents who failed to raise the nonretroactivity defense in a timely fashion prior

to Teague.483 This retroactive application of Teague against petitioners, but
not against respondents, offends not only the principle that like habeas corpus
petitioners ought to be treated alike but also the even clearer principle that
opposing litigants in the same case ought to be treated alike.
Another irony appears upon consideration of reliance interests of the sort
discussed above.4 84 Prior to the Court's announcement of Teague, criminal
defendants justifiably relied upon the broad availability of habeas corpus re-

view as a sufficient reason for not seeking direct-review certiorari or not raising all potentially "new" claims in their page-constrained certiorari
petitions.4" 5 Teague's retroactive application makes that reasonable reliance
detrimental - in some cases, fatally so. For, by applying Teague retroactively, the Court deprives defendants who forbore raising all available claims

in direct appeal certiorari petitions of any federal review whatsoever of claims
subsequently denominated "new." This attachment of unforeseeable and severely preclusive consequences to defendants' reasonable reliance upon preex-

isting law clearly contravenes the policies behind the habeas corpus statute, as
well as established nonretroactivity notions, and arguably offends
the due pro486
cess and suspension clauses of the United States Constitution.

A final irony involves the juxtaposition of Lewis v. Continental Bank
482. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1305 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting),
aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
483. See supra note 469 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 379-412 and accompanying text.
485. See S. Cr. R. 33.3. In regard to the justifiability of a decision to withhold certain
claims from certiorari petitions because the claims - for example, ones requiring evidentiary
hearings - might more appropriately be litigated in postconviction proceedings, see generally
Spencer v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2276 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);
Schiro v. Indiana, 110 S. Ct. 268, 269 (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
486. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (suspension clause); U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, cl. 3 (due
process clause); see Safle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 n.1 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(due process critique of Court's retroactive application of Teague; critique not addressed by
majority); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1221 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same);
J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 7.2d (general suspension clause analysis); supra notes 370-78 (discussing habeas corpus policies offended by retroactive application of Teague); supra notes 379412 (discussing retroactivity policies offended by retroactive application of Teague); supra notes
424-31 and accompanying text (due process-related analysis). That Teague reached its conclusion in a case in which the decisive issue was not presented on certiorari or briefed by the parties
only increases the unfairness of applying it retroactively to unwitting defendants. See Teague v.
Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1086-94 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Corp.48 7 and the post-Teague decisions in Butler and Parks. All three decisions were announced the same day, and Lewis will forever sit between Butler
and Parks in the pages of the United States Reports. In Butler and Parks,the
majority saw nothing amiss in allowing two men to be executed on the basis of
a nonretroactivity defense of which neither man had any reason to be aware
when his case was pending in the court of appeals.4 88 Contrast the Court's
solicitude for the plaintiff in Lewis, a bank holding company aggrieved because
a Florida official would not process the holding company's application to operate an industrial savings and loan.4 9 While the company's case was still
pending in the court of appeals, Congress passed a statute that mooted the
company's claim for relief. The holding company failed to inform the court of
appeals of the new statute, and the court ruled in the company's favor. After
granting certiorari and reversing on the basis of the new statute, a unanimous
Supreme Court had this to say about the unfairness of dismissing the case and
ruling the company out of court on the basis of the change in law:
Our ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has become
moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment with directions to dismiss.... However, in'instances where the mootness is attributable
to a change in the legalframework governing the case, and where the
plaintiff may have some residualclaim under the new framework that
was understandably not assertedpreviously, our practice is to vacate
the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop the record
4 90
more fully.
Teague's retroactivity ought to be rethought - by Congress, if not by the
courts. To assure prisoners an opportunity to raise all of their federal claims
in at least one federal forum, the decision ought to be restricted to cases not
yet final in the state courts as of February 22, 1989.491 At the least, steps
should be taken to give prisoners in the wake of Teague the same chance the
holding company was given in the wake of Lewis to amend their pleadings and
develop the record in regard to residual theories that the prisoners understandably did not assert before Teague toppled the legal framework that previously defined their cases.
A final retroactivity question involves the application of Teague's nonretroactivity principle to "new rules" of constitutional criminal procedure that
cut back on the rights of criminal defendants and habeas corpus petitioners. 92
As acknowledged in dicta by the lone circuit court to address the issue thus
487. 110 S. Ct. 1249 (1990).
488. See Parks, 110 S. CLt at 1264 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1221

n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Teague was announced on February 22, 1989, after the dates of
the final court of appeals decisions in Butler (December 2, 1988) and Parks(October 25, 1988).
489. Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1252.
490. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added).
491. See supra notes 424-31 and accompanying text; supra note 480.
492. See Butler, 110 S. Ct at 1221 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (raising question whether
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far,49 3 Teague's policy of treating like litigants alike494 impels the conclusion
that new rules cutting back on rights should not be applied retroactively to

postfinal convictions. Any other approach would even further erode habeas
corpus' deterrence policy because it would increase the "incentive" on the part

of state courts to ignore existing constitutional law based on the probability
that some part of that law will be retroactively cut back by the increasingly
large and cohesive conservative majority of the Supreme Court.49 5
VIII.
WHO'S IN CHARGE?: THE CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPEAL

However hopeful the Teague Court may have been that its new nonretroactivity rule would speed habeas corpus cases through the CoUrtS, 4 9 6 the preceding discussion suggests that the innovation's immediate and middle-term
effect will be more, not less, litigation. First, by casting its newest attempt to
cut back on habeas corpus as a defense,49 7 the Court simply creates a new
issue for litigation in most or all cases. The time the parties and courts devote

to this issue will simply add to the time they now spend addressing the merits

along with the exhaustion,4 98 procedural default,4 99 Stone v. Powell,5 0 0 successive petition,50 1 and other defenses that arose out of earlier judicial efforts
to move habeas corpus cases along or to keep them out of the courts altogether." 2 This prediction has particular force in capital cases, in which, ac-

Court intends to apply Teague to decisions cutting back on constitutional criminal procedure
rights).
493. See Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393-94 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1982)) (followed in Singleton v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1395, 1401
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 207 (1989)) (assuming that new rules of constitutional criminal procedure favoring state are subject to Teague rules, but concluding that the rule of
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), is not new because it "'merely has applied settled
precedents to new and different factual situations"' and" 'has not in fact altered that [previous]
rule in any material way' "), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 378 (1989); see also Snethen v. Nix, 885
F.2d 456, 459 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting, but not deciding, question of retroactivity of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which limited petitioner's ability to raise claims in habeas
corpus proceedings that petitioner failed to raise at trial or on appeal), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
3223 (1990).
494. See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 333-47 and accompanying text. But cf Carbray v. Champion, 905
F.2d 314, 315 (10th Cir. 1990) (on rehearing) (withdrawing habeas corpus relief granted petitioner under precedent in effect at time his conviction became final on basis of new decision,
handed down while appellee's petition for rehearing was pending), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 796
(1991).
496. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 9.
497. See supra note 470-77 and accompanying text.
498. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 5.1-5.3, 9.3, 16.2, 13.3, 23.2.
499. See id. §§ 9.4, 24.1-24.6.
500. 428 U.S. 465 (1976); see J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 9.5a, 25.1-25.4.
501. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 9.5b, 26.1-27.4.
502. See, eg., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (revising successive petition defense); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (extending exhaustion defense); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (creating procedural default defense); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (creating defense to fourth amendment claims); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I
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cording to a recent American Bar Association report, "it is asking too much
and may be demanding an ethical violation - to expect an attorney to
forgo a valid.., claim that renders the client's execution illegal" until counsel
°3
"has explored every possible avenue around" defenses to the claim.
Second, as is amply borne out above, the numerous subsidiary issues that
the nonretroactivity doctrine now funnels into most or all habeas corpus cases
promise to be even more complex than the subsidiary issues that, as it is, require hundreds of pages of intricate discussion in habeas corpus treatises covering existing defenses." 4 How long, for example, will it take the courts to
decide which retroactivity issues are and are not "threshold" issues and how
those issues differ from the merits;50 what constitutes a "new rue;"' which
outcomes are available to "reasonable" jurists acting in "good faith" and
which are not;5 ° 7 what difference there is between rules "dictated" by prior
law (which are retroactive) and rules "governed" and "controlled" by prior
law (which are not);50 what constitutes "finality" as a matter of federal and as
a matter of state law, and how the federal and state conceptions interact;"
what it means for the Constitution to set certain behaviors and statuses beyond
the reach of the criminal law, and which behaviors and statuses qualify; 5 1° which rules are "fundamental," which contribute to "accuracy," and
how those two requirements interact with each other and with the Court's
definition of "new;""1 1 how and when the state's tardy invocation of the nonretroactivity bar prevents a court from relying on that bar,5 12 how the courts
should treat the retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
cutting back on constitutional law;s3 and how the courts should distinguish
between new rules cutting back on preexisting rights, new rules expanding
those rights, and new rules revising those rights in ways that help some defendants and harm others?
All in all, therefore, the declaration of a new habeas corpus defense can
only aggravate the conditions that the ABA recently attributed to habeas
corpus defenses already in existence: "lengthy and time-consuming litigation
-

(1963) (refining successive petition defense); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (creating
exhaustion defense). See generally Stidum v. Trickey, 881 F.2d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1989)

("Although the magistrate's analysis of the procedural bar was probably correct, we believe it to
be more expeditious to go to the substance of the matter, violation of the Confrontation Clause,
thus avoiding a review of the quagmire presented by a cause and prejudice analysis."), cert.

denied, 110 S. CL 1151 (1990).
503. REcCOMMENDATiONS OF THE ABA,supra note 145, at 94.
504. See, eg., J.LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §§ 22A.1-28.2; L. YACKLE, POSTcoNVWCnoN
REMEDIES §§ 52-87, 96-100, 150-56 (1981).
505. See supra PartII.
506. See supra Part HIL.
507. See supra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
508. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
509. See supra Part IV.
510. See supra Part V.
511. See id.
512. See supra Part VI.
513. See supra Part VII.
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of threshold questions," "'sisyphean'... procedural" maneuvers, and "'satellite'" proceedings that "prevent the federal courts from reviewing [the merits
of] constitutional claims" and "delay the process of... review." ' 4 Teague,
thus, is less a workable way to speed up habeas corpus proceedings than an
exceedingly effective way to slow them down. All that Teague accomplishes,
therefore, is its second probable purpose: 5 15 to assure - slowly but ever more
surely - that noncapital prisoners convicted in violation of the Constitution
lose even the tiny proportion of habeas corpus actions that they currently
win 51 6 and that capital prisoners convicted and condemned in violation of the
Constitution lose a good deal more of the 40% of the cases in which they
currently prevail.5 17
As this and the Court's other efforts to create new habeas corpus defenses
repeatedly have demonstrated over the last fifteen years,5"" the Court's ability
to limit the number of prisoners (particularly capital prisoners) afforded new
trials, without at the same time extending the length and cost of habeas corpus
proceedings, is severely constrained. Although the Court could simply reverse
most of the rights it has afforded criminal defendants over the past sixty years,
it thus far has been reluctant to do so.51 9 The Court also could nullify the
habeas corpus statute, or at least the series of since-codified 520 decisions leading up to Brown v. Allen,52 and thereby cut off access to constitutional remedies after completion of direct appeal. Although, the Court has tried to do
just that sub silentio via Teague, the need to obscure the extent to which it is
intruding on Congress' prerogatives has forced it to structure what is intended
as a restriction on federal jurisdiction as instead a defense to state liability. As
we have seen, although that artifice works well enough as a means of limiting
relief, it works terribly as a means of streamlining and expediting review.
Teague's clearest lesson, therefore, is that Congress is better placed than
the Court to achieve real habeas corpus reform, because only Congress has the
unfettered ability to transform the statutory structure as a whole. Teague thus
522
presents Congress with three stark and potentially decisive options:
If, on the one hand, Congress, like the Court, wants to see constitutional
rights cut off, then it should repeal the habeas corpus statute. The disastrous
514. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADA, supra note 145, at 94-95.
515. See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text..
516. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.2d, at 23 n.97, § 5.2, at 43 n.33; Faust, Rubenstein
& Yackle, supra note 15, at 681.
517. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
518. See, eg., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976).
519. See, eg., Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990) (reaffirming principle of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Kamisar, supra note 13. Butsee Payne v. Tennessee, 59
U.S.L.W. 4814 (U.S., June 27, 1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)).
520. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988) (discussed supra notes 290-91 and accompanying
text).
521. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see supra note 3.
522. See supra note 145.
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effects that would accompany this act of setting back the clock anywhere from

120 to 600 years 5" are revealed not only by the serious state criminal justice
abuses that continue to be uncovered in habeas corpus proceedings,52 but also
523. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.2b.
524. See, eg., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (jury selection pursuant to district
attorney's deliberate scheme, set forth in handwritten memorandum to jury commissioners, to
underrepresent blacks and women); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (petitioner's competency to be executed not adequately adjudicated; behavior while on death row indicated serious mental disorder); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (grand jury selection process
systematically excluded blacks); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (jury instructions on
intent violated due process requirement that state prove offense beyond reasonable doubt); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (petitioner given life sentence for uttering a "no account"
check for $100 following six minor prior convictions); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
(state-employed psychiatrist's testimony at penalty phase based on petitioner's pretrial state-

ments that were not freely and voluntarily given and were made without counsel or waiver of
counsel); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-American petitioner suffered intentional discrimination in grand jury selection process; only 39% of those summoned for grand
jury service were Mexican-American although that group accounted for 79% of county population); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (police driving petitioner from site of arraignment to jail and aware of petitioner's background as former mental patient obtained confession
by violating promise to counsel not to interrogate petitioner and by delivering an impassioned
speech to the prisoner stating that kidnapping victim was entitled to a "Christian burial");
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (misdemeanor assault charge dismissed by prosecutor
and reified as felony after petitioner successfully appealed conviction on misdemeanor charge);
Buttrum v. Black, 908 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1990) (17-year old woman induced to confess by
psychiatrists who failed to warn her that what she told them could be used as a basis for sentencing her to die; state hired independent psychiatrists to examine petitioner but denied her
resources to hire her own expert; after putting on evidence that petitioner, and not her husband,
was the guiding force in the rape and killing, prosecutor successfully objected to evidence petitioner introduced showing that her husband was the guiding force); Julius v. Jones, 875 F.2d
1520 (1lth Cir. 1989) (blatant prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 258 (1989); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (police withheld fact
that chief prosecution witness, who at trial identified petitioner, a dark-skinned black man, as
the assailant, originally told the police the assailant was white), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033
(1989); Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987) (prosecution suppressed statement of its
most crucial witness corroborating other witnesses' trial testimony favorable to defendant), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir.) (counsel's failure to
discover or seek sentence less than death based on defendant's long and well-documented history of mental disorder and difficult home environment held to be ineffective), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 996 (1986); Brown v. Wainwright 785 F.2d 1457 (1lth Cir. 1986) (state deliberately withheld fact that chief witness against petitioner repeatedly failed polygraph test; petitioner thereafter released from prison after charges dropped); Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.
1985) (defendant convicted and sentenced to death by jury composed almost entirely of friends
of the victims who attended their funeral), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Carter v. Montgomery, 769 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (jury instruction relieved state of burden of proving all
elements of the crime); Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1985) (capitally sentenced
petitioner found to have been incompetent to stand trial; on retrial, after petitioner's sanity was
restored, petitioner was acquitted); Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (state
statute used to punish abrasive but legal speech); House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (1 lit Cir.)
(capitally sentenced petitioner's counsel filed no pretrial motions, sought no defense witnesses,
failed to interview either the petitioner's family or the state's witnesses, did not visit the crime
scene, made no use of possibly exculpatory evidence available from states own scientific tests,
and failed to move for new trial after being presented with strong evidence indicating that victims were alive after last time when petitioner could have been in contact with them), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Fair v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (state trial judge
promised capitally sentenced petitioner that his guilty plea could be withdrawn upon hearing
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by the Court's inability - despite its many recent attempts525 - to render
habeas corpus relief a rarity.
If, on the other hand, Congress, unlike the Court, simply wants to speed
up habeas corpus adjudication, it needs take only two actions: First, it should
repeal Teague, as well as, probably, the exhaustion and procedural default
doctrines, and direct federal courts to move immediately and expeditiously to
the constitutional merits of habeas corpus petitions.52 6 Second, in capital
cases, in which the incarcerated prisoner's otherwise sufficient incentive to secure prompt adjudication of his petition for release or retrial 527 is lacking,
Congress should adopt strict deadlines for filing federal petitions upon the
completion of trial, direct appeal, and such postconviction remedies
as the
528
executed.
being
before
invoke
to
prisoners
capital
states permit
If, on the third hand - the hand that usually wins - Congress prefers to
deal incrementally with the problems Teague tries to solve but instead aggravates, Congress should: (1) above all, undertake some modification of Teague
simply to reclaim Congress' 201-year-old status as the maker of habeas corpus
law in this country;5 29 (2) make clear that federal habeas corpus courts retain
their statutorily given jurisdiction to adjudicate novel constitutional claims; 530
(3) codify a reliance-based interpretation of the "new rule" concept that affords retroactivity to decisions that state and lower courts heretofore had reason to assume were the law or were about to become the law;531 and (4) define
finality so as to assure prisoners one full and fair opportunity to secure federal
his sentence, then refused to withdraw guilty plea, on petitioner's request, after sentencing petitioner to die); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (trial counsel failed to challenge manifestly unconstitutional jury-selection procedures for fear of upsetting the trial judge),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983); Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1980)
(prosecutor suppressed corrected statement of crucial witness and witness's psychiatric records;
petitioner (a civil rights activist) denied opportunity to cross-examine critical prosecution witnesses about special treatment witnesses received); Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (police produced two vastly different confessions allegedly given by mentally deficient
petitioner during a 42-hour period of interrogation without counsel; exculpatory version appeared voluntary and to be in defendant's words; inculpatory version was involuntary and in
prose beyond defendant's ken), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Freeman v. Georgia, 599
F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980) (police detective knowingly concealed whereabouts of eyewitness to crime, visited her frequently before and near time of trial,
and married her one year after trial); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 2.2d, at 23 n.95 (collecting
information on apparently innocent prisoners freed recently as a result of habeas corpus
proceedings).
525. See, eg., cases cited supra note 502.
526. See RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA, supra note 145, at 94.
527. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 21.lb.
528. See id., § 2.3 (Supp. 1991) (discussing capital prisoners' disincentive to file quickly
and proposals for 60, 180, and 365 day statutes of limitations on filing capital habeas corpus
petitions).
529. Congress included a habeas corpus remedy in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and has
exercised responsibility over the writ ever since. See id., § 2.2; see also supra notes 374-78 and
accompanying text.
530. See supra Part II.
531. See supra notes 379-412 and accompanying text.
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adjudication of their right to relief under new rules of constitutional law. 5 32
532. See supra note 425-31 and accompanying text.
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